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Abstract
This thesis contains three essays in empirical corporate finance. In the first
chapter I show how cash constrained firms take actions that improve their short-
term liquidity even if they hurt long-term profitability. In government procurement
auctions, constrained firms have incentives to overbid because winning a contract
improves their short-term cash flows. However, overbidding results in lower long-
term profits. I provide an unbiased estimate of the drop in performance of winners
following an award by measuring performance relative to companies which placed
second in the auction. I show that financial constraints predict aggressive bidding,
that firms overbid less in auctions that require larger deposits, and that winning
long-term contracts causes a short-term increase and subsequent decline in prof-
itability. My results offer a non-behavioural explanation for the winner’s curse.
In the second chapter, co-authored with Krzysztof Kalisiak, we investigate how
access to local financing supports economic development. Firms with easier access to
financing respond to a future improvement in investment opportunities at the time
the improvement is announced. Other firms catch up only after the improvement
and associated cash flows are realized. We exploit variation caused by infrastructure
development in the oil industry that exogenously affects firms in only one region and
use nearby regions as control. The event creates a gap between announcement and
realization dates, which eliminates the problem of reverse causality and highlights
the role of financial constraints.
In the third chapter, I examine firm behaviour after major R&D breakthroughs.
I use the example of pharmaceutical companies that carry out last-stage clinical
trials for new oncology drugs. Success is defined as Food and Drug Administration
approval to market new drugs. Companies that obtain approval increase capital
expenditure. However, there is no change to their research and development ex-
pense, cash holdings, or short-term investments. This supports the hypothesis that
innovative firms follow long-term strategies and finalising drug development, even
though infrequent, does not radically change their behaviour.
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Chapter 1
Strategic overbidding in
procurement auctions?
1.1 Introduction
The impact of financial constraints on firm behaviour is a central question in
corporate finance. Most studies focus on the effects of liquidity constraints on to-
tal investment (for example, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988); Kaplan and
Zingales (1997); Whited (1992)). However, financial constraints might also distort
firms’ objectives from long-term value maximization to short-term survival. There
is little evidence on how far constrained firms are ready to go compromising future
payoffs to secure short-term liquidity.
In this paper I document that winners of government procurement auctions per-
form poorly and propose a novel explanation that is based on this intertemporal
trade-off. I test the hypothesis that cash constrained firms strategically overbid
to improve short-term liquidity. Winning a procurement contract ensures short-
term cash inflows, and submitting a low-price offer increases the chance of winning.1
Overbidding, however, creates losses in the longer term.
I test this hypothesis against two alternative explanations. Firstly, firms might
1Regular payments for the work performed are standard for government contracts in many
countries (for example, U.S., Germany, Poland), including my setting.
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bid optimally ex ante but perform poorly ex post because of unexpected negative
shocks that hit the economy after the award. I refer to this as a bad luck story.
Secondly, common value auctions might suffer from the winner’s curse. The win-
ner’s curse explanation posits that firms do not bid optimally because they do not
account for the fact that the most optimistic agent wins the auction.
I start by measuring the change in performance of firms winning government con-
tracts. Using data on procurement auctions for road construction in Poland from
2010 to 2014, I compare firms that ranked first (winners) with firms that ranked
second (runners-up) in a competitive auction. Looking at firms that chose to partic-
ipate in the same auction and were similarly ranked reduces selection bias, as these
companies should be comparable in terms of their abilities and availability to carry
out the project. Expertise, cost efficiency and spare capacity impact both the offer
price and subsequent performance, but are otherwise unobservable. Closely-ranked
firms are more likely to be similar when the auction is more competitive, that is,
when there are many participants. I support my identification assumption by com-
paring the observable characteristics of winners and runners-up before the auction.
I do not find significant differences in terms of profits, assets, liabilities, solvency,
current ratio, profit margins and other performance measures. This holds even when
I account for the fact that some firms both won and placed second in an auction in
the same year and exclude such observations from the control sample.
I show that the difference in the performance change between winners and
runners-up in the two years following an auction is negative and amounts to a
drop of 2.30% in the profit margin. This decline in performance of winners and
its significance is stable across different subsamples, when data are collapsed at the
firm-year level, and when observations are matched on firm size, auction impact,
and award year.2 Deteriorating performance after winning an auction suggests that
companies overbid by submitting underpriced offers.
In the second part of the paper, I investigate the cause of this behaviour. First,
I try to understand selection into aggressive bidding. I compare the pre-award char-
2The auction impact is measured as auction size relative to firm size.
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acteristics of aggressive bidders (winners and runners-up) with a matched sample of
other construction companies. I find that low cash holdings, low cash flow growth,
and several other measures, which might be associated with financial constraints,
predict aggressive bidding. These results suggest that firms ready to sign under-
priced contracts are financially constrained.
Next, I examine how the profitability of auction winners and runners-up evolves
over time. In my setting, government contracts improve short-term liquidity because
they ensure regular (usually monthly) payments for the work performed. If liquidity
constrained firms aim for short-term gains, they should perform well shortly after
the award. I demonstrate that firms winning long-term contracts experience a tem-
porary increase in both profits and cash flows in the award year. With annual data,
I cannot exclude the possibility that pre-award events underlie this positive change.
However, for contracts signed at the end of a year, the positive impact extends to the
year following the award. This is not the case for contracts signed at the beginning
of a year and suggests that there is a link between the temporary improvement in
firm performance and the auction resolution. This pattern confirms that firms have
incentives to overbid and sign new projects. By doing so, companies front-load cash
flows because early payments are received at the cost of profits made in the future.
I further investigate the heterogeneity in bidding behaviour caused by the dif-
ferences in bid guarantees required in auctions. A bid guarantee is a deposit that a
firm has to pay in order to participate in the bidding. It is re-paid unless a firm wins
but refuses to sign the contract. Upfront deposits may discourage companies facing
liquidity issues. I find that the decline in winners’ performance is driven mostly by
auctions with low deposit requirements. This is consistent with the idea that cash
constraints underlie aggressive bidding and the subsequent drop in profitability.
The phenomenon of underperforming after auction wins held during the period
from 2010 to 2014. Winners of auctions resolved in 2008 and 2009 perform better.
This aligns with the intuition that auction winners should not consistently overbid
in equilibrium. The 2008–2009 period is the end of the rapid development of the Pol-
ish construction market following Poland’s accession to the European Union. These
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years are characterised by an ample supply of government procurement contracts,
while the period from 2010 to 2014 is marked by lower demand for construction
services. It is, therefore, likely that many more construction companies found them-
selves financially constrained in the latter period, which can explain their more
aggressive bidding behaviour in procurement auctions. This suggests that how ag-
gressively firms bid and to what extent they sacrifice long-term outcomes depends
on external economic conditions that vary over time.
I also test alternative hypotheses that could explain the poor performance of
auction winners. Firms’ profits might deteriorate due to bad luck, that is, firms
might bid optimally but are hit by a negative post-award shock. I consider two
potential shocks: the financial crisis and a local cost shock. Neither can explain the
results. The bad performance of auction winners from 2010 to 2014 is unlikely to
be related to the financial crisis in the EU in 2009 as Poland experienced only a
mild slowdown around that time. Aggregate demand was additionally boosted by
increased infrastructure investments for the upcoming European Football Champi-
onships in 2012. I also do not find evidence of survivorship bias, which would have
to be present in this scenario because a macroeconomic shock inevitably affects both
winners and runners-up. To assess whether my results might be due to a local cost
shock, I examine the developments on the natural aggregates (crushed rock, sand
and gravel) market in Poland. The biggest increase in production was recorded in
2011, which suggests that there was high demand for building materials and possibly
an increase in prices of natural aggregates in previous years. This is inconsistent
with the fact that the least profitable government contracts were signed in 2012.
Finally, I examine whether the underperformance of auction winners might re-
flect the winner’s curse. The winner’s curse hypothesis is a standard explanation
of negative payoffs in common value auctions. According to this hypothesis, agents
do not account for the fact that the most optimistic bidder wins. In the context
of government procurement, the cheapest offer gets the award but the price is on
average below the project cost and the winning firm incurs losses. If the winner’s
curse explains my results, then firm’s ability to bid optimally must be time-varying,
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as the decline in winners’ performance is not observed during 2008–2009. This might
be the case if, for example, the optimal bidding strategies depend on experience and
a changing economic environment, as proposed by Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989).
They claim that firms’ bidding improves with experience, but changes in external
conditions may distort the learning process and create a need for re-adjustment.
Their story implies that more experienced companies should perform better. It is,
however, inconsistent with my results because my sample comprises of mature firms,
with the majority over 10 years old. I also do not find a link between firm’s bidding
experience and performance after winning.
My paper adds to the large literature on firms’ financial constraints. The anal-
ysis of behaviour of constrained firms started with the work of Fazzari, Hubbard,
and Peteresen (1988) and has been continued in many studies (for example, Hoshi,
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991); Kaplan and Zingales (1997); Lamont (1997)).
Liquidity demand is directly examined by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004)
who find that financially constrained firms have a higher propensity to save cash.
These studies, however, do not emphasize that projects have different impacts on
short-term and long-term profits.
Busse (2002) describes behaviour similar to overbidding in the context of airlines.
She finds that the poor financial condition of an airline increases the probability of
starting a price war. Phillips and Sertsios (2013) reach the same conclusions and ad-
ditionally show that airlines in financial distress are ready to compromise on quality.
The drop in quality induced by the willingness to secure cash flows for debt repay-
ments is also documented by Matsa (2010). All these findings are consistent with
the strategic overbidding hypothesis I propose. My results additionally imply that
constrained firms aim to improve short-term cash flows even when it hurts long-term
payoffs. I also directly measure the drop in profits accepted as a trade-off.
The idea of the liquidity-profitability trade-off also appears in the theoretical
predictions of Garicano and Steinwender (2016). Based on the work of Aghion et
al. (2010) they build a model in which liquidity constrained firms give up future
expected payoffs to increase the probability of surviving. The difference with my
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setting is that firms do not substitute long-term investment with short-term invest-
ment, but sign underpriced contracts and front-load cash flows from new projects.
Also, it is not necessarily in response to a negative shock. Firms aim to improve
liquidity even when they are not faced with the risk of immediate bankruptcy. This
last feature is in line with the model of Maksimovic and Titman (1991).
The idea of short-termism, which is inherent in the trade-off I discuss, puts my
paper close to studies of managerial myopia. Optimal contracts with managerial
short-termism are examined in several articles. Varas (2017) and Edmans et al.
(2012) provide examples of models in which managers improve today’s performance
by compromising future outcomes. I show similar myopia at a different level be-
cause my sample consists of medium-sized, unlisted companies that do not face
open manager-shareholder conflicts. It proves that short-termism pressure exists in
private firms, even though it may be weaker than that experienced by listed com-
panies (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
My analysis also relates to the empirical auctions literature which documents
that winners incur losses following an award. Such underperformance was inter-
preted as a sign of the winner’s curse in the context of oil leases (Capen, Clapp,
and Campbell (1971)), baseball players’ market (Blecherman and Camerer (1998)),
real estate (Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992)) or initial public offering underpricing
(Rock (1986)).3 I also document the poor performance of auction winners, but I
propose that flawed bidding strategies are not the only plausible explanation. My
hypothesis, therefore, provides a new perspective on a well-known result. It might
also explain why some existing empirical studies do not find evidence of the winner’s
curse (for example, Thiel (1988)).
My paper additionally makes a methodological contribution. The theory distin-
guishes common value auctions, in which an auctioned object has the same value for
all bidders, and private value auctions, in which each bidder has his own valuation
of the object. In reality, auctions contain both common and private value elements.
3Kagel and Levin (2002, chap. 1 and 2) provide a comprehensive summary of relevant empirical
work on the winner’s curse.
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In the case of government contracts, a common value element depends on, for ex-
ample, the type and scope of the project, while an individual value element reflects
each firm’s ability. Modelling both components significantly complicates theoretical
considerations.4 By looking at closely-ranked firms, I aim to eliminate the private
factor. This provides a simple approach to testing hypotheses regarding common
value auctions.
My methodology also adds to the mergers and acquisitions literature where find-
ing an appropriate benchmark for the evaluation of acquirers has proved challeng-
ing. Some authors consider failed mergers (for example, Savor and Lu (2009); Seru
(2014)). My approach is similar to the idea of Malmendier, Moretti, and Peters
(2018). They compare winners of merger contests with other contest participants.
My setting has several advantages. First, I can clearly define similar firms and
competitive contests because I have an official firm ranking. Second, I look only at
closely ranked firms. Third, I exploit a direct link between winning and profitability
that relies on the offer price.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 1.2 I present the setting and
datasets. Section 1.3 describes the methodology and reviews identification assump-
tions. Section 1.4 documents the drop in winners’ performance. In section 1.5 I test
the strategic overbidding hypothesis. Sections 1.6 and 1.7 discuss alternative expla-
nations. In section 1.8 I present several robustness checks. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 Setting and data
1.2.1 Road construction in Poland
The Polish economy is ranked eight in the European Union by size5 and is the
largest one among countries from the former Soviet bloc. Construction accounts for
4A model of an auction with both common and individual components appears in, for example,
Hong and Shum (2002).
5Source: World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=PL)
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9.5% of gross domestic product.6 Contracts for road construction are mostly pro-
vided by the government. The institution responsible for procurement is called the
General Directorate for National Roads and Highways (GDDKiA). Poland provides
a good setting for the analysis based on recent data because it was not severely af-
fected by the crisis spreading from the United States into Europe in 2008 and 2009.
Apart from a strong internal market, the upcoming European Football Champi-
onships in 2012 helped the country to navigate away from the recession because the
preparations involved many infrastructural investments.
Government procurement for road construction in Poland is regulated by Public
Procurement Law as of 29 January 2004. The law ensures equal treatment of all
bidders and transparency of the whole process. These rules provide a foundation
for the whole analysis by ensuring there is no obvious selection bias in my sam-
ple. In the most popular auction modes firms submit sealed offers after the auction
announcement.7 Offers are confidential until the resolution day when they are pub-
licly opened and undergo evaluation. It eliminates collusion and corruption. Points
are awarded according to the clear criteria that are announced in advance. The
offer with the highest cumulative score wins the auction.8 Deadlines for submission,
resolution, and signing the contract are fixed and also available beforehand. Any
company may participate in a government procurement auction.9 A deposit (bid
guarantee) of 0.5%–3% of the estimated contract size may be required to guarantee
an offer is serious and binding.
Criteria for awarding points can include price, promised deadlines or length of
a granted guarantee. I analyse only procurement for construction because price is
the main determinant of the winner in these auctions. Even with other criteria, the
6Source: My own calculation based on 2017 data from the Central Statistical Office, quarterly
national accounts of gross domestic product 2013–2017, pp. 37, Table 2; output in 2013–2017,
current prices.
7These modes are called limited and unlimited auctions.
8Sometimes auctions comprise of several tasks, and firms may submit only partial offers for
some of the tasks. Since winners and runners-up are not clearly defined in such auctions I do not
include them in my analysis.
9In a limited mode, the authorities may pre-select suppliers to limit the number of bidders.
Pre-selection criteria are also known in advance, so this two-step procedure does not affect the
competitiveness of a process or the equality of potential participants.
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weight imposed on price is such that it outweighs everything else. Also, offers vary
little in other dimensions. Such a setting provides a one-to-one link between price,
ranking place, and winning.
Each offer contains price quotes for the whole work itemized in the specification.
Only final price matters for the offer evaluation, but quotes for different work stages
are relevant for payments. Once a company begins construction, it regularly submits
(usually at the end of a month) payment claims for the work performed and receives
payments according to how it is priced in the offer. What is important, Polish gov-
ernment does not delay payments. These rules have two important implications for
my analysis. First, firms that sign government contracts receive almost immediate
cash inflows. Second, different work stages can be differently priced. Specifically,
firms can impose high prices on the initial work so that early payments are relatively
higher than payments received in the end.10
While it is possible to front-load future payments, it is not possible to renegoti-
ate the overall offer price because The Public Procurement Law does not allow any
significant changes to the contract signed between authorities and a firm. Submitted
offers are binding, and firms cannot expect to recoup losses during negotiations later
on.
1.2.2 Auctions data
The data about available and already assigned government contracts for road
construction in Poland are published on the website of the General Directorate for
National Roads and Highways (GDDKiA). These data document the whole bidding
process, ensuring transparency and preventing corruption in public auctions. The
dataset is published in Polish and contains detailed information about contractual
requirements and obligations, winning criteria, participants, and the value of the
offers and deadlines. The first entries come from the end of 2005.
The minimum set of information I require to insert an auction in the sample
10According to the practitioners I talked to, it is common to put high margins on tasks that are
done early to ensure quick cash inflow to the firm.
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includes the year of the award, the name of the winning firm and the runner-up,
the prices of the top two offers, and the number of auction participants. These data
are rarely missing, so my sample covers almost all contracts provided by GDDKiA.
Appendix 1.12.1 describes the data collection process in details.
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics of auctions resolved from 2008 to 2014.
The summary includes both competitive and non-competitive auctions to provide a
background description of the investments available to construction firms in these
years. During that time, over 3,000 public auctions took place for infrastructure
construction work in that period. The median winning offer amounts to PLN 0.71
million and lasts a little over 7 months. However, contract sizes and lengths are
widely variable. On average, four competitors bid for each contract.
Figure 1.1 presents characteristics of auctions by year. The number of auctions
initiated by the government is relatively stable until 2013, at which point, the num-
ber drops. This time period coincides with the completion of preparations for the
European Football Championships that took place in 2012. However, the overall
amount of work offered does not drop drastically but falls steadily over years. Com-
petition increases over time and in 2014 on average there is one more participant
in each auction compared to 2008. Mean price varies a lot over the years but this
measure is sensitive to the presence of big infrastructure investment projects. Ven-
tures like building the motorway Autostrada A4 are not undertaken every year and
are also likely to crowd out smaller investments.
1.2.3 Financial data and merged sample
I use financial data on Polish firms included in the international database of Bu-
reau van Dijk Orbis, which provides extensive data on firms’ financials and history.
I evaluate the coverage of Polish firms by looking at the statistics from the Polish
Central Statistical Office (GUS). For 2015, Orbis lists 1.539 million Polish firms,
whereas the Central Statistical Office records 1.914 million firms. At the end of the
sample, around 80% of Polish firms are covered in the Orbis database. This percent-
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age is smaller in the beginning of the sample and amounts to 55%. The coverage
is better for bigger companies, which are more likely to compete for government
contracts, especially in bigger auctions with more participants.
The accounting data in Orbis are available for the 10 most recent years and cover
the period from 2006 to 2016. However, for years 2006–2007 I have only a limited set
of variables. My sample assumes a five-year observation window centred on auction
awards. This allows me to study auctions resolved from 2010 to 2014 using a wider
set of variables or auctions resolved from 2008 to 2014 based on a limited set of
variables. I focus on public auctions resolved from 2010 to 2014 because it was a
period of relative stability in the construction industry.
I merge the data sources based on firm’s name, city, and legal form. The merg-
ing is successful for 88.7% of the observations and 79.8% of firms and does not vary
depending on the auction award year. Appendix 1.12.1 provides more details about
the merged sample.
1.3 Empirical strategy
1.3.1 Identification
The main idea underlying my empirical analysis is to compare performance of
procurement auction winners and runners-up around the award year. Firms that
participate in the same auction and are ranked at the top close to each other are
likely to be similar in terms of abilities, investment opportunities, capacity and
bidding strategy. The auction award exposes some firms to treatment. I employ
a difference-in-differences regression at the firm-auction level centred on the award
year to identify the causal effect of winning a procurement auction. The baseline
specification is:
yijt = βPostPostt + βWinWinij + βddPostt ×Winij + AuctionGroupFEg(j) +
+Y earFEf(j,t) + ijt, (1.1)
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where yijt is performance of firm i that participates in auction j. It is measured
at time t relative to the award year, where t runs from −2 to 2. The parameter of
interest is denoted as βdd and captures the causal effect of winning an auction on
firm performance after the award compared with performance of runners-up. The
dummy Winij identifies auction winners. Companies that both won and placed
second in an auction in a given year are treated because winning any contract af-
fects firm performance. The variable Postt distinguishes the pre-award period from
the post-award period. Ideally, I would introduce auction fixed effects and analyse
the within-auction variation between winners and runners-up following the award.
In practice, however, not every auction has a winner - runner-up pair because of
missing financial data or because the runner-up won another auction and became
treated. Therefore I combine auctions into small groups based on the award year and
firm size, and introduce auction group fixed effects AuctionGroupFEg(j). The main
specification has 100 auction groups based on the five resolution years and twenty
size demi-deciles. I exclude few groups with only winners or only runners-up. In the
following paragraph I discuss the impact of this adjustment on identification. Year
fixed effects (Y earFEf(j,t)) depend on the auction award year and the period around
the award. They control for the overall industry cyclicality and are included because
auctions are resolved in different years. Standard errors are robust and clustered at
the auction group level. The results are robust to alternative specifications, which
are discussed in detail in Section 1.8.
The identification relies on the assumption that the dummy Win is not corre-
lated with firms’ abilities and investment opportunities. To ensure it is satisfied, I
consider only competitive auctions with at least three participants and focus on the
winners and the closest competitors (runners-up). In the competitive environment,
firms bidding for the same contract and ranked close to each other should be com-
parable in terms of the capacity and abilities to fulfil the contract. I measure the
treatment effect within a group of similar auctions, so to validate my identification
I have to make a stronger claim. I assume that firms bidding for similar contracts
and ranking at the top are comparable. To identify similar auctions I control for
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auction size and resolution year. Controlling for size is crucial because firm’s ability
to carry out a construction project is mainly determined by the size of the contract.
In the Appendix (Table A.2, Appendix 1.12.2) I present the results based on winner
- runner-up pairs with auction fixed effects.
Another identification challenge arises because some firms participate in several
auctions every year. The decision about participation is endogenous, and firms
which participate in many auctions are more likely to be treated because of my
definition of the control group. The causal interpretation relies on the assumption
that participation is not correlated with worse performance. One of the concerns
is that bigger firms (with a bigger capacity) participate in auctions more often and
hence appear in the treatment group more often. If size affects performance in my
observation period, then the documented effect would arise due to selection bias. To
address this issue, I match auction participants based on size, auction impact, and
auction year.11 The second concern is that firms become more desperate with each
lost auction. It would create selection bias with desperate, worse-performing firms
appearing more frequently in the treatment group. However, I do not find evidence
that likelihood of winning increases after several lost auctions. Another concern
is that firms stop participating when they get better outside options. These firms
are more likely to be in the control group because frequent participation increases
the likelihood of treatment. In fact, firms which participate in only one auction
do not perform better. Table A.3 in Appendix 1.12.2 includes the estimates of a
regression controlling for one-time participation. Furthermore, outside options are
limited and involve non-competitive (less popular) contracts, local contracts smaller
in size, or rare private contracts. Finally, to address any other concerns arising
due to endogenous participation I perform two robustness tests in which the link
between participation and treatment is broken. I run the regression on firms that
participated only once in a given year. I also collapse the data at the firm-year level
and introduce non-binary treatment intensity, which depends on sizes of won and
lost contracts.
11The auction impact is measured as auction size relative to firm size.
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The conclusions do not change if not winning any auction during in a given year
signals a bad company. Such a story is against the idea of losing winners, and if it
is true, then my estimates provide a lower bound of the magnitude of the decline in
profitability of auction winners.
My primary performance measure is profit margin, which is defined as earnings
before tax over sales. This measure has several advantages. Firstly, it is a scaled
measure that facilitates a comparison of companies of different sizes. Secondly, it is
naturally linked to the bidding process because prices offered by firms are essentially
summed cost estimates and margins. Thirdly, and finally, from the practical point of
view, profit margin is a relatively well-populated variable in my dataset. Other mea-
sures I consider are return on assets (EBT), calculated as earnings before tax over
total assets, and return on assets (NI), calculated as net income over total assets.
As the award may affect assets, I construct two more measures: return on assets
(EBT, pre-award assets), and return on assets (NI, pre-award assets), in which I
divide profits by average assets of a firm in two years before the auction award. I rely
on earnings before tax as a profit measure because Polish construction firms tend
to lease and not buy machinery. Lease payments constitute a predictable cost that
should be accounted for in the offer submitted in the bidding process and included
later in profit calculations. Table A.4 in Appendix 1.12.2 presents the basic results
based on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).
Running a regression at the firm-auction level has several advantages. Doing so
allows a direct comparison of top ranking firms and the inclusion of auction group
fixed effects. It also assigns more importance to companies that won several con-
tracts in a given year. Finally, it does not require taking a stand on how important
a particular auction for a particular company is, which may be difficult for firms
submitting joint offers.
Most firms appear in my sample at most few times. However, a few outliers
reappear dozens of times. In order to ensure that my sample of firms is represen-
tative and results are not driven by a small pool of outliers, I drop firms that rank
at the top of the auction ranking more than 40 times in the relevant period. It
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coincides with dropping five big companies that also tend to participate in smaller
auctions. Figure 1.2 presents how often firms appear at the top of the competitive
auction ranking in the refined sample. Analogical figure based on the raw sample is
in the Appendix 1.12.2 (Figure A.2). I test alternative refinements regarding firm
participation in Section 1.8.3.
1.3.2 Firm characteristics
The comparability of firms that rank first and second in an auction should be
reflected in the observables. A significant imbalance would suggest that despite the
outlined intuition winners are systematically different. Such differences may raise
concerns whether time effects for the treated and control companies are indeed the
same. Table 1.2 presents the average firm characteristics and performance measures
in the two years before auction awards. To ensure extreme values do not obscure
the summary statistics, I winsorize the data at the 0.1% level.
The last two columns present the results of the t-test on differences in means be-
tween winners and runners-up. The runners-up sample does not include firms that
placed both first and second in an auction in a given year. None of the variables
in the t-test yields a significant difference. The variability between firms is, how-
ever, huge and the differences between coefficients raise concerns even though they
are statistically insignificant. The disparities are mostly observed in the variables
expressed in levels, and not in ratios. This finding suggests there may be a weak
size effect in my sample, and the control group consists of smaller firms. This pos-
sibility was already mentioned in the previous section. The size effect undermines
the conclusions if bigger firms on average perform worse after winning a government
contract compared to small firms. Then proper identification requires controlling
for differences in the firm size. To address this concern, I repeat the analysis on
the matched sample. I match observations on firm size, auction impact and auction
award year. Accounting for the auction impact is particularly relevant for big firms,
for which the influence of small contracts may be blurred by other factors. The
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timing of the award is important because the construction industry is cyclical.
1.4 Winning by losing
I find that firm performance significantly deteriorates after winning a competitive
procurement auction compared with firms ranked right below the winner. Perfor-
mance is measured by profit margin and return on assets. Such results suggest that
firms overbid in government procurement auctions. The conclusions do not change
when I analyse the matched sample controlling for firm size, auction impact, and
award year.
1.4.1 Performance of winners after auctions
According to the theory of common value auctions, a company which bids opti-
mally will not on average incur losses. The optimal bid has to account for the fact
that, given cost efficiency, there is a trade-off between the margins a company can
demand and the likelihood of winning. While putting everything at stake of winning
may drive profits down until they are equal to profits from alternative investments,
under optimal strategy profitability cannot go below that threshold. The threshold
may be close to zero, especially in a setting where there is one main supplier of con-
tracts. However, unless companies set more complicated objectives than long-term
profit maximization, government contract winners should not do worse than their
competitors.
Figure 1.3 presents a simple argument that the above economic intuition does
not apply in my setting. The figure shows the average profit margins of winners
and runners-up in competitive auctions for road construction. The roughly parallel
behaviour of winners and runners-up diverges after the auction award and winners’
performance deteriorates. This finding motivates the more rigorous econometric
analysis that follows.
The regressions in this section are estimated based on Equation 1.1. Table 1.3
summarises the results. I find a strong, negative effect of winning a competitive gov-
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ernment auction on company’s performance in the two years following the award.
Profit margins drop on average by 2.30% in the post-period relative to profit mar-
gins earned by companies that placed second in the bidding process. These results
are confirmed by other profit measures. Return on assets based on earnings before
tax and net income drop by 4.39% and 4.62%, respectively. The fall in return on
assets scaled by pre-award assets is slightly smaller, but also significant.
Poor performance of firms that we describe as winners is puzzling. My results
indicate that it is winning a new contract that causes the deterioration in prof-
itability. Contracts signed upon winning in a competitive procurement process are
underpriced. As the contractual price is directly linked to the bid submitted by a
winner, it implies that firms overbid.
There is a concern that my results partially capture the marginal effect. Stan-
dard economic theory suggests that a firm doing many projects chooses first the
most profitable ones. As my treatment group includes firms winning several auc-
tions in a year, their average profitability could relatively fall due to decreasing
productivity of capital. My setting, however, is more complicated because there is
only one supplier of contracts, and firms do not have a variety of projects to choose
from. Theoretically, to distinguish the average and the marginal effect I would have
to look at the return on capital employed with and without the contract, but these
values are unobservable. I briefly address this issue in Section 1.8.3, where I focus
on the number of auctions in which a company participates each year.
1.4.2 Results in the matched sample
One of the main identification concerns mentioned in Section 1.3.1 refers to the
fact that firm performance and treatment status are correlated because of the selec-
tion bias related to the firm size. Bigger firms can carry out more projects at the
same time and participate in auctions more often. This positively affects their prob-
ability of treatment. Firms’ characteristics discussed in Section 1.3.2 also suggest
that there might be a size effect in my sample. To alleviate the concern that the
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results from the previous section capture the heterogeneity in firm performance re-
lated to the firm size and not the impact of auction winning, I evaluate performance
based on the matched sample. I collapse the data at the firm-year level and match
firms using the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)). Variables under-
lying the conditional probability of treatment include firm size, auction impact, and
the auction award year. Collapsing the data helps capturing the overall situation of
a firm in a given year and automatically prohibits matching a company with itself.
The exact matching methodology and estimation algorithm I employ were pro-
posed by Ho et al. (2007, 2007b). I measure firm size by average total assets in
the two years before an auction award. The auction impact is defined as auction
size over firm size one year before the award. The auction size is measured by the
price offered by the winner. I enforce exact matching on the auction year. I apply a
logit model to estimate the conditional probability of treatment based on the listed
covariates. I discard treated observations that fall outside support and match with
replacement. Following Austin (2011), I specify the maximum distance between
the two observations that could be potential pairs not to exceed 0.2 of a standard
deviation of the distance measure (logit of a propensity score). Distribution of the
propensity score can be found in the Appendix 1.12.2 (Figure A.3).
The regressions and tests performed on the matched sample have one weakness.
As pointed out by Abadie and Imbens (2016), standard errors should account for
the fact that the propensity score used in the matching procedure is itself estimated.
I do not introduce any correction for propensity score estimation, which may create
a bias in the obtained estimates.
In the first test on the matched sample, I compare the average performance of
winners and runners-up using the t-test. I average the pre- and post-award values
and compare the changes over time. Table 1.4 presents the results of the t-test. The
difference between the average performance of winners and runners-up before and
after the auction is negative and significant. Profitability of all companies falls but
the drop in the case of winners is stronger.
In the second step, I run two regressions on the matched sample. The first
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specification represents a weighted regression:
yikt = βPostPostt + βWinWinik + βddPostt ×Winik + FirmFEi
+Y earFEf(k,t) + ikt. (1.2)
yikt is the performance of firm i, which participates in an auction in year k. Like
in the baseline specification (Equation 1.1), t measures the periods relative to the
award, Winik identifies winners, and Postt distinguishes the pre-award years form
the post-award years. The parameter of interest is denoted βdd, and captures the
causal effect of winning an auction on firm performance after the award compared
to the performance of runners-up. I include firm and year fixed effects. Weighting
reflects the matching stage and ensures the balance in firm size and auction impact
between treatment and control groups. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level.
The second regression includes fixed effects (PairFEp) to identify pairs of matched
observations:
yipt = βPostPostt + βWinWinip + βddPostt ×Winip + PairFEp +
+Y earFEf(p,t) + ipt. (1.3)
yipt is the performance of firm i from pair p. Standard errors are clustered at the
pair level.
Table 1.5 summarises the estimation results for both approaches. In line with
the t-test results, the impact of an auction award is negative and significant. The
average drop in profit margin amounts to −2.5%. This number is very close to the
estimates of the main regressions summarised in Table 1.3. Even if there is a size
effect, the fact that treated observations are on average bigger does not affect the
conclusions about firm performance following an auction win.
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1.5 Main hypothesis
Poor performance of auction winners suggests that firms overbid in government
procurement auctions. In this section, I propose and test a novel explanation of
these results. Financially constrained firms intentionally bid aggressively and sub-
mit underpriced offers that generate losses in the long term. They compromise
future payoffs aiming to improve their cash flow position in the short term. It is
possible because the contracts I consider ensure regular payments. Polish govern-
ment payments are rarely delayed because in order to start procurement procedures
authorities need to arrange in advance resources for the project. It is true for the
Polish government and it is also a standard characteristics of procurement in many
other countries.12 In addition, according to the evidence of practitioners, contracts
are often more profitable in the beginning because firms can differently price tasks
itemized in the specification. Namely, they can set higher margins on the tasks done
in the very beginning. Manipulating margins does not lower the chances of signing a
contract because offer evaluation depends only on the final price. Regular payments
and possibility of cash flow front-loading provide incentives for firms to start new
projects even when they are unprofitable overall.
If the hypothesis is correct, firms that overbid are more financially constrained.
Overbidding and front-loading cash flows also should be profitable in the very begin-
ning, especially if firms receive first payments calculated based on higher margins.
Finally, the decline in performance should be weaker in auctions with high bid guar-
antees. The requirement to pay an upfront deposit may discourage most constrained
firms that have the strongest incentives to overbid. I analyse these three implications
to test whether the strategic overbidding hypothesis is a plausible explanation.
1.5.1 Cash constrained firms overbid
In the first test I check whether cash-poor firms are more likely to bid more ag-
gressively. I compare pre-award financial constraints measures of aggressive bidders
12However, it is not true everywhere (for example, Brazil).
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and other companies. Compared to the first stage of the empirical analysis I shift
the focus from the two firms at the top of the procurement auction ranking to the
whole population of construction firms in Poland.
I define aggressive bidders as firms which ranked first or second in an auction
in a given year. It is natural to assume that aggressive bidders rank at the top
in the bidding process. However, aggressive bidding does not necessarily guarantee
that a bidder wins because more than one aggressive bidder may be present in an
auction. My definition is in line with the previously stated assumption that winners
and runners-up are similar (also in their bidding strategies) and their treatment /
control status is assigned randomly.
The challenge of the analysis is to construct an appropriate control group. The-
oretically, my control group consists of all companies that could have participated
in government auctions or participated and did not overbid, that is, ranked lower.
Since the intention to participate is not directly observable, I widen this theoretical
definition and include all Polish construction firms. More specifically, I pick all Pol-
ish construction firms from the Orbis database that have non-missing values of cash
flows in the relevant years.13 The big caveat is that the category Construction may
also include companies mostly dealing with housing that usually operate in the pri-
vate sector and less often apply for public contracts. The available data do not allow
me to distinguish between different construction branches. However, all branches
use the same natural aggregates suppliers, and also the upcoming Football Champi-
onships affected the housing industry via hotel infrastructure development, so time
effects across branches are likely to be similar. To further refine the sample, I match
observations on firm size and long-term debt.14 By doing so, I intend to exclude
small firms ineligible for bidding and big, highly levered companies operating only
in the housing sector. My matching methodology mirrors the approach presented in
Section 1.4.2. I use the advantage of having a big pool of potential control firms and
13Not all auction firms are described as Construction firms. Some entities belong to other sectors,
for example, Metals and metal products or Machinery, equipment. However, Construction firms
account for 94.05% of the sample, so limiting the analysis to this single sector is reasonable.
14Observables used for matching are measured as the average value in the two year before the
auction award.
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match three control observations for each treated one. Within the caliper range,
I choose the control observations that are closest in terms of Mahalanobis metric
calculated using matching variables (total assets or total assets and long-term debt).
This step has not been added section 1.4.2. By matching firms closest in terms of
observables I intend to make up for the lack of information about the intention to
participate. It was not necessary previously because I matched companies that I
knew chose to participate and bid aggressively. In that scenario all treatment and
control companies were comparable in terms of the intention to bid by definition,
and the main concern was size imbalance.
The regression I run in this part is specified below:
AggressiveBidderit = α + βConstraintsit + it. (1.4)
AggressiveBidderit is a dummy recording whether firm i in year t is an aggressive
bidder, that is, whether it placed at the top (first or second) of the bidding ranking
in a given year. Variable Constraintsit measures severity of financial constraints of
firm i. Since there is no consensus in the literature how to measure financial con-
straints, I consider several alternatives: cash holdings scaled by fixed assets, cash
flow growth,15 share of current liabilities in total liabilities, sales growth, and current
ratio. All variables are fixed one year before the auction award. Standard errors are
robust. The parameter of interest, β, measures whether financial constraints predict
aggressive bidding.
The estimation results are presented in Table 1.6 for the sample matched based
on firm size and in Table 1.7 for the sample matched based on firm size and long-
term debt. Low cash holdings, low cash flow growth, low sales growth, high share of
current liabilities in total liabilities, and low current ratio before an auction increase
the probability that a company places first or second in a government procurement
auction. Apart from the cash flow growth, the results are even more pronounced in
15Defined as
CFgrowthit =
CashF lowi,t−1 − CashF lowi,t−2
|CashF lowi,t−2| . (1.5)
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the sample matched both on assets and debt. Since high leverage is typical of the
housing industry, the improvement suggests that including companies from other
construction branches undermines the effect.
The overall results support the hypothesis that there are differences in cash po-
sitions of companies ranking high in the government auctions and other companies.
Firms ready to bid aggressively for new contracts are more cash constrained. Even
though it is not obvious how to measure firms’ financial constraints most accurately,
my results are consistent irrespective whether I rely on cash-, sales- or liabilities-
based measure.
Because of the limited set of variables, I cannot analyse whether aggressive bid-
ders were more constrained also before 2010 or whether this pattern is specific to
my observation window. If the link between cash condition of the firm and winning
existed outside my observation window, it would imply that liquidity aspect is al-
ways present in the bidding strategy. It would not mean, however, that margins are
always driven below zero.
1.5.2 Short-term benefits
The second testable implication of the hypothesis is that firms perform better
shortly after signing a contract. They exploit regular payments and front-load cash
flows ensured by winning a procurement auction. Annual data do not allow for a very
detailed analysis of profits over time. To shed more light on potential short-term
benefits, I compare differences in the dynamics of the treatment effect depending on
the length of the project. Contract deadlines significantly vary from one month to
five years, as shown in Table 1.1. A five year observation window around the award
date may not record the whole impact of the longest contracts, but this limit is
necessary to avoid capturing other effects. For projects lasting a few months, early
benefits would be quickly levelled out when the contract is finalised. In this case,
the annual measure should not capture any positive impact. Long-term contracts
give more scope for manipulation. It is difficult to predict how long companies will
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experience relatively high cash inflows, but the overall treatment effect should be at
least weaker and could be reversed in the first year following the auction award.
Figure 1.4 presents how performance of winners relative to runners-up changes
over time depending on contract lengths. The plot depicts coefficients on interactions
between a treatment dummy (Win) and time-around-award dummies. Red-dashed
lines separate pre- and post-award periods. The last point in the pre- period is the
award year. There are no differences in performance of winners and runners-up in the
years preceding the award. After the award winners of shorter contracts experience
an immediate drop in profit margins. For long-term contracts, on the contrary, profit
margins spike in the award year. The evidence is only suggestive because the data
at an annual frequency do not allow me to clearly determine whether the observed
increase captures an influence of the award or any other event from before contract
signing. To bypass this issue, I look only at long-term contracts and compare the
impact of auctions resolved in the first half of a year and auctions resolved in the
second half of a year. Figure 1.5 depicts the results. For auctions finalised in the
beginning of the year, relative performance of the winners drops below zero already
in the year after the award. For auctions finalised at the end of the year, the positive
spike also appears in the year following the award, and performance deteriorates only
in year two.
The temporary increase in performance is consistent with the hypothesis that
cash constrained firms strategically overbid in procurement auctions in order to
exploit short-term benefits of signing a new contract. I identify the benefits of
long-term contracts only, but I presume the benefits of short-term contracts are not
captured by the data at annual frequency. The weakness of the evidence is that the
samples underlying the plots are small, so the test has little power and standard
errors of the coefficients are big. It is reassuring, however, that the same patterns
are observed in the analysis of cash flows. Analogical plots based on cash flows can
be found in Appendix 1.12.2 (Figures A.4 and A.5).
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1.5.3 Disciplining role of deposits
A bid guarantee is a deposit which a firm has to pay in order to participate in
an auction. It is set to ensure that firms submit serious offers and do not withdraw
when other opportunities arise. If a firm leaves a bidding process after the official
offers opening or does not sign the granted contract, it loses the deposit paid as a bid
guarantee. Financially constrained firms are most likely to participate in auctions
in which a small (or none at all) bid guarantee is required. If financial constraints
underlie also aggressive bidding, then the cheapest offers and the worst performance
following the award should be observed in auctions with small bid guarantees. I
explore whether the variation in bid guarantees induces the suspected heterogeneity
in the treatment effect.
The challenge of the test is to construct a meaningful measure of bid guarantees.
Bid guarantees are required in almost 86% of auctions in my sample and their value
is strongly correlated with auction size.16 Auction size is correlated with contract
length, and they both determine to what extent firms are able to exploit short-term
benefits of contract signing. The observed short-term benefits lead to the relatively
lower impact of bigger auctions because the subsequent decline is not fully captured
in the short observation window. To discover an unbiased measure of the impact of
the bid guarantee, I must control for auction size.
I propose two measures of bid guarantees. The first one is calculated within
auction groups determined by auction size demi-deciles. For each group I define
the deposit measure as a binary variable equal to zero (one) for auctions with a
deposit below (above) the median calculated within the group. The second measure
is calculated separately in the subsamples of short-term contracts with deadlines
less than eight months and long-term contracts with deadlines of eight months or
longer. This division is built on the conclusions from the previous section, where
I showed that long-term contracts bring visible short-term benefits. I then define
a dummy variable equal to one for auctions with deposits above the third quartile
16The correlation is not surprising because, according to procurement law, bid guarantees are
set at the value of 0.5%–3% of the estimated contract size.
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calculated in the subsample and zero otherwise. With these measures at disposal, I
estimate the triple difference regression specified as follows:
yijt = βPostPostt + βWinWinij + βDDepositj + βddPostt ×Winij +
+βPostDPostt ×Depositj + βWinDWinij ×Depositj +
+βdddPostt ×Winij ×Depositj + AuctionGroupFEg(j) +
+Y earFEf(j,t) + ijt. (1.6)
The notation is consistent with that used in Equation 1.1. The dummy Depositj is
a bid guarantee measure. It equals one for auctions with high bid guarantees and
zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest, βddd, captures the impact of winning an
auction with a high deposit requirement on the subsequent performance of winners
relative to runners-up and auctions with a low deposit requirement.
Table 1.8 presents the regression estimates. The results for both deposit measures
are consistent. Similarly to the baseline specification, there is a clear negative effect
of winning an auction on post-award performance. It is not true for auctions with
high deposits though. The coefficients on the triple interaction term (βddd) are
positive and the magnitudes are big enough to reverse on average the initial drop
in profit margin measured by βdd. The positive deposit impact is significant in the
case of the first deposit measure and in the subsample of short-term contracts in the
second deposit measure. The estimation outcome favours the hypothesis about the
disciplining role of bid guarantees that lower the scope of overbidding of cash-poor
firms. The results are not very sharp, but the impact of bid guarantees has to be
limited because their values are also limited. Too big deposit values could undermine
the competition, and bid guarantees are not introduced to create barriers to entry
into a bidding process. They are to exclude participants that do not really care
about winning.
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1.6 Bad luck of overbidding?
Previous section presented the evidence in support of the idea that firms may
strategically submit low-price offers. The proposed story explains the documented
poor performance of auction winners with firms’ tendency to overbid when they face
liquidity issues. An alternative hypothesis states that firms bid optimally but per-
form poorly because of a negative shock that hits the economy or the industry. This
story has several testable implications. First, winning by losing arises in response
to unexpected and unfavourable changes in economic conditions and thus cannot
be an equilibrium outcome. Second, an identifiable shock affects winning firms. I
consider two potential negative shocks: the financial crisis (global shock) and a lo-
cal cost shock. Finally, there is a reason why runners-up seem to be unaffected by
the shock. In the case of a global shock it could be because of survivorship bias.
This concept assumes that all firms are equally affected by the shock, but due to
increased bankruptcy rates of runners-up the performance evaluation is inaccurate
as the worst-performing runners-up leave the sample. Firms losing government con-
tracts perform better only conditional on survival. The probability of bankruptcy,
on the other hand, is lower for winners that are able to continue operations at lower
margins. In the case of a local cost shock, it is possible that runners-up are not af-
fected because they stay idle as outside options are limited and mostly comprise of
smaller contracts. I discuss each of the three implications in the following sections.
1.6.1 Firm performance in different years
It is not possible for firms to constantly incur losses and still operate on the
market. Even making relative losses compared to the competitors would be diffi-
cult to reconcile with rationality. Especially for companies in the road construction
industry, in which the government is basically the sole supplier of contracts. There-
fore I suspect that winning by losing is a temporary phenomenon and test for its
presence outside my observation window. It is not a test that can unequivocally
determine whether the bad luck story is true because better performance of winners
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in other years may be consistent with several other hypotheses as well. However,
pinning down the timeline of poor performance of public auction winners may help
identifying any negative shocks relevant for the bad luck hypothesis
To investigate the effect in different years, I extend the sample so that it also
covers auctions from 2008 and 2009.17 In order to understand whether post-award
performance of auction winners changed around 2010 I run a triple difference re-
gression specified as follows:
yijt = βPostPostt + βWinWinij + βddPostt ×Winij +
+βPostTPostt × After′09j + βWinTWinij × After′09j +
+βdddPostt ×Winij × After′09j + AuctionGroupFEg(j) +
+Y earFEf(j,t) + ijt. (1.7)
It is an extension of Equation 1.1 and the notation is consistent. The dummy
After′09j identifies auctions resolved after 2009. It does not appear separately in the
regression because it is absorbed by auction group fixed effects (AuctionGroupFEg(j)).
My model has two coefficients of interest, βdd and βddd. βddd measures the impact of
the contract award on winners after the auction resolution, compared with firms that
placed second and relative to auctions resolved in 2008 and in 2009. By comparing
coefficients βdd and βddd I intend to determine whether the impact of winning an
auction on firm performance changed over time. Specifically, whether it is different
in years 2008–2009.
Table 1.9 presents the regression estimates. For all performance measures (profit
margin, return on assets and return on assets scaled by pre-award assets) the two
coefficients of interest are significant at the 1% level. Winners of government pro-
curement auctions in general perform better than runners-up following the award
as indicated by the positive coefficients on Post ×Win. The same is not true for
auctions resolved after 2009 because the coefficients on the triple interaction term
17The extended sample has a limited pool of variables, and not all regressions can be run on the
extended sample.
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are negative. The effect observed for auctions from 2010 to 2014 is much stronger,
leading to the negative impact of winning observed in my initial sample.
I also support the evidence from the table with a graphical illustration. Fig-
ure 1.6 plots the treatment effect separately for each award year. The red dashed
line separates the initial data from the extended sample. In earlier years, winners’
performance compared with that of runners-up was better. The most pronounced
positive effect is for auctions resolved in 2008, whereas 2009 and 2010 constitute
a transition period in which profit margins of winners drop below the profit mar-
gins of runners-up and continue to fall. For auctions resolved in 2012 the difference
reaches almost 5% in terms of the profit margin. An even more pronounced pattern
is observed for return on assets. Here, the caveat is that my specification does not
account for sizes of supplied contracts and may be affected by big infrastructural
investments. I have shown that long-term contracts bring short-term benefits which
undermine the negative award impact measured in the two-year post-period. Disre-
garding size composition of contracts may be an issue for the estimate of the 2009
effect because, as presented in Figure 1.1, many very big investment projects were
initiated that year. The adjustment could decrease the coefficient.
Figure 1.6 also raises concerns that poor performance of firms winning gov-
ernment contracts is driven purely by auction resolved in year 2012. To test this
possibility I run the main regression (Equation 1.1) on the sample excluding auc-
tions resolved in year 2012. The results are presented in Table A.5 in the Appendix
1.12.2. While there is a drop in magnitude of the coefficient measuring the impact
of auction winning, the results stay negative and significant. Therefore they are not
not driven by one year only.
1.6.2 Negative shock
The previous section confirmed the intuition that winning by losing is not valid
outside the observation period. It is in line with the bad luck story and also, more
generally, with the intuition that firms operating on negative margins cannot survive
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on the market. The magnitude of the decline in winners’ performance in different
years, however, contradicts the idea that the drop in global demand during the fi-
nancial crisis in the European Union is behind the observed performance patterns.
As shown in Figure 1.6, the main decrease is observed in 2012 and not in 2009,
when the bust in Europe was most severe. It gradually arises after 2009, when a
slow recovery of the European Union starts.
The bad luck story has also another weakness. As already mentioned in Section
1.2.1, the crisis in Poland’s case was really a slowdown of a continuously growing
economy. The Polish economy grew in 2009 by 1.3%18 compared with a −4.9%
aggregated loss of other EU countries.19 Furthermore, the global downturn is likely
to indirectly affect firms through the supply of contracts. It may be difficult to sign
a contract, but conditional on signing a firm is in a comfortable position because
the government does not withhold or delay payments. Summing up, the financial
crisis cannot be responsible for poor performance of auction winners.
Another version of this hypothesis states that the profitability of the contracts
won in procurement auctions was affected by a shock that was specific to the Pol-
ish construction industry. Preparations for the European Football Championship
initiated many infrastructure investments in Poland and increased the demand for
natural aggregates. I evaluate the link between the natural aggregates market and
profitability of construction contracts by studying the volume of production of the
natural aggregates. Production and price should be closely related because Polish
firms rely on local suppliers due to high transportation costs. I rely on information
about production because I do not have data on historical prices.
As depicted in Figure 1.7, the rapid increase in production in 2011 suggests there
was high, possibly unexpected demand for building materials.20 The supply-demand
imbalance, stemming from the oversupply of government contracts, decreased after
18Percentage change in the first quarter of 2009 compared to the same quarter of the previous
year.
19Source: Eurostat, Newsrelease Euroindicators, 22/2010 12 February 2010.
20The natural aggregates production reached its high record in 2011. The increase was to a
large extent due to developments in construction. The main recipient of aggregates is the housing
industry, which accounts for about 60% of demand. Infrastructure construction accounted for
about 30% of demand during the boom (Kabzinski (2011)).
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2011 when the production went back to its long-term trend. Hence the highest prices
were most likely recorded in 2011 or earlier, and the construction industry might
have been negatively surprised by the material costs at that time. This surprise
would affect contracts signed in 2009 or 2010. However, auctions resolved in 2009
are not yet unprofitable for winners. The main drop in performance is recorded
for auctions resolved in 2012, which depend on 2013 and 2014 prices. Therefore
it is unlikely that material costs caused a crisis in the road construction industry.
Furthermore, the industrial literature perceives 2011 as a highly profitable year for
the aggregate production industry. It does not mention the collapse or crisis in the
construction sector and indicates that movements on the materials markets were, to
some extent, predictable.
1.6.3 Testing for survivorship bias
The previous subsection already provided evidence against the bad luck story.
To complete the argument I test also the third implication of the hypothesis, that
is, whether survivorship bias is present in my sample. If there is survivorship bias
then the observed drop in winners’ performance mechanically arises when badly
performing runners-up go bankrupt. I check whether winners and runners-up leave
my sample in a consistently different manner.
Table 1.10 presents the survivorship of firms in my sample. I measure sur-
vivorship with a simple approximation by counting non-missing entries of the profit
margin data in my sample. First, I consider all firms with recorded profit margins
in the auction award year. Subsequently, I analyse how many firms recorded profit
margins in the next year and in the two years after the award. I do it separately for
winners and runners-up. I rely on profit margin because it is a primary dependent
variable in my analysis. It underlies the samples used for estimation and is among
well-populated accounting variables in the Orbis dataset.
The results show that fractions of companies lost in years following the award do
not significantly differ in the subsamples. The fractions of the lost companies vary
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from 7.14% to 7.2% in the first year and from 9.59% to 11.89% in the second year.
In the second year the drop rate is actually lower in the Runners-up subsample.
My considerations do not include firms for which no entries of profit margin exist.
Missing data in the auction award year are unlikely to result from the liquidation
of a firm because such firms cannot participate in auctions. Financial information
is missing most likely for very small firms, which face no reporting requirements.
Additionally, I consider a possibility that survivorship bias reveals itself at the
earlier stage of the data collection process, that is, when I match auction firms with
the accounting data. Missing a whole company in the Orbis dataset could be due
to the fact that they left the market. The Orbis database does not automatically
drop firms that enter bankruptcy, but these firms may be more difficult to match
as their name and legal status change during the liquidation. Therefore I check the
merging success rates by firm’s status. Table 1.11 presents the results.
Matching is successful for over 80% of firms and varies from 80.74% to 81.50%
in the subsamples. The differences are very small and, contrary to the survivorship
bias prediction, merging is slightly better for the Runners-up subsample.
In sum, both coverage of firms in the database and the percentage of missing
entries, which I examine to learn whether a firm exists or left the market, do not
depend on firm’s rank achieved in the bidding process. The hypothesis that winners’
performance is worse compared with that of runners-up because the worst runners-
up leave the sample after the economy is hit by a negative shock is not supported
by the data.
1.7 Winner’s curse
The third hypothesis I consider is closely related to the setting I use. The
winner’s curse is a phenomenon that arises in common value auctions. Firms are
not able to form an optimal strategy that aligns with their ex post beliefs about the
contract value. They do not take into account that the winning offer is the most
optimistic one and can deviate from the unbiased estimate of the auction subject.
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In the case of government procurement auctions the winning offer is too cheap and
the winner ends up signing an underpriced contract.
The main issue with the winner’s curse explanation is that the phenomenon of
auction winners being worse off is not permanent. For auctions resolved from 2008
to 2009, winning firms actually gain relative to firms that place second and miss
the award. Assuming overbidding is involuntary, it is necessary to explain why the
inability to submit an optimal offer changes over time. A fitting scenario is described
in the existing literature. Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) prove in an experimental
study that executives in the construction industry (who regularly submit offers for
projects in common-value-type public auctions) overbid in line with the winner’s
curse. Their performance improves with experience, and the authors conclude they
have to adapt to bidding in real-life auctions.
The story of Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) relies on the link between overbidding
and experience.21 Because experience drives the ability to adjust bidding strategies
and submit optimal offers, experienced firms should suffer less from the winner’s
curse and as a result perform better after the award. I assume that this is true
even if all bidders have to adapt their strategies in response to changes in economic
conditions.
To examine the impact of experience on bidding ability I look at firm age. As
presented in Table 1.12, the median company in my sample is 18 years old and only
5% are younger than five years old. My sample consists of mature firms, so the
winner’s curse effect should be weak or altogether absent. It is also confirmed by
the manager’s individual experience measured by age, which is available for a few
companies. Information about managers’ age is non-missing only for 5% of firms,
but no manager is younger than 40 years old.
In a more rigorous test, I run a triple difference regression in which the third
difference allows me to evaluate the impact of winning an auction on an experienced
21Other works prove, however, that impact of experience may indirectly reflect also other factors.
For example, Da Silva, Dunne, and Kosmopoulou (2003) show that new entrants in auctions bid
more aggressively and win with much lower prices than incumbent firms because of the higher cost
dispersion. It is consistent with the idea that inexperienced bidders are more aggressive, but it
abstracts from the winner’s curse problem.
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and an inexperienced firm. The specification is as follows:
yijt = βPostPostt + βWinWinij + βEExpij + βddPostt ×Winij +
+βEPostPostt × Expij + βWinEWinij × Expij +
+βdddPostt ×Winij × Expij + AuctionGroupFEg(j) +
+Y earFEf(j,t) + ijt. (1.8)
The notation is consistent with that used in Equation 1.1. The dummy Expij de-
termines whether firm i in auction j is an experienced bidder. βddd measures the
impact of a contract award on an experienced bidder after the auction resolution,
compared with firms that ranked second and relative to inexperienced bidders. By
looking at βdd and βddd I can determine whether the decline in performance of win-
ners depends on how experienced a company is.
I measure experience based on the past bidding record. I construct two alterna-
tive dummy measures. The first one is equal to one for firms that bid and ranked
at the top two in the past two years. The second measure is equal to one for firms
that won in the past two years. The idea behind this is that exposure to either the
bidding process or winning a contract in an auction provides additional information
about the optimal bidding strategy.
Table 1.13 summarises the estimation results. Experience does not affect per-
formance of winners following the award. The caveat here is that the accuracy of
measures is disputable because past participation and winning is correlated with
other firm characteristics as, for example, firm size. I cannot exclude the possibility
that the impact of experience is weaker than potential heterogeneity in the results
coming from other firm characteristics.
Summing up, I do not find evidence in support of the winner’s curse. There is
no link between performance and experience and my sample consists of relatively
mature firms that are less likely to suffer from the winner’s curse. Furthermore,
the hypothesis cannot explain the correlation between companies’ cash flows and
aggressive bidding documented in Section 1.5. It is unlikely that the winner’s curse
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is responsible for the observed strong drop in performance of firms that win govern-
ment contracts.
1.8 Robustness checks
In this section I test the robustness of the documented drop in winners’ perfor-
mance. First, I run the main regression on several subsamples to ensure the results
are not driven by a small subset of firms. In Section 1.8.2 I address the identification
issue related to firms that both win and rank second in the same year. In Section
1.8.3 I explore alternative restrictions on firms’ participation. Finally, in Section
1.8.4 I discuss how accounting rules may affect the documented results.
1.8.1 Robustness in the subsamples
I re-run the main regression specified in Equation 1.1 on the subsamples to en-
sure the results are not driven by outliers, and I analyse the potential heterogeneity
in the treatment effect. Table 1.14 presents the results.
The first column contains the estimates of the regression in which 4% of the
smallest and largest auctions are dropped. The regression aims to address the con-
cern that the effect is driven only by very small or very big contracts. It is a valid
concern because of the huge variability in auction sizes. The size of an auction is
measured in terms of the price offered by a winner. The threshold of 4% is arbi-
trary, but very similar results are obtained with the 2% and 8% cut-offs. In the
second column I present the results when the estimation excludes a few unlimited
companies in my sample. The majority of the firms in my sample have limited lia-
bility. If the excluded companies created the treatment effect, this would undermine
the idea of strategic firm behaviour. Compromising long-term profits increases the
probability of bankruptcy and should be less pronounced in behaviour of companies
in which an owner is responsible for business debt. The third column presents the
results for unlimited auctions only. As mentioned in Section 1.2.1, both limited and
unlimited auctions ensure equality of all bidders and specify evaluation criteria in
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advance. The difference is that limited auctions are organised in two stages, and
the first stage provides a signal about the competitiveness of an auction that can
affect bidding. Different procedures could also attract a different pool of bidders.
The results for these three subsamples do not differ from the main estimates. The
impact of auction winning is significant and leads to a drop in the profit margin of
around 2.5%.
The last column presents the results for high-impact auctions.22 If the docu-
mented effect measures the auction influence on post-award company performance,
then it should be stronger for relatively big auctions. As expected, the treatment
effect is significant and bigger in magnitude - the drop in profit margin amounts to
over 3%.
1.8.2 Winning and losing in the same year
Firms that participate in several auctions every year and both win and place
second raise concerns about the identification validity, which I discussed in Section
1.3.2. To argue in support of the identification strategy, I perform two additional
tests.
First, I run a regression on the subsample of firms that ranked first or second
in an auction only once per year. It circumvents the problem that participation is
a firm’s choice that correlates with the treatment status. Table 1.15 presents the
estimation results. Conclusions are consistent with the main results. Coefficient
on the interaction term is significant and negative. The post-award performance of
winners relative to runners-up decreases on average by 2.60%.
In the second approach, I consolidate the data at the firm-year level and define
non-binary treatment intensity. The regression is specified as follows:
yikt = βPostPostt + βWRWinningRateik + βddPostt ×WinningRateik +
+FirmFEi + Y earFEf(k,t) + ikt. (1.9)
22As defined is Section 1.4.2, auction impact is calculated separately for each auction-firm ob-
servation as winning offer price over firm’s total assets one year before the award.
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yikt is the performance of firm i, which participates in auctions in year k. Variable
t measures time relative to the award. Variable WinningRateik is defined as the
cumulative dollar-size of won auctions in a particular year over the cumulative dollar-
size of auctions in which a firm ranked first or second. I measure auction size by the
price offered by a winner. WinningRateik is zero for firms that have not won any
competitive contract in a particular year. It is equal to one for companies that have
not lost any auction conditional on ranking in the top two. For firms that placed
both first and second in a particular year, the variable takes a value between zero
and one, depending on the sizes of auctions. The observations are collapsed at the
firm-year level, so I include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. Table 1.16 presents the results. They are consistent with the earlier
findings. The impact of an auction award on the subsequent firm performance when
treatment is non-binary is negative for the majority of the considered performance
measures.
1.8.3 Alternative participation restrictions
The main sample excludes five firms that participated and ranked in the top
two of more than 40 auctions during the observation period. The number is set as
a compromise between preserving the original sample and firm representativeness.
Table 1.17 presents the results for the alternative cut-off definitions.
The first column shows the regression results when no participation restrictions
are imposed. The second column presents the estimates for a subsample of firms
that ranked in the top two in a maximum of 10 auctions in a year. The third re-
gression excludes firms that won or placed second in more than 10 auctions in total
from 2010 to 2014. All coefficients are significant and close to the baseline regression
results.
The treatment effect is a little smaller in the absolute terms in the first sub-
sample. It implies that firms that participate in many auctions in a given year
perform slightly better afterwards. It may be related to having more opportunities
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to front-load cash flows after signing many contracts. However, better performance
for frequent participants also provides the argument that results do not reflect the
decreasing marginal efficiency of capital. If this was the case, then the observed
decline in performance would be driven by companies that win many auctions in
a given year and receive relatively lower returns due to limited investment oppor-
tunities. On the contrary, dropping companies with more than 40 appearances in
the sample actually improves significance and increases the magnitude of the effect
compared with the raw sample. Similarly, limiting the sample to companies that
ranked in the top two in less than 10 auctions within a five-year period increases
the magnitude of the drop in profitability without any loss of significance.
In the last three specifications I do not drop firms from the sample but limit firm
appearances in the sample. The subsample First appearance in a year (the fourth
column) includes only the first auction in which a firm participated in a given year.
The last two subsamples take into account only one firm-auction observation in the
whole observation period. The subsample First appearance only includes the very
first appearance, while the subsample One random appearance picks one random
appearance. I document the negative and significant treatment effect of auction
winning in all the subsamples.
1.8.4 Accounting rules
Measuring performance using accounting variables poses a few risks. First, there
may be delays in reporting or publishing data. Second, shifts caused by changes
in accounting rules may occur. In both of these scenarios, worsening performance
would not reflect firms’ strategic actions. I address these concerns in the following
paragraphs.
The first scenario is unlikely because of the system of payment claims described
in Section 1.2.1. Companies immediately receive payments for their work, so the
impact of the signed contract should be recorded in the considered observation
window. Also, in the case of Poland the delays in government payments are unlikely
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because public authorities need to organise and allocate resources before the auction
is resolved. Even an economic downturn does not affect the financing of the ongoing
projects but rather the future supply of contracts.
Mechanical changes in the accounting rules are most likely to arise after changes
in tax rates. The corporate tax rate in Poland has been stable since 2005 and equals
19%. The sales tax rates changed in 2011 with the general rate increasing from 22%
to 23%. This change is not responsible for the relative poor performance of winners
for several reasons. First, the reform was announced in the middle of year 2010. To
be affected by this change, contracts would have to be signed before July 2010 and
last longer than six months. Offers submitted in auctions finalised after that date
would take the reform into account. Second, as offers contain net prices, tax rates,
and gross prices, any changes arising because of a change in sales tax rate are easy
to measure. For the small pool of affected auctions this would be one of the very
rare scenarios in which a price could be adjusted after the contract is signed. It
could be possible because of the exogenous nature of the change of circumstances
and the fact that it would not undermine competitiveness of any firm. Furthermore,
an increase in the gross price would not shift the economic balance in favour of the
winner as winners’ remuneration relies on net prices.23
1.9 Conclusions
In this paper I consider the hypothesis that cash constrained firms buy liquidity
in exchange for future profits. I test this hypothesis in the context of government
procurement auctions for which I document poor performance of winning compa-
nies. Profit margins of winners drop on average by 2.30% in the two years following
the award. This number is measured relative to the firms that placed second and
lost in the bidding process. My methodology provides an unbiased estimate of the
23Arguments regarding sales tax rate change rely on the official law interpretation published
by The Public Procurement Office. Source: https://www.uzp.gov.pl/baza-wiedzy/interpretacja-
przepisow/opinie-archiwalne/zmiana-umowy-w-sprawie-zamowienia-publicznego-w-zwiazku-z-
ustawowa-zmiana-stawki-podatku-od-towarow-i-uslug-vat (accessed 17.08.2018).
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performance drop. The results are robust in various subsamples and when observa-
tions are matched on firm size and auction impact. The magnitude of the drop is
economically significant as construction companies usually do not operate on mar-
gins above 10%. The empirical analysis suggests that firms ranking at the top in
procurement auctions overbid.
I find several pieces of evidence in support of the idea that documented over-
bidding reflects the intertemporal trade-off that liquidity constrained firms face.
First, pre-award low cash holdings, low cash flow growth, low sales growth, low cur-
rent ratio or high share of current liabilities predict the top position in the bidding
ranking. It implies that aggressive bidders are financially constrained. Second, in
the case of long-term contracts the drop in performance is delayed and I observe a
temporary positive impact on profitability shortly after the auction resolution. It
confirms the existence of short-term benefits that provide incentives for aggressive
bidding. Third, the observed overbidding is driven mostly by auctions which do not
require high bid guarantees. Setting an upfront deposit as a participation require-
ment discourages the most constrained firms from bidding, leading to submission of
less underpriced offers and relatively better performance after contract signing.
I also take into account alternative explanations of the deteriorating performance
of winners of government contracts. I consider the hypothesis that firms bid opti-
mally ex ante but are hit with a negative shock realization after the auction award. I
reject this possibility because the timing of potential negative shocks is inconsistent
with the magnitude of the decline in firm performance in different years. Further-
more, I analyse the possibility that results reflect the winner’s curse. I do not find
evidence in support of this hypothesis because in my setting experience does not
significantly improve firm performance. However, I do not have enough evidence
to reject it. In reality, both strategic overbidding and the winner’s curse may exist
and lead to worse performance of auction winners. A natural follow-up step is to
measure which effect is stronger. My setting provides more evidence in favour of the
strategic firm behaviour.
My results emphasize the importance of the liquidity-profitability trade-off faced
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by cash constrained firms. The drop in profits does not lead firms to bankruptcy in
my sample as I do not find differences in survivorship of winners and runners-up.
The overall effect on welfare, however, is ambiguous. The direct, short-term effects
are positive: overbidding does not increase bankruptcy rate, government pays lower
prices, and firms improve cash flows. However, aggressive bidding also affects the
other market participants. It creates a pressure on offered prices, which impacts
bidding strategies and potentially cash flows of other companies. Price pressure
may also decrease competition because low expected profit margins discourage com-
panies from auction participation or new entrepreneurs from entering the market.
Although my unique dataset allows for a comprehensive analysis of the procure-
ment auction bidding strategies, the dataset of firms’ financials does not ensure full
coverage of auction firms. Thus my conclusions may not be easily generalised to
small firms, which are underrepresented in the final sample compared to how often
they participate in public auctions. This limitation also does not allow me to study
the role of limited liability, which could add value to considerations about inten-
tional overbidding. On the other hand, the analysis supplies a valid benchmark
for evaluation of auction winners’ performance and a non-behavioural explanation
of the winner’s curse. The conclusions I draw may be relevant in other settings
because they rely on the analysis of company’s core activity - the main and direct
source of firm’s profits and losses.
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1.10 Figures
Figure 1.1: Auctions by year.
Notes: This figure presents characteristics of procurement auctions by award year. Offer price
refers to the price offered by the auction winner. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions resolved
resolved from 2008 to 2014.
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Figure 1.2: Firms’ participation in auctions.
Notes: This figure presents frequencies with which the same firm re-appears in my sample in
different auctions. A firm is counted when it ranks in the top two. Sample: limited and unlimited
auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014; firms participating in 40 or
fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014.
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Figure 1.3: Firm performance around the award year by rank.
Notes: This figure presents the average performance of firms winning procure-
ment auctions (winners) and firms that rank second and do not win other
auction (runners-up) around the award year. Year 0 is the award year. Sam-
ple: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved
from 2010 to 2014; firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to
2014. Data are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Figure 1.4: Treatment effect around the award year.
Notes: This figure shows the treatment effect (the impact of winning an auction) separately for
each year around the auction award. The dashed line distinguishes the pre-award period from
the post-award period. The top panel presents the sample of all contracts; the bottom-left panel
presents short-term contracts lasting fewer than eight months; the bottom-right panel presents
long-term contracts lasting eight months or more. The dependent variable is defined as: profit
margin = EBT/sales. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants
resolved from 2010 to 2014; firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Data
are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Figure 1.5: Treatment effect around the award year: Long-term contracts.
Notes: This figure shows the treatment effect (the impact of winning an auction) separately for
each year around the auction award for long-term contracts. The dashed line distinguishes the
pre-award period from the post-award period. The top panel presents contracts resolved in the
beginning of the year (first half of the year); bottom panel presents contracts resolved in the end
of the year (second half of the year). The dependent variable is defined as: profit margin =
EBT/sales. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved from
2010 to 2014; firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Data are winsorized
at the 0.1% level.
57
Figure 1.6: Treatment effect by auction award year: Auctions from 2008 to 2014.
Notes: This figure shows the treatment effect (the impact of winning an auction) separately for
each auction resolution year. The dashed line distinguishes the main sample from the additional
auction years. The dependent variables are defined as: profit margin = EBT/sales, ROA (EBT) =
EBT/total assets, ROA (EBT, lagged assets) = EBT/(average total assets before award). Sample:
limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014; firms
participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Data are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Figure 1.7: Natural aggregates production in Poland.
Notes: This figure presents the production of two main natural aggregates (construction materials)
in Poland from 2006 to 2014. The figure is based on Table 1 from Koziol, Cieplinski, Machniak,
and Borcz (2015).
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1.11 Tables
Table 1.1: Procurement auctions from 2008 to 2014.
mean sd p50 min max
Price [million PLN] 26.2 133.5 0.71 0.0061 2195.9
Number of bidders 3.92 2.81 3 1 25
Contract length [months] 7.18 9.08 3 1 60
Deposit [million PLN] 0.26 1.28 0.0075 0 15
Observations 3441
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of procurement auctions. Sample: limited and unlim-
ited auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014.
Table 1.2: Firm characteristics by rank.
Winners Runners-up T-test
mean sd mean sd diff t-stat
Total assets 73.8 (257.29) 64.5 (297.01) 9.26 (0.40)
Employees 168.5 (258.13) 138.3 (198.01) 30.2 (1.26)
Turnover 120.7 (357.21) 99.0 (381.64) 21.7 (0.70)
EBT 3.95 (22.11) 1.72 (15.43) 2.23 (1.34)
NI 2.87 (18.07) 1.14 (12.05) 1.73 (1.28)
ROA (EBT) [%] 7.12 (11.56) 7.00 (14.11) 0.13 (0.12)
ROA (NI) [%] 5.62 (10.44) 5.57 (12.78) 0.053 (0.056)
Cash flow 6.81 (21.41) 3.56 (18.29) 3.24 (1.64)
Cash flow/turnover 0.060 (0.06) 0.059 (0.08) 0.0016 (0.24)
Equity 24.7 (76.51) 24.7 (105.31) -0.031 (-0.0041)
Long-term debt 4.97 (31.93) 5.23 (43.59) -0.25 (-0.075)
Current liabilities 38.5 (138.76) 31.1 (141.11) 7.42 (0.63)
Solvency ratio [%] 42.7 (22.61) 44.1 (23.15) -1.36 (-0.71)
Current ratio 1.76 (1.20) 1.96 (1.77) -0.20 (-1.61)
Profit margin [%] 3.64 (6.66) 3.24 (7.93) 0.40 (0.66)
Auctions 916
Firms 315
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of firms bidding in competitive auctions. Averages
are calculated over the two years before an auction award. Non-ratio variables are expressed in
millions of PLN. The columns diff and t-stat present the results of a t-test of the differences in
means between Winners and Runners-up. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or
more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014; firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010
to 2014. Subsample Winners: firms that placed first in an auction in a given year. Subsample
Runners-up: firms that placed second and did not place first in an auction in a given year. Data
are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Table 1.3: Firm performance after auctions.
Profit
margin
ROA
(EBT)
ROA
(NI)
ROA (EBT,
pre-award assets)
ROA (NI,
pre-award assets)
Post 1.14 2.85∗ 3.11∗ 1.39 1.16
(0.79) (1.57) (1.59) (1.62) (1.39)
Win 0.36 0.30 0.38 0.16 0.34
(0.49) (1.07) (1.09) (1.30) (1.30)
Post x Win -2.30∗∗∗ -4.39∗∗∗ -4.62∗∗∗ -4.16∗∗∗ -3.58∗∗∗
(0.75) (1.45) (1.46) (1.37) (1.13)
Group FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Obs 4310 4435 4430 4435 4435
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of winning an auction on firm’s subsequent performance.
The specification is presented in Equation 1.1. The dependent variables are defined as: profit
margin = EBT/sales, ROA (EBT) = EBT/total assets, ROA (NI) = net income/total assets,
ROA (EBT, lagged assets) = EBT/(average total assets before award), ROA (NI, lagged assets)
= net income/(average total assets before award). The dummy Win identifies firms that won an
auction in a given year. The dummy Post distinguishes the pre-award period from the post-award
period. Standard errors are clustered at the auction group level. Sample: limited and unlimited
auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014; firms participating in 40 or
fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Data are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Table 1.4: Firms’ profit margins after auctions - t-test: Matched sample.
Winners Runners-up t-stat p-value
-3.96 -1.27 -2.6834 0.007
Notes: The table shows the t-test of the mean change in performance of Winners and Runners-up
after an auction award. Observations are collapsed at the firm-year level. Firms are matched based
on average pre-award assets, auction impact, and auction award year. The matching procedure
follows that of Ho et al. (2007). The dependent variable is defined as: profit margin = EBT/sales.
Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to
2014; firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Subsample Winners: firms
that placed first in an auction in a given year. Subsample Runners-up: firms that placed second
and did not place first in an auction in a given year. Data are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
Table 1.5: Firms’ profit margins after auctions: Matched sample.
Probability Weights Pair Fixed Effects
Post 0.93 0.73
(0.78) (0.71)
Treat 1.12∗∗ -0.059
(0.53) (0.52)
Post x Treat -2.52∗∗ -2.51∗∗∗
(0.99) (0.78)
Year FE X X
Firm FE X
Pair FE X
Obs 2670 3560
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of winning an auction on firm’s subsequent performance.
The specification of the first model is presented in Equation 1.2. The regression is weighted to
ensure covariate balance. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The specification of
the second model is presented in Equation 1.3. It includes pair fixed effects to identify matched
observations. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. Observations are at the firm-year
level and matched based on firms’ average pre-award assets, auction impact, and auction award
year. The matching procedure follows that of Ho et al. (2007). The dependent variable is defined
as: profit margin = EBT/sales. The dummy Win identifies firms that won an auction in a given
year. The dummy Post distinguishes the pre-award period from the post-award period. Sample:
limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014; firms
participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Data are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Table 1.6: Predictors of aggressive bidding: Sample matched on firm size.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash/FixedAssets -0.011∗∗∗
(0.0041)
CF growth -0.025∗∗
(0.012)
SalesGrowth -0.079∗∗∗
(0.014)
CurrentLiab./TotalLiab. 0.66∗∗∗
(0.12)
CurrentRatio -0.11∗∗∗
(0.024)
Obs 2519 1749 2565 2744 2697
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of financial constraints on the probability of aggressive
bidding in an auction. The specification is presented in Equation 1.4. Observations are matched
based on year and firm’s average pre-award assets. The matching procedure follows that of Ho
et al. (2007). The estimations are based on a logistic function. The regressions are weighted
with sampling weights obtained during matching. The dependent variable AggressiveBidder is a
dummy equal to one for firms that ranked first or second in a relevant auction and zero for all other
Polish construction firms. Relevant auctions are defined as limited and unlimited auctions with
three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014. Firms participating in more than 40 auctions
from 2010 to 2014 are excluded from the group of aggressive bidders. Constraints measures are
fixed one year before the auction award. Equation 1.5 defines the variable CFgrowth. Standard
errors are robust. Data are winsorized at the 1% level.
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Table 1.7: Predictors of aggressive bidding: Sample matched on firm size and long-
term debt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash/FixedAssets -0.023∗∗
(0.0089)
CF growth -0.021
(0.020)
SalesGrowth -0.11∗∗∗
(0.020)
CurrentLiab./TotalLiab. 0.33∗∗
(0.15)
CurrentRatio -0.16∗∗∗
(0.028)
Obs 2018 1353 2011 2122 2088
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of financial constraints on the probability of aggressive
bidding in an auction. The specification is presented in Equation 1.4. Observations are matched
based on year, firm’s average pre-award assets, and average long-term debt. The matching pro-
cedure follows that of Ho et al. (2007). The estimations are based on a logistic function. The
regressions are weighted with sampling weights obtained during matching. The dependent vari-
able AggressiveBidder is a dummy equal to one for firms that ranked first or second in a relevant
auction and zero for all other Polish construction firms. Relevant auctions are defined as limited
and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014. Firms par-
ticipating in more than 40 auctions from 2010 to 2014 are excluded from the group of aggressive
bidders. Constraints measures are fixed one year before the auction award. Equation 1.5 defines
the variable CFgrowth. Standard errors are robust. Data are winsorized at the 1% level.
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Table 1.8: Disciplining role of deposits: Profit margin.
Deposit 1
All
contracts
Deposit 2
Short-term
contracts
Deposit 2
Long-term
contracts
Post 1.86∗ 1.55 2.35
(1.07) (1.11) (2.34)
Win 0.52 -0.16 1.65
(0.73) (0.82) (1.09)
Deposit 0.75 1.48 0.35
(0.90) (1.20) (1.52)
Post x Win -4.06∗∗∗ -3.24∗∗∗ -3.95∗
(1.19) (1.13) (2.28)
Post x Deposit -1.82 -2.39∗ -3.98
(1.26) (1.40) (2.55)
Win x Deposit -0.18 0.23 0.69
(0.96) (1.16) (2.05)
Post x Win x Deposit 3.85∗∗ 3.70∗ 4.76
(1.60) (1.84) (3.23)
Group FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Obs 4485 3155 1330
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of winning an auction on firm’s subsequent performance
for auctions with high and low deposit requirements. The specification is presented in Equation
1.6. The Deposit 1 measure is a dummy equal to one for auctions with deposits above the median
calculated within the auction group based on auction size demi-deciles. The Deposit 2 measure is
a dummy equal to one for auctions with deposits above the third quartile based on the subsample
of short-term / long-term contracts. Short-term contracts are defined as contracts with deadlines
below 8 months. Long-term contracts defined as contracts with deadlines of 8 months or more.
The dependent variable is defined as: profit margin = EBT/sales. The dummy Win identifies
firms that won an auction in a given year. The dummy Post distinguishes the pre-award period
from the post-award period. Standard errors are clustered at the auction group level. Sample:
limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014; firms
participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Data are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Table 1.9: Firm performance after auctions: Auctions from 2008 to 2014.
Profit margin ROA (EBT)
ROA (EBT,
pre-award assets)
Post -2.12∗∗ -3.86∗∗ -6.53∗∗
(0.91) (1.91) (2.94)
Win -2.28∗∗ -4.77∗∗ -6.19∗∗
(0.92) (2.08) (2.77)
Post x Win 2.61∗∗∗ 5.33∗∗∗ 8.40∗∗∗
(0.81) (1.72) (2.83)
Post x After’09 3.28∗∗∗ 6.53∗∗∗ 8.45∗∗
(1.18) (2.40) (3.28)
Win x After’09 2.74∗∗ 5.36∗∗ 6.56∗∗
(1.05) (2.35) (3.05)
Post x Win x After’09 -4.98∗∗∗ -9.71∗∗∗ -12.7∗∗∗
(1.11) (2.26) (3.15)
Group FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Obs 6135 6245 6245
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of winning an auction on firm’s subsequent performance
for auctions resolved in different years. The specification is presented in Equation 1.7. The
dependent variables are defined as: profit margin = EBT/sales, ROA (EBT) = EBT/total assets,
ROA (EBT, lagged assets) = EBT/(average total assets before award). The dummy Win identifies
firms that won an auction in a given year. The dummy Post distinguishes the pre-award period
from the post-award period. The dummy After′09 distinguishes auctions resolved in 2008 or 2009
from those resolved after 2009. Standard errors are clustered at the auction group level. Sample:
limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2008 to 2014; firms
participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Data are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
66
Table 1.10: Firm survivorship.
Year after Winners Runners-up
award No Drop-rate No Drop-rate
Year 0 308 . 236 .
Year 1 286 7.14% 219 7.20%
Year 2 254 11.89% 198 9.59%
Notes: This table shows the percentage of missing entries of profit margin in the financial database
in the years following an auction award. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or
more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014. Subsample Winners: firms that placed first in an
auction in a given year. Subsample Runners-up: firms that placed second and did not place first
in an auction in a given year.
Table 1.11: Merging success rates by rank.
Winners Runners-up
Matched 696 569
Unmatched 166 131
Matched (%) 80.74% 81.29%
Notes: This table shows the percentage of merged firms listed in the auction data files with the
Orbis financial database. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants
resolved from 2010 to 2014. Subsample Winners: firms that placed first in an auction in a given
year. Subsample Runners-up: firms that placed second and did not place first in an auction in a
given year.
Table 1.12: Firm age distribution.
All Winners Runners-up
p5 4 5 4
1st quartile 12 12 10
median 18 18 16
3rd quartile 21 21 21
p95 60 59 61
Notes: This table shows firm age distribution. Age is estimated based on the incorporation year
from the Orbis financial database. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more
participants resolved from 2010 to 2014; firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to
2014.
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Table 1.13: Firm performance after auctions: Experience.
Participated
before
Won
before
Post 1.97∗∗ 1.62∗∗
(0.91) (0.80)
Win 0.28 0.20
(0.70) (0.63)
Exp -1.44 -1.67
(0.95) (1.05)
Post x Win -3.24∗∗∗ -2.51∗∗∗
(1.03) (0.95)
Post x Exp -1.93 -1.51
(1.26) (1.38)
Win x Exp 0.54 0.97
(1.09) (1.19)
Post x Win x Exp 2.06 0.99
(1.59) (1.75)
Group FE X X
Year FE 4330 4330
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of winning an auction on firm’s subsequent performance
for experienced and inexperienced bidders. The specification is presented in Equation 1.8. The
dummy Exp identifies experienced firms. In the column Participated before, the experience measure
equals one for firms that ranked first or second in the two years before an auction resolution. In
the column Won before the experience measure equals one for firms that ranked first (won) in the
two years before an auction resolution. The dependent variable is defined as: profit margin =
EBT/sales. The dummy Win identifies firms that won an auction in a given year. The dummy
Post distinguishes the pre-award period from the post-award period. Standard errors are clustered
at the auction group level. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants
resolved from 2010 to 2014; firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Data
are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Table 1.14: Firms’ profit margins after auctions: Subsamples.
No price
outliers
Only limited
liability
Unlimited
auctions
Auction impact
above 20%
Post 1.68∗∗ 1.89∗∗ 1.63∗ 2.02
(0.80) (0.84) (0.83) (1.44)
Win 0.51 0.46 0.48 -0.17
(0.50) (0.53) (0.52) (0.82)
Post x Win -2.59∗∗∗ -2.92∗∗∗ -2.47∗∗∗ -3.19∗∗
(0.78) (0.78) (0.80) (1.36)
Group FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Obs 3960 3675 3855 1135
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of winning an auction on firm’s subsequent performance
based on the various subsamples. The specification is presented in Equation 1.1. The dependent
variable is defined as: profit margin = EBT/sales. The dummy Win identifies firms that won
an auction in a given year. The dummy Post distinguishes the pre-award period from the post-
award period. Standard errors are clustered at the auction group level. Main sample: limited and
unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014; firms participating
in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Subsample No price outliers excludes 4% of the
biggest and smallest auctions measured by auction size. Subsample Only limited liability excludes
unlimited liability firms. Subsample Unlimited auctions excludes Limited auctions with a two-
stage selection of winners (defined in detail in Section 1.2.1). Subsample Auction impact above
20% excludes auction-firm observations in which the auction size is smaller than 20% of the firm
size. Data are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Table 1.15: Firms’ profit margins after auctions: Firms participating once per year.
Profit margin
Post 0.38
(1.25)
Win 0.77
(0.99)
Post x Win -2.60∗∗
(1.25)
Group FE X
Year FE 1525
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: This regression shows the impact of winning an auction on firms’ subsequent performance
in the subsample of firms which participate only in one auction per year. The specification is
presented in Equation 1.1. The dependent variable is defined as: profit margin = EBT/sales. The
dummy Win identifies firms that won an auction in a given year. The dummy Post distinguishes
the pre-award period from the post-award period. Standard errors are clustered at the auction
group level. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved from
2010 to 2014; firms participating in an auction only once per year. Participation is defined as
firm’s appearance in the top two places of the auction ranking. Data are winsorized at the 0.1%
level.
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Table 1.16: Firm performance after auctions: Consolidated data.
Profit
margin
ROA
(EBT)
ROA
(NI)
ROA (EBT,
lagged assets)
ROA (NI,
lagged assets)
Post 0.17 0.16 0.17 1.60 0.76
(0.61) (1.22) (1.19) (1.39) (1.08)
WinningRate 0.90 0.78 1.02 1.21 1.05
(0.59) (1.09) (1.05) (1.04) (0.87)
Post x WinningRate -2.14∗∗ -2.98 -3.44 -3.78∗ -3.35∗∗
(1.01) (2.05) (2.10) (2.04) (1.69)
Year FE X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X
Obs 2995 3070 3065 3070 3070
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of winning an auction on firm’s subsequent performance.
Equation 1.9 presents the specification. Data are consolidated at the firm-year level. WinningRate
is between zero and one and measures treatment intensity. It is defined as the dollar size of
auctions won in a given year to auctions in which a firm ranked in the top two. The dependent
variables are defined as: profit margin = EBT/sales, ROA (EBT) = EBT/total assets, ROA (NI)
= net income/total assets, ROA (EBT, lagged assets) = EBT/(average total assets before award),
ROA (NI, lagged assets) = net income/(average total assets before award). The dummy Post
distinguishes the pre-award period from the post-award period. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved
from 2010 to 2014; firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Data are
winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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1.12 Appendix
1.12.1 Data collection
All auction data are collected from the website of the General Directorate for
National Roads and Highways (GDDKiA). In November 2017 I downloaded all ten-
der reports available under the link www.gddkia.gov.pl/ajax/zamowieniePubliczne
Szczegoly.php?id=X by looping over subpages for each auction, where “X” denotes
auction ID number. The collection process was performed in two stages. First, I
collected all information directly published on the website. Then I extracted infor-
mation from the downloaded supplementary files.
Website data
Data available on the website contains basic information about the auctions.
The information is presented in a semi-structured form, that is, the website layout
and row titles are usually the same for all auctions. Downloaded data include: ID
number, auction number, the number of submitted offers, the types of works covered,
ordering authority, winning firm name and address, resolution date, winning offer
price, auction announcement date, deadline, deposit, winning criteria, offer with
lowest price, offer with highest price, reasons of cancellation, and auction group. I
exclude auctions that were cancelled or that fell outside the relevant observation
window. I also try to identify and exclude multitask auctions by searching for words
like part, task, number in variables winner, cancel reason, price, deposit or number of
participants. The auction deadline is defined in number of months (weeks) or given
as a completion date. In the case of the latter, I approximate the deadline in months
by looking at the auction resolution date. In the case of joint offers, I identify the
leader and partners and list them separately in my dataset. I focus on unlimited
and limited auctions for construction. At this stage I already drop auctions with
fewer than three participants. Any missing entries are filled in by hand.
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Extraction from files
I begin by downloading all the files entitled Information about the best offer
choice. These files are usually in the “.pdf” and, occasionally, in the “.doc” or
the “.jpg” format. They contain information about all the participants, prices they
submit, and score they get. The “.pdf” files are scanned, so the data they contain
needs to be extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR). I use the Adobe
Acrobat XI Pro program and transform files into the “.xls” format. Many of these
files contain a table with the ranking. I identify whether this is the case by looking for
a variable that would denote Offer number and extract the whole table, row by row.
The column names differ across files but I identify among them firm name, offered
price, and offer evaluation. Auctions for which I cannot identify these columns are
set aside for a manual check. The same goes for auctions for which most of the row
entries are missing. I rank offers according to the points awarded and drop auctions
with fewer than three participants.
Final improvements
The file with extracted data is then merged with auction information obtained in
the first stage. I use the merged file to compare winners identified from the “.pdf”
files and the winners’ names published online. I manually correct any discrepancies.
I supplement the file with the data typed in by hand.
I end up with a file in which the data are at the auction-firm level. Each auction
has at least one winner (or more in cases of joint offers) and one runner-up (or
more in the case of joint offers or ties). The data about auctions include dates,
deadlines, winning offer prices, the number of competitors (initial and after potential
exclusions), deposits and point differences between winners and runners-up.
Merged sample
As mentioned in Section 1.2.3, firms’ financial data is merged with auction data
by their name, city, and legal form. If the last two do not agree, I check firm’s his-
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tory in the Polish National Court Register (KRS), which has an excellent coverage
and is available online. The ID number for Polish firms in the Orbis database relies
on the official register number from the Polish Central Statistical Office also used
by National Court Register. It lowers the risk of confusing two companies with a
similar name or a company that changed its name. Table A.1 presents percentages
of successfully merged auctions with firm data by auction award year.
I focus on public auctions from 2010 to 2014. The end of the observation period
is dictated by the data availability. The beginning is set to 2010 in order to capture
the period of relative stability in the construction industry. Figure A.1 depicts the
overall situation in the Polish construction industry, including that road construc-
tion. It shows that the industry was thriving around 2007. The boom phase lasted
a few years and ended around 2009. Section 1.6.1 makes a comparison between
auctions by year, including 2008 and 2009. An extended sample has fewer variables
available and worse data coverage.
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Figure A.1: Boom in general construction industry around 2007.
Notes: This figure shows business tendency in general construction. There was a boom in construc-
tion around 2006–2008. Source: Business tendency in industry, construction, trade and services
from 2000 to 2018, July 2018, pp.18, Polish Central Statistical Office.
Table A.1: Merging success rates by auction award year.
Award Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Merged 91.28% 87.17% 86.03% 90.10% 90.23% 87.62% 87.77%
Notes: This table shows the percentage of successfully merged auction observations with the
financial data by auction award year.
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1.12.2 Other Tables and Figures
Table A.2: Firm performance after auctions: Auction pairs.
All contracts
Contracts below
10 million PLN
Post -0.46 0.77
(1.05) (1.03)
Win 0.68 -0.12
(0.74) (0.74)
Post x Win -0.80 -2.30∗
(1.14) (1.26)
Auction FE X X
Year FE X X
Obs 1675 1295
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of winning an auction on firm’s subsequent performance.
The specification is presented in Equation 1.1. Group FE are replaced with Auction FE and the
sample includes only auctions for which the data on both winner and runner-up are available. The
dependent variable is defined as: profit margin = EBT/sales. The dummy Win identifies firms
that won an auction in a given year. The dummy Post distinguishes the pre-award period from
the post-award period. Standard errors are clustered at the auction level. Sample: limited and
unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014; no restriction on
firms’ participation to avoid decreasing the sample size. Subsample Contracts below 10 million
PLN excludes auctions in which winning offer is above 10 million PLN. Data are winsorized at the
0.1% level.
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Table A.3: Firm performance after auctions: Controlling for firms participating only
once per year.
Profit
margin
Post 1.37
(1.10)
Win 0.66
(0.55)
Post x Win -2.45∗∗∗
(0.91)
One 0.80
(0.51)
One x Post -0.41
(0.97)
Group FE X
Year FE
Obs 4330
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: This regression shows the impact of winning an auction on firm’s subsequent performance.
The specification is presented in Equation 1.1, but additionally includes controls for infrequent
participation - One and One × Post. The dummy One identifies firms that in a given year
participate only once. The dependent variable is defined as: profit margin = EBT/sales. The
dummy Win identifies firms that won an auction in a given year. The dummy Post distinguishes
the pre-award period from the post-award period. Standard errors are clustered at the auction
group level. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved from
2010 to 2014; firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Data are winsorized
at the 0.1% level.
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Table A.4: Firm performance after auctions: EBITDA.
EBITDA (pre-award assets)
Post 1.62
(2.19)
Win -0.081
(1.70)
Post x Win -4.04∗
(2.22)
Group FE X
Year FE X
Obs 3130
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: This regression shows the impact of winning an auction on firm’s subsequent performance.
The specification is presented in Equation 1.1. The dependent variable is defined as: EBITDA
scaled by average total assets in two year before award. The dummy Win identifies firms that
won an auction in a given year. The dummy Post distinguishes the pre-award period from the
post-award period. Errors are clustered at the auction group level. Sample: limited and unlimited
auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014; no restriction on firms’
participation to avoid decreasing the sample size. Data are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Table A.5: Firm performance after auctions: Without year 2012.
Profit
margin
ROA
(EBT)
ROA
(NI)
ROA (EBT,
pre-award assets)
ROA (NI,
pre-award assets)
Post 0.58 3.29∗ 3.34∗ 3.29∗ 2.68∗
(0.85) (1.72) (1.71) (1.87) (1.60)
Win 0.73 0.68 0.80 1.24 1.33
(0.58) (1.24) (1.25) (1.52) (1.55)
Post x Win -1.78∗∗ -4.79∗∗∗ -5.15∗∗∗ -4.81∗∗∗ -4.00∗∗∗
(0.82) (1.57) (1.57) (1.65) (1.33)
Group FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Obs 3280 3360 3355 3360 3360
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of winning an auction on firm’s subsequent performance.
The sample excludes auctions resolved in year 2012. The specification is presented in Equation 1.1.
The dependent variables are defined as: profit margin = EBT/sales, ROA (EBT) = EBT/total as-
sets, ROA (NI) = net income/total assets, ROA (EBT, lagged assets) = EBT/(average total assets
before award), ROA (NI, lagged assets) = net income/(average total assets before award). The
dummy Win identifies firms that won an auction in a given year. The dummy Post distinguishes
the pre-award period from the post-award period. Standard errors are clustered at the auction
group level. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants resolved in
years 2010, 2011, 2013 or 2014; firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014. Data
are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Figure A.2: Firms’ participation in auctions: All firms.
Notes: This figure presents frequencies with which the same firm re-appears in the sample in
different years. A firm is counted when it ranks in the top two in an auction. The dashed line
reflects the cut-off used in the main sample. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or
more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014.
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Figure A.3: Propensity score distribution.
Notes: This figure presents the distribution of the propensity score in the raw and matched sample
by rank. The matching procedure follows that of Ho et al. (2007). Firms are matched based on
average pre-award assets, auction impact, and auction award year. Sample: limited and unlimited
auctions with three or more participants resolved from 2010 to 2014.
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Figure A.4: Treatment effect around the award year (Cash flows).
Notes: This figure shows the treatment effect (the impact of winning an auction) separately for
each year around the auction award. The dashed line distinguishes the pre-award period from
the post-award period. The top panel presents the sample of all contracts; the bottom-left panel
presents the short-term contracts lasting fewer than eight months; the bottom-right panel presents
long-term contracts lasting eight months or more. The dependent variable is defined as: cash flow
(fixed assets) = cash flow/fixed assets. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more
participants resolved from 2010 to 2014; firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to
2014. Data are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Figure A.5: Treatment effect around the award year (Cash flows): Long-term con-
tracts.
Notes: This figure shows the treatment effect (the impact of winning an auction) separately for
each year around the auction award for long-term contracts. The dashed line distinguishes the
pre-award period from the post-award period. The top panel presents contracts resolved in the
beginning of the year (first half of the year); bottom panel presents contracts resolved in the end
of the year (second half of the year). The dependent variable is defined as: cash flow (fixed assets)
= cash flow/fixed assets. Sample: limited and unlimited auctions with three or more participants
resolved from 2010 to 2014; and firms participating in 40 or fewer auctions from 2010 to 2014.
Data are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
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Chapter 2
Financial markets and regional
economic development.
2.1 Introduction
In this paper we show that the heterogeneous response of the labour market to
cash flow shocks reveals novel information about the credit market in the U.S. at the
county level. The uniqueness of the study lies in the identification strategy, which
is based on the announcement of reversing the direction of flow in a major crude oil
pipeline. Specific structure of the event creates a one-year gap between the news of
the shock and its realization. Thanks to that we can provide causal evidence that
even in developed countries access to local financing can facilitate economic growth
through job creation.
In recent years after the Great Recession more attention is paid to the role of
financial intermediaries. It is believed that access to credit facilitated by banks in-
fluences firms’ behaviour. However, there is little empirical research that would in
a causal setup precisely estimate the extent to which those financial constraints are
present. It is challenging to measure them directly due to issues with endogeneity,
so finding the experiment was essential.
Financial intermediaries can be especially helpful in providing credit after an
investment opportunity shock. Insufficient access to credit can lead to underinvest-
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ment and low growth. Consequences of inadequate local economic growth are dire
and range from unemployment and forced labour mobility, spillovers from one sector
to another, or even skewed outcomes of elections. However, it is worth investigating
if this type of process is relevant to the U.S., a developed economy with plenty of
big financial institutions that have vast resources to invest in firms and presumably
face small financial constraints.
The difficulty in answering this question lies in finding a credible quasi-natural
experiment that would allow to establish a causal relationship between access to
financing and local employment levels. In the paper we exploit variation triggered
by infrastructural developments in the oil industry that exogenously affected firms
in a region called Bakken Formation, which occupies parts of Montana and North
Dakota. The particular event that we use is the reversal of the direction of the flow
of Seaway pipeline. It allowed to transport crude from Cushing, OK to refineries
in Texas, reducing the oversupply in the storage hub and price disparities between
domestic and foreign oil. The advantage of the approach relies on the specific struc-
ture of the event that creates a one-year gap between dates of the announcement,
so the news of income shock, and the actual realization of the shock. It eliminates
the problem of reverse causality and accentuates the role of financial constraints.
The paper shows that the presence of robust financial institutions at a county
level in the U.S., which is considered a developed market, has potential to affect
the responsiveness of local economic growth1 to cash flow shocks. Furthermore, our
results suggest that geographical closeness of lenders and borrowers that is likely to
alleviate asymmetric information issues inherent in corporate financing plays a big
role in ability to react to income shocks.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. All oil producers operating in the
Bakken Formation learn that they are going to receive a positive cash flow shock
in the future because their product will no longer be trapped in the storage hub
in Cushing, OK. Those that are located within counties with relatively good access
1Due to data availability local development is measured by quarterly employment at a county
level.
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to finance can borrow funds in order to respond to the news immediately. New
investment is accomplished by drilling new wells, which requires an increase in the
number of jobs in the oil sector in the quarter of the announcement. Consequentially,
we demonstrate that quarterly employment in the oil sector increases substantially
more in those counties that have deep financial markets instantly. The value of
the response that we find is relatively big which is consistent with the nature of
the oil production process because employment is needed mostly during the drilling
phase and can be subsequently greatly reduced. However, investment in counties
with poor banking is delayed until the realization of the actual income shock, which
corresponds to the time when the infrastructure project is completed.
The causal interpretation in the analysis relies on the specific nature of the shock.
The gap between the news and the moment cash flows reach the regions creates in-
centives for firms rather than banks to respond at the time of the announcement.
This is crucial in order to claim that the pre-existing banking network is not cor-
related with the future investment opportunities anticipated after the shock. Any
other shock to the oil industry without such a specific timing structure would not
allow us to disentangle the response coming from more productive counties from the
one originating in less financially constrained counties. It is therefore necessary to
control for other oil industry shocks.
Additionally, using constraints in infrastructure to study the employment re-
sponse in the oil sector by exploiting heterogeneity in access to finance requires
making some assumptions about the banking sector. Specifically, that the banking
industry did not experience any significant development at the time of the announce-
ment or that bank location and size are not endogenous. Since financial development
is heterogeneous rather than exogenous, looking at differential response to the an-
nouncement can lead to distorted estimates due to underlying differences behind
the development of the financial sector. Finally, even though there is little corre-
lation between financial depth measures that are used in the paper and mean oil
production before the gap in oil price indices emerged, one could be concerned that
something happened in the banking sector (or the whole economy) at the same time
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as the reversal was announced, which would further bias the results.
In order to address those concerns, we extend the analysis by including another
region, called Niobrara Formation, which was affected by the shale revolution and
inadequate infrastructure but could not benefit from the Seaway pipeline reversal.
Increased outbound capacity form Cushing, OK could benefit only producers well
connected to the hub. Niobrara did not gain immediately after the reversal due
to insufficient pipeline infrastructure at the time. Therefore firms operating in this
region are expected not to react after the announcement even if they are located in
counties with deep financial markets because they cannot benefit from the project.
The increase in employment observed in Bakken region compared to Niobrara is
driven by counties with local access to deep financial markets, confirming the base-
line results. The interaction term of announcement and banking measure is not sig-
nificant, which suggests that the effect discovered in original difference-in-difference
regression with Bakken region cannot be simply attributed to developments in bank-
ing sector.
Our main banking measure relies on the physical existence of commercial banks.
However, the results are also consistent if we focus on the amount of commercial
loans granted locally. The measures based on the amount of commercial assets avail-
able in the county has turned out inconsistent. It seems that it is not the availability
of funds that matters but rather a willingness to finance oil projects which is prob-
ably best measured by a physical presence of a branch or historical lending activity.
Those measures perhaps reflect the presence of bankers who have developed personal
relationships with firms and know their businesses and oil industry overall.
Nonetheless, we find that even in developed countries regions with deeper finan-
cial markets, so those with more bank branches rather than those with more funds
available, react faster to investment opportunity shocks.
Oil industry and in particular the U.S. shale revolution have been recently closely
examined in an array of research articles. The scope of these papers ranges from de-
scriptive studies documenting the impact of the boom (for example Decker (2016))
to structural analysis (for example Allcott and Keniston (2014) or Caldara et al.
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(2018)) to the ones using oil and natural gas shale discoveries as a quasi-experiment
to identify the influence of shocks on economic outcomes (for example Feyrer et al.
(2017) who estimate the degree to which economic shocks propagate locally). Our
paper adds to this body of work in a number of ways.
First, we complement the literature that studies the infrastructure in the oil sec-
tor. Borenstein and Kellogg (2014) as well as Kilian (2016) were among the first
to discuss the economic consequences of inadequate infrastructure in the industry.
They show that discrepancy between the Midwest and international crude oil prices
did not pass through to gasoline prices. We start the analysis by examining the
bottlenecks in the pipeline system. However, we differ from other authors by focus-
ing specifically on the Seaway pipeline reversal and developing a quasi-experimental
design. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to propose a pipeline reversal
as an experiment in order to identify causal relationship in data.
Second, we target the link between the timing of investment in the infrastructure
(and therefore employment in the industry) in response to positive income shocks.
Kellogg (2014) and Anderson et al. (2018) provide crucial evidence on how drilling
activity is connected to changes in employment in the sector. Our paper leverages
on their findings by emphasizing the gap between the announcement and realization
of the cash flow shock and positing when it is optimal for firms to react. This allows
us to investigate whether access to local financing can facilitate economic develop-
ment.
Our paper also adds to the growing empirical literature on the physical proximity
between lenders and borrowers2 and resulting financial constraints. Early papers,
for example Petersen and Rajan (2002) or Berger (2003), based on the idea that
innovation in banking and information technology (wide adoption of credit scores
etc.) reduces importance of location, argued that proximity between lenders and
borrowers is becoming less significant even in small business lending. This can be
explained by improvements in lender productivity due to technological change which
reduces the need for face-to-face interactions between the lender and borrower. Fur-
2For some recent studies see Brevoort et al. (2010) or Agarwal and Hauswald (2010).
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thermore, some authors, for example Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Kroszner and
Strahan (1999), Bertrand et al. (2007) or Tewari (2014), have emphasized the effects
of ongoing bank deregulation in facilitating growth, entrepreneurship, and lending
to consumers.
However, more recent papers have documented significant correlations between
distance and credit outcomes. This was largely done by looking at either survey
data or data obtained from a single lender. Among papers that are most closely
related to ours are Nguyen (2019), who uses exogenous variation in exposure to post-
merger branch consolidation as an instrument to show how distance shapes credit
allocation, or Bonfim et al. (2018), who use matching estimator to study lending
relationships between firms and bank branches. In contrast, we use differences-in-
differences approach in a plausible quasi-experimental design.
Finally, our paper relates to a number of recent studies which examined how the
shale oil revolution can be used to investigate financial markets. Gilje (2019) shows
that external finance dependence and presence of small banks shapes firms’ response
to shock in funds availability. Plosser (2014) provides evidence on how extra funds
are allocated between liquid assets as opposed to loans. Gilje et al. (2016) document
that banks exposed to shale booms have greater capacity to originate and hold new
loans in non-boom counties. Gilje (2016) analyses how firms engage in risk-shifting
when distressed. Our paper adds to this literature by providing completely different
quasi-exogenous variation that can be used in future studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2.2 we present the set-
ting and characteristics of the pipeline infrastructure in the U.S. as well as discuss
the validity of the quasi-experiment used in the identification procedure. Section
2.3 describes datasets and sample selected to be used in the empirical part. Next
section, 2.4, discusses methodology, including identification assumptions, empirical
specification and controls, and treatment and control group characteristics. Section
2.5 presents the evidence of importance of local financial markets to local economic
development by comparing response in employment immediately after the announce-
ment of the shock to the change after the realization of the event. In Section 2.6,
90
we offer several additional robustness checks. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Institutional setting
Since the World War II, the United States is divided into five regions called
Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts (PADDs) as presented in Figure
2.1. West Coast (PADD V) and East Coast (PADD I) are significantly disjoint from
the other three districts in the central part of the U.S. in terms of oil transportation
and trade, which will play a significant role in the identification strategy presented
in the paper. In the following section we focus on briefly characterising pipeline
infrastructure in the U.S. and the challenges it posed to the oil industry focusing on
the Gulf Coast, Midwest and Rocky Mountain (PADDs II to IV).
2.2.1 Infrastructure bottleneck
Before the shale oil revolution started, most oil refined domestically had been
imported to the U.S. via Gulf and East Coast ports3 and then if need be transported
further inland. Domestic crude oil production has also been concentrated in that re-
gion since the discovery of the Spindletop oilfield that prompted the Texas oil boom
in early twentieth century and paved the way for mass consumption of petroleum as
fuel. Drilling offshore Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama across the Gulf
of Mexico soon became another major source of kerosene.
The emergence of the extraction part of the industry was accompanied by a rapid
development of oil refineries in the Gulf Coast area.4 Only some of the petroleum
was transported north to the Midwest through a system of interstate pipelines. One
of the most important transshipment points on the way is located in Cushing, OK.
The area became a major storage place and a trading hub and is also where the West
3For example the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (https://www.loopllc.com/About/History) has
been the largest point of entry for waterborne crude oil imported to the U.S. and is the single
domestic port suitable to serve biggest crude oil carriers in the world.
4The region is responsible for about half of the overall domestic refining capacity.
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Texas Intermediate5 is priced and delivered. Since Cushing, OK, has connected Gulf
Cost suppliers of crude oil with the northern parts of the U.S. for years the pipeline
infrastructure was oriented northbound.
Surprisingly, basins in the North became significant after advances in technology
made hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling viable production methods. Large
shale oil formations, like the Bakken Formation occupying parts of North Dakota
and Montana, as well as the Niobrara formation in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming
rapidly gained on importance as tight oil deposits suddenly became recoverable.
Just within years of the start of the shale boom extraction in PADDs II and III
tripled in volume.6
Existing infrastructure allowed the ever-increasing amounts of shale oil to be
transported South, to the hub located in Cushing, OK, but not further down to re-
fineries scattered across the Gulf Coast, where one would naturally want the crude
to be. The thick pipeline net was focused on transporting crude and refined products
into the interior of the continent, and not to the Gulf Coast. Inadequate pipeline
infrastructure oriented northbound and increasing production in the North finally
caused an oil glut in Cushing, OK. Surplus of domestic oil was then reinforced by
inflow of Canadian crude, production of which was triggered by the same surge in
oil price and availability of new technologies that caused the shale oil revolution in
the U.S.
Growing imbalance between in- and outbound capacity in Cushing, OK, became
visible in prices in the end of 2010. In the next six months the gap between the
price of oil in Cushing (measured by the West Texas Intermediate index) and the
price in international markets (measured by the Brent index) reached over 20% and
persisted for a few years as shown in Figure 2.2. Even though refiners on the Gulf
Coast would be willing to buy cheaper domestic oil instead of the imported variety,
5West Texas Intermediate is commonly abbreviated as WTI. Alongside Brent, which is priced
in London, it is a commonly used benchmark for oil prices. The name itself denotes a grade of the
crude oil.
6Crude oil production data is recorded by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. For
the latest data see: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet crd crpdn adc mbblpd a.htm.
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it was largely limited by the lack of efficient means of transportation.7
The glut was significantly alleviated when one of the main pipelines connecting
Texas with Midlands was reversed.8 The project initially involved converting a gas
pipeline, but was subsequently replaced with the idea to reverse the flow of crude
oil in an already existing pipeline. This has been known in the literature and news
as the Seaway Reversal and marks a revolution in the crude transportation map of
the U.S.9
The Seaway Crude Pipeline System, called Seaway for short, initially run from
Freeport, TX to Cushing, OK (through the Texas City, Texas Terminal and Dis-
tribution System) and carried petroleum to the North consistently since 1996. In
May 2012 two midstream companies, Enterprise Product and Enbridge, completed a
joint-venture project to reverse the flow direction of the pipeline to transport crude
oil from Cushing, OK to Freeport, TX.10
Crucially, the intention to resolve the oil glut in Cushing was first publicized in
April 2011 - over a year before the project completion date. The gap between the an-
nouncement and realization dates is essential for the identification strategy proposed
in this paper. Since it was the first viable solution to the pipeline infrastructure prob-
lem since the disparity between the WTI and Brent indices emerged, focusing on the
announcement helps eliminating the potential reverse causality. What is more, it
uniquely allows us to document the presence and investigate the degree of financial
constraints in a developed market economy. We return to this point when discussing
the optimal time for drilling firms to react to income shocks.
7Due to the inadequate pipeline infrastructure producers and refineries were forced to use alter-
native means of moving oil, primarily rail or boat, despite significantly higher charges per barrel
and lower reliability. Continuous productivity improvements in the shale oil extraction process
that coincided with infrastructure bottleneck partially lessened the problem.
8The layout and direction of oil flow of major interstate pipelines in PADDS II trough IV and
Canada is presented in Figure 2.3
9For example: “This is the first project announced since we started seeing a big spread between
crude in the Midcontinent and on the Gulf Coast, Colson, [...] The first pipeline to solve that
problem is going to be valuable.” (See: https://fuelfix.com/blog/2011/04/26/enterprise-energy-
transfer-partners-plan-cushing-to-houston-pipeline/ ).
10Initially, it was operating at a limited capacity of 150b/d. Full utilization of 400b/d has not
started until January 2013.
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2.2.2 Financing the investment in oil extraction
Domanski et al. (2015) estimate that the total debt of the oil and gas sector
globally amounts to $2.5 trillion in 2015. Sure enough the shale oil industry is
known for heavy reliance on external capital to develop new projects. According to
ThomsonONE oil industry is financed by a combination of equity, project finance,
and bonds, however the majority of the capital is provided through bank loans,11
including so-called reserve-based loans. Small-to-medium-sized borrowers who are
typically responsible for oilfield services (like services, seismic interpretations or
drilling contracts) particularly rely on traditional sources of finance as they lack
direct access to institutional markets.
The crucial decision each drilling firm has to make when facing uncertainty is
when it is optimal for it to react to income shocks. It has been shown by Anderson et
al. (2018)12 that oil production from existing wells does not respond to price shocks
because it is constrained by reservoir pressure, which decays as oil is extracted.
Instead firms adjust their production via decisions about new drilling by either
accelerating or postponing investment. Even though Anderson et al. establish this
by looking at oil production form existing wells in Texas, it is reasonable to expect
that the same pattern occurs in Bakken and Niobrara.
However, drilling a well requires extensive planning in advance (seismological
surveys, mineral rights, covering bond, environmental impact assessment, creating
infrastructure, mapping etc.). For example, planning and permitting process in
Colorado13 may take as long as a year to complete, before the well can be scheduled
for drilling. Furthermore, drilling itself of a typical onshore oil well can take between
1 and 3 months14 (horizontal drilling requires twice as much time as vertical drilling
and additional time is needed to make the well fully operational). This provides some
11Source: Brogan (2014).
12For additional reference see Kellogg (2014).
13For details on the regulatory process for permitting and tracking an oil or gas well
(http://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/about/general/RegProcessPermitandTrackingWell.pdf ).
14For example, analysis based on proprietary survey data provided by the Oklahoma Oil and Gas
Association can be found at http://okoga.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/OK-Oil-Gas-Well-
Drilling-OKOGA.pdf.
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rationale behind conjecture that firms need to react as soon as they learn about the
positive news regarding transport opportunities and closure of gap between Brent
and WTI instead of waiting until the reversal is complete.
2.2.3 Differences in the North
Finally, it is important to distinguish between two shale oil producing regions in
the North, Bakken and Niobrara Formations. The fundamental difference between
them lies in how they were affected by the announcement of and the subsequent
Seaway Pipeline reversal. Due to extremely limited capacity of interstate pipelines
connecting Niobrara and Cushing, OK, the increased outbound capacity from the oil
hub benefited only producers operating in the Bakken area, which were connected
through the Keystone and Enbridge pipelines. At the time oil fields in Wyoming,
Nebraska or Colorado lacked the necessary infrastructure to directly gain from the
reversal. This interpretation was confirmed in the following years when additional
infrastructure projects were announced that aimed to connect Niobrara to Cushing,
OK.
Differences between the two regions are depicted in Figure 2.3. While oil pro-
duced in Bakken can be shipped south through the system of major pipelines, Nio-
brara’s output is limited to 175 thousand barrels per day. Historically, relatively
small amounts of traditionally extracted oil were refined in local refineries, therefore
there was no need for extensive infrastructure connecting to refineries in the south.
After the shale boom however, local refineries could no longer meet the market de-
mand.
To further corroborate the differences between Niobrara and Bakken we present
Figure 2.4, which highlights the response in pipeline transports of crude oil after the
announcement, reversal, and expansion of the project. Shipment from both regions
to Cushing, OK, remains unaffected after the news of the reversal becomes public
reflecting the already fully utilised pipeline capacities. However, as predicted the
volume transported from Bakken to PADD 3 reacts sharply at dates of the actual
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reversal and expansion, while figures for Niobrara are relatively stable.
In this paper we exploit the fact that the reversal, which reduced the oversup-
ply in Cushing, OK and accommodated the increase in production in the north,
differentially affected producers in Bakken (treated region) and Niobrara (control
region) plays. Therefore the two formations can potentially serve as quasi-natural
treatment and control groups in assessing the impact of financial constraints on
investment decisions.
2.3 Data description
All data used in this paper come from publicly available sources. Here we only
provide sources and briefly justify choices behind sample and variable selection pro-
cess.
2.3.1 Employment data
Data about the employment come from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators
(QWI) database published by the United States Census Bureau15 and collected
in cooperation with all state agencies. It contains local labour market statistics
disaggregated by industry, worker demographics, employer age and size. The QWI
is a product of the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics16 linked employer-
employee microdata, which includes 95% of private sector jobs thus providing rela-
tively precise description of the labour market dynamics at the county level.
One of the unique characteristics of the QWI is that they are job-level data that
track worker-employer pairs. The association between an individual and a partic-
ular firm provides data on worker flows (hires, separations, and turnover). We use
this feature by basing our empirical analysis on end-of-quarter employment.17 This
15Data are available publicly at https://qwiexplorer.ces.census.gov.
16For more information see: https://lehd.ces.census.gov/.
17Census definition: “when an individual receives earnings from the same employer in con-
secutive quarters, that individual is interpreted as having had an active job on the boundary
between the quarters”. According to Census the measure provides an “estimate of the number
of jobs on the last day of the quarter”. Source: Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics
(https://lehd.ces.census.gov/doc/QWI 101.pdf ).
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approach allows us to pin down the timing of the events more accurately.
Finally, we are able to identify employment broadly associated with the oil sec-
tor by restricting data using the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS). Our sample includes industries with codes 21 (Mining, Quarrying, and
Oil and Gas Extraction), 22 (Utilities), 23 (Construction18). It was not possible to
further decompose workers with 4 or 6 digit classification due to limited data avail-
ability. However, we believe that the selected sector levels are a good approximation
of the petroleum industry in Bakken and Niobrara and provide a good measure of
economic activity that could be associated with the news of Seaway Pipeline reversal.
2.3.2 Banking data
Information about physical location of bank branches19 as well as banks’ as-
sets and loans is taken from The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),20
which features quarterly financial statistics for the U.S. We use these data to con-
struct various measures of the depth of financial sector at the county level to reflect
the ability of oil related companies to borrow money for new investment. As we
argued in Section 2.2.2 access to loans is crucial for the oil industry because of its
high capital intensity. Therefore we expect that measures of banking development
will be informative about the speed with which firms can react to business oppor-
tunities.
Furthermore, we take advantage of an indicator variable provided by the FDIC
that describes institution’s primary specialization in terms of asset concentration.
18Including Utility System Construction.
19Definition of branch/office by FDIC: “A branch/office is any location, or facility, of a financial
institution, including its main office, where deposit accounts are opened, deposits are accepted,
checks paid, and loans granted. Some branches include, but are not limited to, brick and mor-
tar locations, detached or attached drive-in facilities, seasonal offices, offices on military bases
or government installations, paying/receiving stations or units, non-deposit offices, Internet and
PhoneBanking locations where a customer can open accounts, make deposits and borrow money.
A branch does not include Automated Teller Machines (ATM), Consumer Credit Offices, Contrac-
tual Offices, Customer Bank Communication Terminals (CBCT), Electronic Fund Transfer Units
(EFTU), and Loan Production Offices Summary of Deposits information is required for each in-
sured office located in any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or
any U.S. territory or possession such as Guam or the U.S. Virgin Islands, without regard to the
location of the main office.”
20https://www.fdic.gov/
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In order to increase precision of estimates by capturing lending to business (rather
than households) we focus our empirical analysis on banks that belong to the cat-
egory: Commercial Lending Specialization.21 According to the definition these are
“institutions whose commercial and industrial loans, plus real estate construction
and development loans, plus loans secured by commercial real estate properties ex-
ceed 25 percent of total assets.”
Finally institutions are matched with their locations using a unique number as-
signed by the FDIC for the purpose of issuance of insurance certificates.
2.3.3 Other data and information sources
We supplement the analysis with various data and information sources that help
validating the quasi-experiment, increase the precision of regression estimates and
allow to verify sample unbiasedness.
County level data on monthly oil production was hand-collected from state agen-
cies in Bakken and Niobrara regions.22 Other data on oil sector (such as pipeline
transportation between PADDs etc.) as well as maps and diagrams were taken
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.23 Finally, information on the
oil supply chain and pipeline infrastructure is derived from the report Crude Oil
Infrastructure published by the National Petroleum Council.24
County characteristics used as controls in all specifications come from 2010
United States Census and include information on population, area, and density.
WTI and Brent crude oil price indices were taken from Bloomberg.
21Other categories include: International, Agricultural, Credit-card, Mortgage Lending, Con-
sumer Lending or Other Specializations.
22For example: Industrial Commission, Department of Mineral Resources, Oil and Gas Divi-
sion in North Dakota (https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/ ) or Oil & Gas Conservation Commission
(http://wogcc.wyo.gov/ ) in Wyoming
23https://www.eia.gov/
24The National Petroleum Council (https://www.npc.org/ ) is a federally chartered and privately
funded advisory committee, which was established by the Secretary of the Interior in 1946.
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2.3.4 Selected sample and summary statistics
Counties were selected based on information provided by state agencies and the
EIA to capture the underlying geological landscape of Bakken and Niobrara Forma-
tions. We then extended the list by including neighbouring counties with consistent
positive oil production as they would likely be interconnected with local pipeline
systems and would be therefore potentially impacted by the announcement of the
reversal. This was made possible using hand-collected data on monthly oil produc-
tion in all counties. Our sample consists of 105 counties, 35% of which are in Bakken
and 62% have good access to banking. Maps presenting geographical distribution
of counties are in the Appendix (Figures B.1, B.2 and B.3). Full list of counties is
also included in the Appendix (Table B.1).
We have restricted the time window to a period of relatively stable oil prices to
decrease the role of market volatility in addition to using fixed time effects. The
main analysis based on level of employment in the oil sector is carried on the sample
ranging from 2010q1 to 2013q2. Earlier years have been additionally used to estab-
lished trends or scaling. We can extend the sample to range from 2004q1 to 2013q2
when we measure changes in employment. Details can be found in Section 2.4.1.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the selected sample and includes coun-
ties with deep and shallow banking sectors as well as from Bakken and Niobrara
regions. Standard deviations of population, area, and therefore density are rela-
tively large, reflecting differences in administrative divisions in the U.S. However,
states like North Dakota and Montana (Bakken) as well as Wyoming, Nebraska,
and Kansas (Niobrara) are relatively less populated than the rest of country. Oil
sector plays an important role in the economies of selected counties as about 5% of
the population is working within broadly defined sector.25 Even though the U.S. is
a financially developed country there are still vast differences in access to physical
branch locations as the median (1) substantially differs from the mean (8.25), par-
tially reflecting differences between cities and urban locations. However, two other
25For details about the definition of employment and sector see 2.3.1.
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measures of bank development, loans and assets per capita, also suggest diversity
across regions.
2.4 Empirical strategy
2.4.1 Identification
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the causal impact of local banking on eco-
nomic development. The usual difficulty with such a task is the possibility of reverse
causality. To provide causal interpretation it is necessary to disentangle the impact
of banking on local economy from the fact that regions with better investment op-
portunities may attract more banks.
In this paper we exploit a quasi-natural experiment triggered by the big infras-
tructure investment in the oil pipeline network in the U.S.26 The flow reversal in
one of the big pipelines facilitates the transport of oil produced in the northern
shale oil basins. The new route increases the price received by producers because
extracted oil was previously stuck in overfilled storage hubs. The announcement of
the project creates a positive intertemporal cash flow shock in regions connected to
the discussed pipeline. Since the actual cash flows are not affected until the project
is finalised, the shock exposes to treatment only areas with good access to financing.
Oil producers have incentives to respond to improvement in investment opportuni-
ties immediately because increasing oil production takes time. However, they may
not have resources to do so and the access to local financing alleviates this problem.
The advantage is temporary because increased cash flows realized after the pipeline
launch should reduce firms’ financial constraints. Most importantly, the news affects
firms’ investment opportunities, but is not correlated with the existing banking net-
work. Therefore we can evaluate the causal impact of the pre-existing local banking
network on economic development in a difference-in-differences setting. The baseline
26Details were described in Section 2.2.
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specification is as follows:
yit = αi + βIInterimt + βIBInterimt ×Banki + βPPostt +
+ βPBPostt ×Banki + it, (2.1)
where the dependent variable yit is a measure of local development in county i at
time t. αi denotes county fixed effects that account for time-invariant differences
between counties. The dummy Banki distinguishes between counties with deep and
shallow banking sector. It does not appear separately because it is absorbed by
county-level fixed effects. The regression is estimated on the sample of counties
affected by the new pipeline project (Bakken region).
The dummy Interimt identifies a period after the announcement and before the
pipeline launch. It is equal to one from 2011q2 to 2012q1 (four quarters). The
dummy Postt is equal to one from 2012q2 onwards (five quarters) and identifies
the pipeline launch. We include these dummies instead of a full set of time effects
because we want to directly observe the impact of the announcement and the launch
also on counties without deep financial markets. We adjust the data for quarterly
seasonality, and the exact procedure is discussed in the following paragraphs.
Coefficients βIB and βPB estimate the causal impact of local access to financing
on local development when future expected cash flows increase, and when the actual
cash flows increase. it are random disturbances. Standard errors are robust and not
clustered at the county level due to relatively small number of different counties in
the sample. Therefore the significance of the coefficients needs to be analysed with
caution as it may be overestimated due to possible within-county error correlation.
The issue is briefly discussed in Section 2.6.
Local development is measured based on county employment in the oil sector.
It is a meaningful measure of development and producers’ response to the positive
intertemporal cash flow shock because increasing future oil production involves in-
vestment in new oil wells. Pure maintenance of existing wells does not require many
employees, but additional workforce is necessary for drilling. Employment is mea-
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sured at the end of the quarter either in levels or as a change relative to a previous
quarter. In both cases it is scaled with average employment in the oil sector in a
county three years before the announcement (2008q2–2011q1). As an alternative,
we scale the dependent variable with a county population (published in 2010 U.S.
Census). Scaling is necessary due to substantial variability in sizes of populations
and oil sectors in the counties.
Employment and oil production are both subject to seasonal fluctuations and
require adjustment. Otherwise a seasonal change may be mistakenly interpreted as
a consequence of the event. We estimate and subtract quarterly fixed effects for
each county separately. The estimation is based on the pre-event sample (2004q1–
2010q4) to ensure the event itself does not impact the results. For the development
measure based on employment in levels we must also account for the trend. It is not
an easy task because there is a trend change around 2010q1. We cut the sample at
2010q1, estimate the trend based on the pre-announcement period (2010q1-2011q1)
and continue the analysis on the detrended time series. The weakness of this ap-
proach is the short observation window used for trend estimations, but the plots of
errors and fitted values do not raise any concerns (Figures B.4 and B.5). It is not
necessary to eliminate the trend from the second measure of employment based on
quarterly changes. The dependent variables are additionally winsorized to account
for outliers.
We consider several binary measures of local banking development. All the mea-
sures rely on banking data from one year before the event (2010q2). The measure
based on Branches is equal to one for counties with at least one bank branch. It
reflects the idea that access to financing is limited if a firm is not in a close proximity
to the bank branch. It is refined by excluding branches which grant few loans, i.e.
for which the overall amount of commercial lending is below the tenth percentile.27
The second measure, Loans, is based on commercial loans granted in a county. It is
equal to one if the amount of loans granted in a county is above the sample median
or the amount of loans relative to the population is above the sample median. This
27The percentile is calculated based on counties in which the lending is positive.
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measure captures the idea that access to financing can be measured by the scale of
lending. Finally, the third measure, Assets, relies on banks’ assets. It is equal to one
if banks’ assets relative to a county population is above the sample median. The
scaling is necessary to avoid capturing only bigger or more populated counties.
The main assumption validating our regression (Equation 2.1) is that develop-
ment of the local banking system is independent of the investment opportunities in
the oil industry in the county. It is likely to be satisfied thanks to the specific time
structure of the event. First, the information about the future increase in cash flows
comes one year in advance. Second, investment in oil industry requires time. Hence
by measuring response of employment at the time of the announcement we are likely
to capture only the impact of access to local financing on firm’s ability to exploit
new investment opportunities. Existing banking network may be correlated with the
existing quality of oil reserves, but not necessarily with the productivity of new wells
since oil reserves are difficult to estimate and often found in completely new areas.
Also, banks do not have incentives to respond simultaneously with firms because
before the real cash flows are realized the uncertainty regarding quality of resources
is high. In this setting it is unlikely that banking development is correlated with
the area’s post-announcement investment opportunities. This feature alleviates the
problem of reverse causality.
2.4.2 Controlling for other oil industry and banking shocks
There is a concern stemming from the fact that oil sector depends on many dif-
ferent economic and political factors. Changes in oil industry may arise because
of the other shocks than the new pipeline infrastructure investment. In such a
scenario it would not be possible to prove that the effect is causal as the identifi-
cation assumption relies on the specific nature of the shock. Similarly, there could
be a macroeconomic shock to banking that would affect only counties with more
developed local banking sector. To address these concerns we extend the setting
and compare oil-producing counties from the region that suffers from insufficient
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pipeline infrastructure, but is not affected by the reversal (Niobrara). Introducing
another control region allows us to separate the effect of changes affecting the whole
oil industry or banking from the effect of the reversal. The extended specification is
a triple difference regression presented below:
yit = αi + βIInterimt + βIBInterimt ×Banki + βIT Interimt × Treati +
+ βITBInterimt × Treati ×Banki + βPPostt + βPBPostt ×Banki +
+ βPTPostt × Treati + βPTBPostt × Treati ×Banki + it. (2.2)
The notation is consistent with the previous specification (Equation 2.1). The
dummy Treati identifies regions affected by the reversal project, i.e. regions with a
convenient connection to the new pipeline before the announcement (Bakken). Sim-
ilarly to the dummy Banki, Treati does not appear separately, or as Treati×Banki,
because these dummies are absorbed by county-level fixed effects. The coefficient
βITB captures the influence of the announcement in counties with deep financial
markets relative to counties with shallow financial markets and affected by the in-
tertemporal cash flow shock as opposed to the unaffected region. Similarly, the
coefficient βPTB captures the influence of the pipeline launch. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the county level.
The dependent variables are adjusted for seasonality and trend in the same way
as in the previous specification. We include separate trends for the treated and
control counties.
The additional condition needed to justify the causal inference in the above spec-
ification regards the independence of oil infrastructure development and investment
opportunities in both oil regions. There is a valid concern that pipelines connecting
most profitable regions would be built first. However, we consider a reversal of an
existing pipeline and not building a new one. The choice which regions become
connected depends on historical structure of the oil industry in the U.S. and not
on the current investment opportunities in the regions. Therefore the identification
assumption is likely to hold.
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2.4.3 Treatment and control group characteristics
Table 2.2 characterises counties with better and worse access to local financing.
Not surprisingly, counties with more developed banking sectors have more commer-
cial bank branches, and banks there are on average bigger and grant more loans.
The difference in median number of bank branches is one and it actually determines
whether there is a local bank branch or not. Bank branches in counties with shallow
banking sectors are small and the scale of a difference in terms of assets per capita
is 8.65 to 7638.6 thousand dollars. Counties with better access to financing are also
more populated. Local oil sectors in these counties are bigger both in relative and
absolute terms. The share of employment in the oil sector in the population is,
however, of the same order and amounts to almost 8% and 5% in counties with deep
and shallow banking sectors respectively. Average oil production varies a lot in both
groups.
Table 2.3 provides county summary statistics by treatment status (Bakken vs
Niobrara). Bakken region, which was affected by the pipeline reversal, consists of
less populated counties in which local oil sectors are slightly more important. The
difference is not striking, though, since the average share of employment in oil sector
in population equals 6.4% and 5.1% in Bakken and Niobrara regions respectively.
Local banking sectors are more developed in the control region (Niobrara). This
disparity may be naturally related to population sizes since the amount of granted
commercial loans per capita is similar in both areas, especially in terms of a median
(14.6 vs 16.1). Also, the share of counties with deep financial markets is similar in
both regions.
While the methodology accounts for potential pre-event differences between the
treated and non-treated counties, the time-effects in the sub-groups are assumed to
be the same in the absence of treatment. In our setting it implies that the invest-
ment opportunities in the oil sector cannot be correlated with the treatment status
and the banking measures. The justification of this assumption has been discussed
in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. It the following paragraphs we support it further with a
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graphical illustration.
The stability of the differences between the treated and the control counties
also implies that economic development measures before the event plotted for both
regions should create parallel trajectories. As mentioned in the previous sections,
for the measure relying on employment in levels this claim has to hold in terms of
deviations from a trend. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 depict employment in the oil sector
over time. Each line represents the time series of scaled employment/employment
changes averaged across counties by treatment/control status and by deep/shallow
banking. Vertical lines indicate the announcement and the launch of the pipeline
reversal.
The lines are roughly parallel in the pre-announcement period. In the control
region they stay stable in the whole observation window. It confirms the assumption
that the control region has not been affected by the pipeline reversal. Treated coun-
ties respond, but the timing of the response is different depending on the depth of
the local financial markets. Counties with better access to financing (deep financial
markets) respond positively already around the announcement date, while employ-
ment in counties without good access to financing (shallow financial markets) stays
stable around the announcement. These counties, however, react at the end of the
observation window after the pipeline launch. It is also time when the increase in
employment in the affected counties with deep banking sectors fades away. The gap
between treated counties with deep and shallow banking sectors closes at the end of
the observation period.
The measure relying on employment changes is much noisier, but the pattern
is similar. Treated counties with better access to financing exhibit bigger changes
in employment in the period between announcement and launch. After the launch,
this behaviour immediately reverses and the affected counties with shallow banking
sectors are characterised on average by higher growth rates in employment, while
these rates drop for counties with deep banking sectors.
The presented figures confirm several key facts consistent with the hypothe-
sis that local financial markets facilitate local economic growth. Firstly, treated
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counties respond to the cash flow shock. Secondly, there is a clear reaction to the
announcement in the treated counties with deep financial markets. Finally, treated
counties with less developed banking sector respond to the cash flow shock with a
delay.
2.5 Importance of local financial markets
2.5.1 Response to the project announcement
Access to external financing increases firm’s ability to start new investment.
While it is not always true that delaying investment is bad, firms expecting higher
oil prices and greater transport capacity at a specific point in time in future have
additional incentives to produce more oil when the event happens. Increasing pro-
duction requires drilling new wells, hence firms need to plan in advance production
expansion. In our setting there is a four-quarter gap between the announcement
and realization of the new pipeline project. In order to increase production at the
time of the pipeline launch, firms should respond shortly after they learn about the
new opportunities. In this section we analyse the employment response of to the
shock at the time of announcement. Therefore the main coefficients of interest are
interactions with the dummy Interim. The interpretation of coefficients gives in-
sight about the causal role of banking in development because in the interim period
between announcement and launch the role of financial constraints is accentuated.
The analysis of the employment reaction post-launch is discussed later.
Measuring employment in levels after the project announcement
Table 2.4 shows the results of the baseline specification (Equation 2.1) using the
sample of counties affected by the reversal (Bakken). The left panel shows the esti-
mates when the dependent variable is scaled with the mean employment in the oil
sector and right panel when the dependent variable is scaled with county’s popula-
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tion.28 Each column corresponds to a different measure of county’s banking sector
development.
The results in the left panel confirm that financial markets have positive im-
pact on economic development. After the announcement the employment in the oil
sector increases in counties with better access to financing. The coefficient on the
interaction Interim×Bank is positive and significant, and amounts to 0.20− 0.46.
The post-announcement change in employment in the oil sector is on average higher
by around two–four people for every 10 people employed in counties with better
access to financing relative to counties with worse access to financing. It is a big
number, but it is consistent with the characteristics of oil industry. Fluctuations in
oil sector employment tend to be high because drilling new wells is a temporary ac-
tivity that requires much more labour than maintenance of the existing ones. More
importantly, we do not find any change in employment in counties with shallow
banking sectors. The results imply that, in general, firms without access to external
financing are not able to instantly respond to positive shocks to future investment
opportunities.
The results in the right panel are consistent for the first two banking measures.
The coefficients on the interaction term Interim×Bank are positive and significant.
The magnitudes are different because they are affected by the relative sizes of local
oil sectors. The coefficients on the Interim dummy are negative implying that in
the interim period the employment in the oil sector was falling.
The results for the banking measure based on assets are weaker in terms of
significance in the left panel and inconsistent in the right panel. We suspect that
the Assets measure is less informative about the availability of financing at the lo-
cal level. While assets capture bank’s ability to lend money, they may not reflect
bank’s willingness to engage in lending for oil-related projects. Firms may more
easily obtain a loan for drilling of oil wells if banks are smaller and local for several
reasons. Firstly, geographical closeness alleviates asymmetric information inherent
28For clarity, reported coefficients and standard errors based on regressions of employment scaled
with county population are multiplied by 100.
108
in corporate financing. Secondly, local banks are equipped with better expertise
about local industry, including oil. Finally, local banks are able to maintain better
relationships with entrepreneurs. Close borrower-lender relationships are less likely
to arise with banks operating at the bigger scale and at the national level. We drop
the asset-based measure of banking from the other reports.
Table 2.5 shows the results of the triple difference specification presented in Equa-
tion 2.2. The results are consistent with the previous conclusions that local financing
facilitates economic growth through job creation. The post-announcement reaction
in the affected region, Interim × Treat, is not significant (or is even negative in
the right panel). However, the post-announcement reaction in the affected counties
with deep financial markets (Interim×Treat×Bank) is positive and significant at
the 5% level. The coefficients have similar magnitudes as in the basic specification.
The drop in significance may result from the small testing power. There are only
35 treated counties and the sample period is relatively short considering the high
volatility of employment, oil production and oil prices. However, the loss of signifi-
cance may also come from more accurately measured standard errors. In the triple
difference specifications the errors are clustered at the county level.
Measuring employment in changes after the project announcement
In this section we replicate the previous estimations but measure economic de-
velopment with employment changes. Starting new drilling projects should increase
employment, and the impact is likely to be visible both in levels and changes. Even
though the measure relying on quarterly changes exhibits high volatility, it has an
advantage that there is no visible trend change over years. Hence by using this
measure we are able to extend the observation period.
Table 2.6 presents the baseline estimation results. The sample comprises of
counties affected by the new project (Bakken). The response of employment in the
oil sector following the project announcement is positive and significant in counties
with better access to local financing. It confirms the importance of local financing
in exploiting new investment opportunities and stimulating economic growth. Con-
109
clusions are the same for both types of scaling of the dependent variable.
Measuring employment in terms of growth rates also gives consistent results in
the extended sample. The estimates of the triple difference regressions are presented
in Table 2.7. The coefficients on the interaction, Interim×Treat×Bank, are posi-
tive and significant. The values are similar in magnitudes compared to the baseline
specification.
Overall, the results suggest that well-developed local banking sector has positive
and significant impact on local economic development. The conclusions are the same
when we measure development using employment levels and quarterly changes in
employment. The depth of the local banking sector can be consistently measured
by either the number (existence) of local bank branches or the scale of local lending.
2.5.2 Catching-up
The results from the previous section support the hypothesis that developed lo-
cal banking sector constitutes a crucial factor in economic development and is not
only a by-product in highly productive regions. Firms in counties with better access
to external financing are able to respond instantly (which we assume is optimal)
to improvement in future investment opportunities. If the response is indeed possi-
ble because of the local access to financing then firms in more constrained regions
should respond when the cash flows actually increase and improve their borrowing
capacity.
In this part we, therefore, examine what happens after the pipeline project is
realized. Most importantly, we are interested whether the areas limited by poor
access to financing are able to follow the trend or catch-up after the new pipeline
is launched. Identifying the response from more financially constrained counties is
not only interesting, but provides a relevant argument in support of the hypothesis
that the financial markets are behind the patterns in employment observed around
the announcement.
The launch of the pipeline increases profitability of companies by increasing
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prices obtained from selling oil, reducing transportation costs and increasing quan-
tities that firms are able to sell.29 The intuitive graphical analysis presented in Sec-
tion 2.4.3 already indicated the possibility of catching-up, i.e. that affected counties
without good financing options respond to the discussed shock with a delay after the
expected cash flows are realized. The graphs create an impression that the gap in
employment between treated counties with deep and shallow banking sectors closes
after the pipeline launch. It is consistent with the idea that counties that responded
earlier may reduce employment and focus on maintenance of new wells, while coun-
ties that respond with a delay aggressively increase employment during the drilling
stage.
To draw more rigorous conclusions about the possible catching-up process we
analyse the significance of coefficients Post × Treat and Post × Treat × Bank in
regressions 2.1 and 2.2.
Measuring employment in levels after the pipeline launch
We go back to the results based on the treated counties (Bakken sample) pre-
sented in Table 2.4. First we focus on the estimates in the left panel that use
employment scaled with its pre-event mean as a dependent variable. The response
after the pipeline launch is different than after the announcement. All counties in-
crease employment as the coefficient on the Post dummy is positive and significant.
It suggests that financial constraints in counties with limited access to local banking
have been alleviated, and firms in these counties are able to respond to opportunities
arising from better transportation options.
The role of local banking after actual cash flows increase is ambiguous. It is not
obvious whether counties with better access to financing still drill more intensively
because the conclusions depend on the adopted banking measure. The coefficient
on Post×Bank dummy is insignificant in the first column, but big and significant
29We do not take a stand on the actual size of additional cash flows relative to expectations
formed at the announcement, and we assume it is a second-order effect compared to actual money
flowing in that would not change the direction of the impact. Theoretically, however, this could
be either a positive or a negative surprise, which would reinforce of damped the effect.
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at 5% level in the second column. The latter implies that deep financial markets
are important even when firms’ internal funds increase. Insignificance, on the other
hand, does not mean that local banking does not play a role anymore since firms
in counties with deep financial markets could simply finalise their projects. We do
not aim to make a stand when counties with better access to financing should stop
their investment. Both continuous drilling and finalising the investment are possible
scenarios and do not contradict the view that local banking impacts development.
The results accounting for other shocks in the triple difference setting are pre-
sented in Table 2.5, left panel. The coefficients on the interaction on Post× Treat
and Post × Treat × Bank are positive but insignificant. It seems that we lack
power for this estimation. When we do not differentiate counties by banking in the
post-launch period, the impact of the launch in the treated counties is positive and
significant. These estimates are included in the Appendix (Table B.2). It implies
that after the launch all affected counties, irrespective of the development of the
local banking, increase their employment. Given the results, we cannot, however,
determine whether the investment in the post period is mostly driven by counties
that could not react earlier due to financial constraints.
There are three factors that may justify low power. Firstly, the post-launch pe-
riod is very short. This is something we cannot improve on because the employment
data are not available for some states after year 2014, and, more importantly, the
period of relatively stable and high oil prices finishes in 2014. Secondly, the graphi-
cal analysis suggests the reaction of affected counties with shallow banking is slow.
Furthermore, the distinction between counties with and without access to exter-
nal financing may be irrelevant because counties which started investment around
the announcement do not have to necessarily finish it completely by the time the
pipeline is launched.
The results for the dependent variable scaled with population are presented in
the right panels of Tables 2.4 and 2.5. The reported outcomes lead to very different
conclusions. The employment in the oil sector on average drops post-launch and
increases in counties with better access to financing. This variable, however, has a
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long right tail and is sensitive to how the data are winsorized. There are several
counties in which the oil sector is very important and they may blur the results.
For this reason we look at the results in the right panel with caution. Scaling by
population does not allow to abstract from the importance of the oil sector in the
county. Scaling with the pre-event mean employment is preferred since it allows to
compare the condition of the oil sector before and after the event irrespective of its
relative size.
Measuring employment in changes after the pipeline launch
Since the launch of the pipeline does not imply that counties with better ac-
cess to financing need to stop all the investment, the employment patterns in the
post-period may be captured more accurately by employment changes. Even if em-
ployment in all treated counties increases, it is likely that counties in which there
was little action in anticipation of the launch try to make up for the time lost by
waiting for financing.
In the region affected by the reversal (Bakken) the initial positive impact of the
announcement in counties with deep banking sector seems to be reversed following
the launch of the pipeline (Table 2.6). This reversal is not significant though. The
results confirm, however, that in the post period the increased investment takes
place in counties with shallow banking sectors. The coefficient on the Post dummy
is positive significant at 5% level. Relative to counties with better financing options
that responded at the announcement changes in employment are slightly smaller
(0.13 vs 0.081).
The results based on the extended sample (Bakken and Niobrara) are incon-
clusive (Table 2.7). They are consistent in terms of signs, but insignificant. The
coefficient on the interaction Post × Treat is significant at 10% level in the right
panel, where changes are scaled with the county population.
The provided results confirm that the advantage of counties with deep banking
sector that can respond instantly to the intertemporal cash flow shock is temporary.
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The impact of the launch in affected counties does not differ depending on the local
banking. All affected counties increase employment, even though coefficients are not
significant in some specifications. We did not manage to clearly discern the reaction
in the affected counties with shallow banking sectors which would further support
the hypothesis that local banking is crucial for economic development. However,
the graphical analysis and the results from the previous subsection provide pieces
of suggestive evidence that catching-up indeed takes place, but is more difficult to
measure due to possible delays and instability in the oil sector that starts playing a
role in the later quarters.
2.6 Robustness checks
In this section we test the robustness of the results. We focus on two dimensions:
event time and sample composition. In the first step we want to check that the
project announcement and realization indeed determine the periods of major changes
in the investment activity of oil producing firms measured by employment. Second,
we do a placebo test to evaluate how often random treatment status and deep
banking sector assignment produce significant results.
2.6.1 Conditional trends
To analyse the employment in counties over time and pin down the timing of
employment reaction we run a series of regressions in which time variables Interimt
and Postt are replaced with time dummies and plot interaction terms between these
dummies, Treati and Banki. For the dependent variable based on employment in
levels we use quarterly time dummies. For the dependent variable based on changes
in employment we use year dummies to capture the annual averages. The average
each year is calculated staring from the second quarter so that the specification
fits the event time structure. The sample length is adjusted so that each dummy
captures four quarters. Such regressions allow us to track changes in economic de-
velopment over time and identify when they exactly occur. Most importantly, we
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expect no significant movements before the event.
The results for the employment measured in levels are presented in Figure 2.7 for
the affected counties only (Bakken), and in Figure 2.8 for extended sample (Bakken
and Niobrara). Top panels present the effects of common movements of employ-
ment in all affected counties. Bottom panels present the additional movements of
employment in the affected counties with good access to external financing. The
patterns are very similar in both samples. On average, there is no reaction in the af-
fected counties until the project is finalised. Coefficients are oscillating around zero.
Shortly after the launch there is an increase and estimates are positive. The plotted
errors are big but we attribute this to the fact that we estimate many coefficients
based on a relatively small sample. The pattern for affected counties with better
access to local banking confirms the previous conclusions. There is an observable
increase in employment after the project announcement which fades away shortly
after the pipeline launch. The temporary response suggests that firms were able
to finalise the investment around the anticipated date of the pipeline flow increase.
The response to the announcement may be delayed by one quarter. It is possible
that firms do not respond as quickly as in the end of June 2011 to the news that
arrived in the end of April 2011.
What raises some concerns is the weak trend in the pre-announcement period
observed in the affected counties with access to local banking. It is significant in the
triple difference specification. Since we consider it unlikely that the announcement
was anticipated, it may suggest that some other shocks affected these counties as
well. We think, however, that it is a result of imperfectly measured trends in the
pre-announcement period. We discuss this issue further in the following paragraph
when we employ our second development measure.
The results for the employment measured in changes are presented in an ana-
logical manner in Figures 2.9 (Bakken) and 2.10 (Bakken and Niobrara). In general
the plots confirm that affected counties with access to external financing increase
employment after the announcement and before the project launch, and this pattern
is reversed in the post-launch period. In the extended sample, the increase after the
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announcement is very close to zero though. Counties without good financing options
respond only in the post-launch period. As opposed to the measure of employment
in levels, there are no concerns about the pre-announcement trend. In the two years
before the announcement, when a possible pre-trend was observed in the employ-
ment measured in levels, the coefficients are stable and close to zero. It confirms our
claims that the previously observed trend is not due to possible shock to counties
with better developed local banking sectors.
Overall, the movements in employment in the oil sector in response to the an-
nouncement of a new pipeline development project and after its realization are con-
sistent with the previous results. However, the analysis suffers from the noisy data
and a short sample which is reflected in the low power and changing significance of
the coefficients.
2.6.2 Placebo test
We run regressions on the artificial sample where the treatment status and the
values of banking measure are assigned randomly. The assignment aims to pre-
serve on average the structure of the original sample in terms of proportions of
treated counties and counties with deep financial markets. We run regressions 2.1
and 2.2 on the artificially categorized sample of counties 100 times. We then count
how many times the coefficients on the variables measuring the response of em-
ployment in the affected counties with deep banking sectors (Interim× Bank and
Interim × Treat × Bank) are significant at 5% level. If the standard errors are
calculated correctly and the documented increase in employment is indeed in re-
sponse to the project announcement and possible only in counties with access to
external financing, then coefficients should not be significant more than 5% of time.
The dependent variable is scaled with its pre-event mean. We focus only on the an-
nouncement because this is the main event of interest in this analysis that is crucial
for the causal inference about banking and economic development.
In the sample that comprises of counties affected by the reversal (Bakken) when
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the development is measured with employment in levels the coefficient is insignifi-
cant in 64% cases. The analogical rejection rate for the extended sample (Bakken
and Niobrara) equals 97%. The latter is consistent with the predictions and jus-
tifies the adopted division between treated and control counties and counties with
deep/shallow local banking sectors. The former number shows the significance in
over 30% of cases, which as a stand-alone results raises serious concerns. The most
likely reason is that standard errors in this sample are underestimated due to lack of
clustering. We did not introduce clustering because with a small number of clusters
the intra-group correlation is underestimated. The percentages of insignificant es-
timates when placebo test uses measure of employment in changes equals 73% and
96% for the difference-in-differences and triple difference regressions respectively.
The results of the placebo tests emphasize that caution is needed in evaluation of
results based on the affected region only. Still, we consider the baseline results to be
informative because they are very consistent with the triple difference specification,
which does not suffer from the underestimated standard errors.
2.7 Conclusions
In the paper we employ a unique setting to analyse the role of local banking in
economic development. We are able to disentangle the causal impact of the existing
banking network from the fact that more productive regions attract banking devel-
opment. Lack of reverse causality in our setting comes from the specific structure of
the studied intertemporal cash flow shock. The news about the shock arrives four
quarters before the cash flows increase and the associated uncertainty is resolved.
The announcement creates incentives for firms to respond. Banking network, on the
other hand, cannot expand in the most productive regions because the productivity
is not revealed before the shock is realized.
The main finding of the paper confirms that local banking is important for eco-
nomic growth. Lack of local banking sector increases financial constraints of the
firms and delays job creation in the oil sector. Counties hit with the news about
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future improvement of cash flows respond only if they have easy access to external
financing. We believe that in the oil industry employment may proxy for investment
because drilling new wells requires more labour input than maintenance of existing
wells.
The investment opportunities created by the shock do not disappear if they are
not exploited straight away. This feature allow us to study how firms time their in-
vestment. We find that firms in counties that are also exposed to the positive shock,
but do not have good financing options respond to it with a delay. More specifi-
cally, they respond when the anticipated increase in cash flows occurs and reduces
financial constraints itself. Therefore local banking facilitates economic growth not
only via provision of financing, but also because it helps optimizing the timing of
investment.
Geographical closeness in our setting is helpful because investment opportunities
in the oil industry are difficult to assess. Local presence may provide additional ex-
pertise and increase willingness to lend to oil producers. While this setting is rather
specific, geographical proximity may be also useful when information asymmetry
between entrepreneurs and lenders is particularly severe. In such situations local
banks are more likely to build long-term relationships with borrowers.
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Division of the U.S. into Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts
(PADDs).
Notes: This figure shows U.S. Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts. Source: EIA.
Figure 2.2: Crude oil price indices gap as percentage of Brent.
Notes: This figure shows the gap between WTI and Brent oil price indices as a percent of the
Brent price. Source: Bloomberg.
119
Figure 2.3: Major interstate oil pipelines connecting PADDs 2 through 4.
Notes: This figure shows the two main shale oil production regions analysed in the paper -
Bakken and Niobrara - and the relevant pipeline structure. Arrows show the direction of the
oil flow. Pipelines of significant/limited capacities are shown in black/beige. The pipeline invest-
ment project discussed in the paper is shown in orange. Source: Own work based on EIA data
sources.
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Figure 2.4: The impact of Seaway pipeline reversal on oil transport between PADDs.
Notes: This figure shows the amounts of oil transported from districts including Bakken (PADD2)
and Niobrara (PADD4) over time. Source: EIA.
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Figure 2.5: Employment in the oil sector over time.
Notes: This figure shows employment in the oil sector by treatment status and banking devel-
opment over time. Employment is defined as the employment in the oil sector measured at the
end of a quarter and scaled with its pre-event mean. The underlying time series are adjusted for
quarterly seasonality and detrended using pre-event trend estimates separate for the treated and
control counties.
Figure 2.6: Employment changes in the oil sector over time.
Notes: This figure shows employment in the oil sector by treatment status and banking develop-
ment over time. Employment is defined as the quarterly change in employment in the oil sector
measured at the end of a quarter and scaled with its pre-event mean. The underlying time series
are adjusted for quarterly seasonality.
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Figure 2.7: Time trends in the affected region (Bakken): Employment levels.
Notes: This figure shows the treatment effect (the impact of local banking) over time. The depen-
dent variable is defined as the employment in the oil sector measured at the end of a quarter and
scaled with its pre-event mean. The underlying time series are adjusted for quarterly seasonality
and detrended using pre-event trend estimates. The banking sector depth is evaluated based on
the Branches metric (defined in Section 2.4.1). The dashed lines distinguish the pre-announcement
period from the post-announcement period and the pre-realization period from the post-realization
period. Sample: counties with limited oil transportation options and affected by the new pipeline
project (Bakken region); 2010q1–2013q2. Data are winsorized in the right tail at 1% level.
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Figure 2.8: Time trends in the extended sample (Bakken and Niobrara): Employ-
ment levels.
Notes: This figure shows the treatment effect (the impact of local banking) over time. The de-
pendent variable is defined as the employment in the oil sector measured at the end of a quarter
and scaled with its pre-event mean. The underlying time series are adjusted for quarterly season-
ality and detrended using pre-event trend estimates separate for the treated and control counties.
The banking sector depth is evaluated based on Branches metric (defined in Section 2.4.1). The
dashed lines distinguish the pre-announcement period from the post-announcement period and the
pre-realization period from the post-realization period. Sample: counties with limited oil trans-
portation options (Bakken and Niobrara regions); 2010q1–2013q2. Data are winsorized in the right
tail at 1% level.
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Figure 2.9: Time trends in the affected region (Bakken): Employment changes.
Notes: This figure shows the treatment effect (the impact of local banking) over time. The de-
pendent variable is defined as the quarterly change in employment in the oil sector measured
at the end of a quarter and scaled with its pre-event mean. The underlying time series are ad-
justed for quarterly seasonality. The banking sector depth is evaluated based on Branches metric
(defined in Section 2.4.1). The dashed lines distinguish the pre-announcement period from the
post-announcement period and the pre-realization period from the post-realization period. Sam-
ple: counties with limited oil transportation options and affected by the new pipeline project
(Bakken region); 2004q1–2013q2. Data are winsorized in the right tail at 1% level.
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Figure 2.10: Time trends in the extended sample (Bakken and Niobrara): Employ-
ment changes.
Notes: This figure shows the treatment effect (the impact of local banking) over time. The de-
pendent variable is defined as the quarterly change in employment in the oil sector measured at
the end of a quarter and scaled with its pre-event mean. The underlying time series are adjusted
for quarterly seasonality. The banking sector depth is evaluated based on Branches metric (de-
fined in Section 2.4.1). The dashed lines distinguish the pre-announcement period from the post-
announcement period and the pre-realization period from the post-realization period. Sample:
counties with limited oil transportation options (Bakken and Niobrara regions); 2004q1–2013q2.
Data are winsorized in the right tail at 1% level.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: County summary statistics.
p50 mean sd
population 8962 44487.4 111436.7
area [sq mi] 2056.0 2377.3 1760.0
density 4.10 82.9 426.0
employment in oil sector 471.8 1898.8 3896.0
employment in oil sector / population 0.033 0.056 0.057
oil production 49089.3 428812.2 1117295.0
bank branches 1 8.25 19.8
loans (thous) 98696 12831336.4 19024731.9
loans per capita (thous p.c.) 14.6 436.2 1008.5
bank assets (thous) 855917 108205464.0 158603936.2
assets per capita (thous p.c.) 152.6 3759.8 8724.4
counties 105
treated 37
deep banking 65
Notes: This table shows county summary statistics. Employment in the oil sector and oil pro-
duction are calculated as the averages over the period 2008q2–2011q1. The other time-varying
variables are fixed one year before the reversal announcement (2010q2).
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Table 2.4: Employment after announcement and realization of the new pipeline
project: Affected region (Bakken).
Scaled with employment Scaled with population
Branches Loans Assets Branches Loans Assets
Interim -0.049 -0.047 0.099 -1.02∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗ 0.61
(0.073) (0.061) (0.067) (0.23) (0.25) (0.48)
Interim x Bank 0.38∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.20∗ 3.06∗∗∗ 3.32∗∗∗ 0.49
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.62) (0.72) (0.74)
Post 0.27∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.37∗∗∗ -1.54∗∗∗ -1.20∗∗∗ 1.06∗
(0.11) (0.093) (0.090) (0.24) (0.29) (0.55)
Post x Bank 0.10 0.30∗∗ -0.11 4.05∗∗∗ 4.24∗∗∗ -0.49
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.69) (0.81) (0.82)
County FE X X X X X X
Obs 518 518 518 518 518 518
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of local banking on employment in the oil sector after
the announcement and the realization of the new pipeline project. The specification is presented
in Equation 2.1. The dependent variable is defined as the employment in the oil sector measured
at the end of a quarter and scaled with its pre-event mean/population. The time series are
adjusted for quarterly seasonality and detrended using pre-event trend estimates. The dummy
Bank identifies counties with better developed local banking sectors. Each column evaluates the
local banking sector based on a different metric: Branches, Loans or Assets (defined in Section
2.4.1). The dummy Interim identifies the period between announcement and launch. The dummy
Post distinguishes the pre-realization period from the post-realization period. Standard errors
are robust. Sample: counties with limited oil transportation options and affected by the new
pipeline project (Bakken region); 2010q1–2013q2. Data are winsorized in the right tail at 1% level.
Coefficients and standard errors in the right panel Scaled with population are multiplied by 100.
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Table 2.5: Employment after announcement and realization of the new pipeline
project: Extended sample (Bakken and Niobrara).
Scaled with employment Scaled with population
Branches Loans Branches Loans
Interim -0.018 -0.029 -0.056 -0.12
(0.051) (0.044) (0.087) (0.100)
Interim x Bank -0.076 -0.065 -0.17 -0.075
(0.055) (0.049) (0.15) (0.16)
Interim x Treat -0.031 -0.018 -0.97∗∗∗ -0.69∗
(0.091) (0.075) (0.35) (0.35)
Interim x Treat x Bank 0.45∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 3.24∗∗ 3.39∗∗
(0.20) (0.23) (1.37) (1.62)
Post -0.13∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗ -0.68∗∗
(0.060) (0.056) (0.13) (0.29)
Post x Bank -0.12∗ -0.089 -0.50∗ 0.11
(0.065) (0.060) (0.26) (0.33)
Post x Treat 0.40 0.34 -1.24∗∗ -0.51
(0.28) (0.23) (0.52) (0.78)
Post x Treat x Bank 0.22 0.39 4.56∗∗ 4.13∗
(0.37) (0.37) (2.01) (2.39)
County FE X X X X
Obs 1470 1470 1470 1470
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of local banking on employment in the oil sector after
the announcement and the realization of the new pipeline project. The specification is presented
in Equation 2.2. The dependent variable is defined as the employment in the oil sector measured
at the end of a quarter and scaled with its pre-event mean/population. The underlying time series
are adjusted for quarterly seasonality and detrended using pre-event trend estimates separate for
the treated and control counties. The dummy Bank identifies counties with better developed
local banking sectors. Each column evaluates the local banking sector based on a different metric:
Branches or Loans (defined in Section 2.4.1). The dummy Treat identifies counties affected by the
new pipeline project (Bakken). The dummy Interim identifies the period between announcement
and launch. The dummy Post distinguishes the pre-realization from the post-realization periods.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Sample: counties with limited oil transportation
options (Bakken and Niobrara regions); 2010q1–2013q2. Data are winsorized in the right tail at
1% level. Coefficients and standard errors in the right panel Scaled with population are multiplied
by 100.
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Table 2.6: Employment changes after announcement and realization of the new
pipeline project: Affected region (Bakken).
Scaled with employment Scaled with population
Branches Loans Branches Loans
Interim 0.027 0.026 0.19 0.21
(0.032) (0.027) (0.15) (0.14)
Interim x Bank 0.13∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.043) (0.21) (0.22)
Post 0.081∗∗ 0.060∗ 0.25∗ 0.19
(0.040) (0.033) (0.13) (0.13)
Post x Bank -0.044 -0.010 -0.022 0.094
(0.049) (0.047) (0.22) (0.24)
County FE X X X X
Obs 1368 1368 1368 1368
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of local banking on employment in the oil sector after
the announcement and the realization of the new pipeline project. The specification is presented
in Equation 2.1. The dependent variable is defined as the quarterly change in employment in the
oil sector measured at the end of a quarter and scaled with its pre-event mean/population. The
underlying time series are adjusted for quarterly seasonality. The dummy Bank identifies counties
with better developed local banking sectors. Each column evaluates the local banking sector based
on a different metric: Branches or Loans (defined in Section 2.4.1). The dummy Interim identifies
the period between announcement and launch. The dummy Post distinguishes the pre-realization
from the post-realization period. Standard errors are robust. Sample: counties with limited oil
transportation options and affected by the new pipeline project (Bakken region); 2004q1–2013q2.
Data are winsorized in the right tail at 1% level. Coefficients and standard errors in the right panel
Scaled with population are multiplied by 100.
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Table 2.7: Employment changes after announcement and realization of the new
pipeline project: Extended sample (Bakken and Niobrara).
Scaled with employment Scaled with population
Branches Loans Branches Loans
Interim -0.0026 -0.00090 -0.011 -0.065
(0.017) (0.015) (0.040) (0.070)
Interim x Bank 0.0093 0.0074 -0.011 0.086
(0.018) (0.016) (0.065) (0.076)
Interim x Treat 0.030 0.027 0.20∗ 0.27∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.11) (0.13)
Interim x Treat x Bank 0.12∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.62∗
(0.059) (0.067) (0.30) (0.34)
Post 0.027∗ 0.019 0.053 -0.045
(0.015) (0.014) (0.036) (0.065)
Post x Bank -0.025 -0.014 -0.12∗ 0.039
(0.017) (0.016) (0.064) (0.076)
Post x Treat 0.054 0.041 0.20∗ 0.23∗∗
(0.045) (0.038) (0.11) (0.11)
Post x Treat x Bank -0.019 0.0034 0.099 0.055
(0.055) (0.053) (0.19) (0.21)
County FE X X X X
Obs 3952 3952 3952 3952
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of local banking on employment in the oil sector after
the announcement and the realization of the new pipeline project. The specification is presented
in Equation 2.2. The dependent variable is defined as the quarterly change in employment in
the oil sector measured at the end of a quarter and scaled with its pre-event mean/population.
The underlying time series are adjusted for quarterly seasonality. The dummy Bank identifies
counties with better developed local banking sector. Each column evaluates banking sector based
on a different metric: Branches or Loans (defined in Section 2.4.1). The dummy Treat identifies
counties affected by the new pipeline project (Bakken). The dummy Interim identifies the period
between announcement and launch. The dummy Post distinguishes the pre-realization from the
post-realization periods. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Sample: counties
with limited oil transportation options (Bakken and Niobrara regions); 2004q1–2013q2. Data are
winsorized in the right tail at 1% level. Coefficients and standard errors in the right panel Scaled
with population are multiplied by 100.
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2.10 Appendix
Table B.1: List of counties.
County State Treatment status Banking
development
Adams County CO 0 1
Arapahoe County CO 0 1
Boulder County CO 0 1
Broomfield County CO 0 1
Cheyenne County CO 0 0
Delta County CO 0 1
Denver County CO 0 1
Elbert County CO 0 1
Fremont County CO 0 1
Garfield County CO 0 1
Gunnison County CO 0 1
Jefferson County CO 0 1
Kit Carson County CO 0 0
Larimer County CO 0 1
Lincoln County CO 0 0
Logan County CO 0 1
Mesa County CO 0 1
Moffat County CO 0 1
Morgan County CO 0 1
Prowers County CO 0 0
Rio Blanco County CO 0 1
Routt County CO 0 1
San Miguel County CO 0 1
Washington County CO 0 1
Weld County CO 0 1
Yuma County CO 0 1
Decatur County KS 0 0
Gove County KS 0 0
Greeley County KS 0 0
Logan County KS 0 0
Rawlins County KS 0 0
Scott County KS 0 0
Sheridan County KS 0 0
Sherman County KS 0 0
Thomas County KS 0 1
Wichita County KS 0 0
...
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County State Treatment status Banking
development
Big Horn County MT 1 1
Blaine County MT 1 0
Carbon County MT 1 1
Daniels County MT 1 0
Dawson County MT 1 1
Fallon County MT 1 0
Glacier County MT 1 1
Hill County MT 1 1
McCone County MT 1 0
Musselshell County MT 1 0
Pondera County MT 1 0
Powder River County MT 1 0
Richland County MT 1 0
Roosevelt County MT 1 0
Rosebud County MT 1 1
Sheridan County MT 1 0
Stillwater County MT 1 1
Teton County MT 1 0
Toole County MT 1 1
Valley County MT 1 0
Yellowstone County MT 1 1
Billings County ND 1 0
Bottineau County ND 1 1
Bowman County ND 1 0
Burke County ND 1 1
Divide County ND 1 1
Dunn County ND 1 1
Golden Valley County ND 1 0
McHenry County ND 1 1
McKenzie County ND 1 1
McLean County ND 1 1
Mercer County ND 1 1
Mountrail County ND 1 1
Renville County ND 1 1
Stark County ND 1 1
Ward County ND 1 1
Williams County ND 1 1
Chase County NE 0 1
Cheyenne County NE 0 1
Dundy County NE 0 0
...
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County State Treatment status Banking
development
Frontier County NE 0 0
Hitchcock County NE 0 0
Kimball County NE 0 0
Lincoln County NE 0 1
Morrill County NE 0 1
Red Willow County NE 0 1
Scotts Bluff County NE 0 1
Albany County WY 0 1
Big Horn County WY 0 0
Campbell County WY 0 1
Carbon County WY 0 0
Converse County WY 0 0
Crook County WY 0 0
Fremont County WY 0 1
Goshen County WY 0 1
Hot Springs County WY 0 0
Johnson County WY 0 1
Laramie County WY 0 1
Lincoln County WY 0 0
Natrona County WY 0 1
Niobrara County WY 0 0
Park County WY 0 1
Platte County WY 0 1
Sheridan County WY 0 1
Sublette County WY 0 1
Sweetwater County WY 0 1
Uinta County WY 0 1
Washakie County WY 0 1
Weston County WY 0 0
Notes: This table lists counties in the sample by treatment status and by banking development.
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Figure B.1: Counties by treatment status and banking development (Branches).
Notes: This figure shows a map of counties categorized by treatment status and banking develop-
ment. The banking measure is based on the number of branches of commercial banks in a county
(details in Section 2.4.1).
Figure B.2: Counties by treatment status and banking development (Loans).
Notes: This figure shows a map of counties categorized by treatment status and banking develop-
ment. The banking measure based on the amount of commercial loans granted in a county (details
in Section 2.4.1).
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Figure B.3: Counties by treatment status and banking development (Assets).
Notes: This figure shows a map of counties categorized by treatment status and banking devel-
opment. The banking measure based on the assets of commercial banks in a county (details in
Section 2.4.1).
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Figure B.4: Detrending: Residuals vs Fitted values
Notes: This figure shows residuals and fitted values for the regression yiyq = θ0Trendy +
θ1TrendyTreati + ηiyq. i denotes counties, y years and q quarters. The dependent variable is
defined as employment in the oil sector at the end of a quarter scaled with its pre-event mean.
The time series do not include county-specific quarterly fixed effects. Sample: 2010q1–2010q4.
Figure B.5: Detrending: Residuals over time
Notes: The figure depicts residuals over time for the regression yiyq = θ0Trendy +
θ1TrendyTreati + ηiyq. i denotes counties, y years and q quarters. The dependent variable is
defined as employment in the oil sector at the end of a quarter scaled with its pre-event mean.
The time series do not include county-specific quarterly fixed effects. Sample: 2010q1–2010q4.
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Table B.2: Employment after announcement and realization of the new pipeline
project: Extended sample (Bakken and Niobrara), alternative specification.
Scaled with employment
Branches Loans
Interim -0.054 -0.054
(0.047) (0.040)
Interim x Bank -0.018 -0.020
(0.051) (0.045)
Interim x Treat 0.036 0.081
(0.10) (0.089)
Interim x Treat x Bank 0.35∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(0.13) (0.13)
Post -0.21∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028)
Post x Treat 0.53∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18)
County FE X X
Obs 1470 1470
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: This regression shows the impact of local banking on employment in the oil sector after the
announcement and realization of a new pipeline project. The specification is presented in Equation
2.2 but the impact of banking is measured only in the Interim period. The dependent variable is
defined as the employment in the oil sector measured at the end of a quarter and scaled with its pre-
event mean. The underlying time series are adjusted for quarterly seasonality and detrended using
pre-event trend estimates separate for the treated and control counties. The dummyBank identifies
counties with better developed local banking sectors. Each column evaluates the local banking
sector based on a different metric: Branches or Loans (defined in Section 2.4.1). The dummy
Interim identifies the period between announcement and launch. The dummy Post distinguishes
the pre-realization from the post-realization period. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level. Sample: counties with limited oil transportation options (Bakken and Niobrara regions);
2010q1–2013q2. Data are winsorized in the right tail at 1% level.
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Chapter 3
Firm behaviour after R&D
breakthroughs.
3.1 Introduction
Innovation is the force underlying growth and social welfare. Research and de-
velopment process is, however, lengthy, costly and risky. The uncertainty is not
resolved until the project is finalised, and cash flows are generated only conditional
on success. Hence popular corporate finance questions may be answered differently
in the context of R&D-intensive firms, and the topic of innovation attracts a lot of
literature.
The analysis of unrealized innovation involves uncertainty, agency problems
and financing (for example, Holmstrom (1989), Acharya and Subramaniam (2009),
Manso (2011)). Realized innovation opens discussion about patenting and protec-
tion, which motivate innovators and are relevant for policy makers (for example,
Klemperer (1990), Aghion and Tirole (1994), Lerner (1994)). However, to better
understand the innovation process it is also interesting to look at the moment when
the uncertainty is positively resolved. Successful completion of an R&D project is
a one-time positive breakthrough event in a tedious process of developing a new
product. An R&D success has the features of a rare random shock - it is uncertain
whether and when it will occur. On the other hand, for a firm that continuously
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engages in research, it is also a necessary condition for survival in the medium hori-
zon. It is not obvious how such an event translates into firm’s strategy focused on
long-term value maximisation.
In this paper I propose a new measure of an R&D breakthrough and analyse its
impact on firm’s strategy. An R&D breakthrough creates a windfall of investment
opportunities. A company has a wider portfolio of projects to choose from and,
more importantly, better access to external finance. The latter improves because
innovation success signals profitability and may be used as a form of collateral. I
test how successful completion of innovation process affects firm’s investment and
financing choice.
I base my study on the data from the pharmaceutical industry and define an
R&D breakthrough as regulator’s consent to introduce a new oncology treatment
method to the market. The consent is granted by Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) in the form of the approval. I study firm’s strategy in the four quarters fol-
lowing the approval relative to the four previous quarters. I compare the strategy of
a successful firm in a difference-in-differences setting using as a control group other
companies in the last stage of the development process. Complicated regulations
in the pharmaceutical industry make approvals, and, what is more important, the
timing of approvals, uncertain and unpredictable. Therefore companies engaged in
the last stages of clinical trials in each quarter are assumed to be randomly sorted
into treatment and control groups. To ensure this assumption is likely to hold I
control for firms’ observable characteristics.
I find that companies that obtain the FDA approval increase their capital expen-
diture relative to other innovative companies in the last stage of an R&D process.
The increase within a year amounts to around 2% in terms of company’s assets.
There is no evidence that firms change their research and development expense,
cash holdings and short-term investments or debt-equity ratio. Lack of response of
debt and cash suggests that innovative firms in the last stages of a research and
development process do not suffer from financial constraints. Therefore the increase
in investment measured by capital expenditure is not likely to result from better
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financing options. New investment also does not aim to replace the finalised inno-
vation in the production pipeline because research and development expense does
not change.
The main contribution of the paper is to evaluate innovativeness with FDA ap-
provals for new oncology treatment. This measure constitutes an alternative to
the patent-based measures of innovativeness, which are often applied in the litera-
ture (for example, Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), Lerner, Sorensen and
Stro¨mberg (2011), Howell (2017)). There are several reasons why my measure should
be more accurate and precise compared to obtained patents and citations. Firstly,
approvals identify only successful research and directly translate into real money.
Filed patents do not guarantee that the product is marketable in future and are
not informative when a patented subject may bring profits. Secondly, patent filings
provide different effective marketing rights protection and profits depending on how
quickly a product is marketed. Therefore the level of protection they guarantee is
not homogeneous across firms and subjects of the patent filings. It is true even for
products from the same industry. Last but not least, several patents can be filed
on one product. Hence the same innovation may be unnecessarily counted multiple
times. Furthermore, even though a measure based on approvals is more closely re-
lated to the economic success, it is not affected by external economic conditions as,
for example, demand shocks.
Company’s strategy after a positive or negative shock has been widely studied in
the context of investment. Several authors analyse it in the quasi-natural experiment
environment (for example, Blanchard et al. (1994), Lamont (1997), Rauh (2006))
and confirm the hypothesis that external capital markets are imperfect, contrary to
the model of Modigliani and Miller (1958).
The above studies, however, do not focus on R&D-intensive companies. Such
companies may behave differently because innovation is a lengthy process, marked
with high uncertainty, which is not resolved even in the final stage of the devel-
opment process (Nanda, Younge and Fleming (2013)). In such environment it is
particularly difficult to raise debt. Even if companies could convince lenders about
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the profitability of the project they may not want to do so to avoid information
disclosure (Thakor and Lo (2015)). Hence alternative forms of financing play an
important role and financing R&D investment constitutes a separate stream of lit-
erature. Nanda, Younge and Fleming (2013) investigate the role of venture capital
in financing R&D. Howell (2017) analyses the role of grants in financing innovation
and finds that financing support increases the probability of success.
In my paper I study the strategy of an R&D-intensive firm after a specific positive
shock to investment opportunities, i.e. successful completion of innovation. Similar
exercise is done by Phillips and Sertsios (2014) who also examine a positive shock
to investment opportunities in the innovative industry. In the context of public and
private companies producing medical devices, they document that publicly traded
firms after a positive shock to investment opportunities increase their external fi-
nancing and subsequent product introductions more compared to private firms. My
sample consists only of publicly traded firms, but I do not find any change in financ-
ing decisions induced by the shock. I follow companies only one year after the R&D
breakthrough though, while Phillips and Sertsios rely on a three-year observation
window arguing that financing activity can last up to two years.
My study is also related to the literature about predictability of the research
potential. Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2012) claim that firm’s ability to innovate
is predictable but this predictability is ignored by market participants. To measure
R&D efforts and abilities they rely on patent database. In my paper I claim that
companies cannot predict the timing of the FDA drug approval, but it does not
necessarily contradict their findings. Firstly, I account for company’s fundamentals
and research efforts. Secondly, I take into account specific characteristics of the
pharmaceutical market and look at projects close to completion.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 I characterise the research and
development process in the pharmaceutical industry. I pay attention to complicated
regulations that induce even more uncertainty. The data collection process is de-
scribed in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 I present the methodology. The empirical
results are summarised in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Innovation in pharmaceutical industry
3.2.1 General overview
Pharmaceutical industry has several specific features. From the social perspec-
tive, it is an important area of research that brings significant benefits to public
health. On the other hand, it is potentially very profitable. It forms the largest
market in the United States reaching around $300 billion is terms of sales and ac-
counting for about 36% of sales globally as of 2009. What is more, once a product
is on the market, the operational risk related to its sale is relatively small. The
development process that brings a new treatment to the market is itself crucial.
Even though both society and companies are interested in new treatment methods,
the market has to be thoroughly regulated to ensure safety of the drugs available to
patients. In addition, regulations defining patent protection and market exclusivity
rights motivate inventors to engage in the most costly and/or uncertain research
studies for the sake of patients.
Out of all medical conditions, the area of oncology gains on relevance most
rapidly. As presented in Figure 3.1, cancer is the second leading cause of death as
of 2013. The difference between the first and second cause is small (32% to 30%)
and has been getting smaller over the years. People have significantly improved pre-
vention and treatment of heart illnesses, while the area of oncology is still a great
challenge. Furthermore, oncology treatment becomes more urgent as the number of
patients increases. It requires long-term studies as the true treatment effects often
can be assessed only after a few years. Despite the intensified research efforts there
is no cure and the uncertainty about effectiveness of a treatment for an individual
patient is very big. Summing up, among various medical research topics oncology is
one of the most costly ones, for which successes are rare and which brings massive
benefits to society. These are the reasons why getting approval to introduce an on-
cology treatment can be perceived as an R&D breakthrough for a company engaged
in pharmaceutical innovation.
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3.2.2 Food and Drug Administration regulations
This section describes procedures that have to be fulfilled before a new drug is
made available to patients. The aim of the overview is to explain the difficulties
faced by innovators in the pharmaceutical industry, especially in the last stages of
an R&D process.
To get approval for a new drug in the United States a company has to go through
several stages of studies. Firstly, it has to test the safety of a drug in preclinical
trials before it can be used on humans.1 Once a drug is considered safe enough, a
company may start clinical trials in order to assess its safety and efficacy on real
patients.
Clinical trials involve at least three phases.2 Phase III trials are the most crucial
studies carried out on the large samples of patients to prove the efficacy.3 The de-
velopment process may be also shorter if a company obtains an accelerated approval
designation.4 This allows a company to present the results based on surrogate end-
points which are markers able to predict final clinical benefit.5
Clinical trials have to be formally registered. For serious and life-threatening
conditions the requirement to submit basic information about clinical trials was in-
troduced in 1997.6 In 20077 FDA clarified the requirements for registration8 and
also set penalties for non-compliance. This law allows me to identify companies
1The information gathered in this phase is summarised in Investigational New Drug (IND)
application that is submitted to Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
2Probabilities of going through subsequent trials can be found in for example Krieger and
Ruback (2001).
3Phase I trials are to determine the safety and dosing of a drug on healthy volunteers. Phase
II is carried out on sick patients to further learn about the safety of a drug and get first results
about its efficacy. The trials are sometimes extended and include phase IV. These are carried when
the drug is already approved and marketed to confirm the results from previous trials. Sometimes
a company commits to phase IV actions in other circumstances, for example, to compare it with
other drugs, to monitor long-term influence or to analyse cost-effectiveness.
4They are granted for drugs that “treat serious conditions, and that fill an unmet medical need”
(FDA guidelines).
5Accelerated approval application may be submitted without results from phase III clinical
trials. The practice shows that majority of accelerated approvals rely on phase II trials only
(George (2003)).
6FDA Modernization Act.
7Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA).
8Formal registration is necessary for applicable clinical trials. Generally, studies that meet the
definition of phase 1 are not applicable drug clinical trials.
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aiming to introduce a new oncology drug to the market.
If a drug passes phase III trials, a company can ask for approval by submitting
a New Drug Application (NDA) or Biologics License Application (BLA) if a drug is
a biologic.9 FDA does not make public its negative decisions or clinical assessments
on which they are based.
Patents and exclusivity marketing rights can be granted to companies in order to
protect the innovation. Patents are issued by Patent Trademark Office (PTO) and
they exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention. They are granted
for 20 years10 from the issue date. As companies usually apply in the early stages
of the development process, the effective patent protection is much shorter. It is
possible to apply for the Patent Term Restoration (PTR) that extends the patent
life by up to five years. Patents and patent-citations constitute common measures of
innovativeness.11 While they may properly approximate company’s research efforts,
they do not accurately measure how the innovation translates to company profits.
Therefore they also do not capture breakthrough events of the innovation process.
Exclusivity became an important provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984.12
Exclusivity marketing rights are granted by FDA after the approval and equal three
to seven years13. Exclusivity period ensures that for a limited period of time a com-
pany that successfully finalised the development of an innovative drug is the drug’s
sole supplier. They provide a link between successful research process and profits.
The outlined protection is necessary because of competitors producing low-cost
9Biologics are usually made from a variety of natural sources (human, animal or microorganism).
Biologics are regulated by Center for Biologic Evaluation and Research (within FDA).
1017 years before 1995.
11Examples of papers using patent-based metrics of innovation include, for example, Lerner,
Sorensen and Stro¨mberg (2011), Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2013), Chemmanur, Loutskina and
Tian (2014), Fang, Tian and Tice (2014), Tian and Wang (2014), Bernstein (2015), Bernstein,
Giroud and Townsend (2016), Howell (2017), Balsmeier, Fleming and Manso (2017), and many
others.
12Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Act of 1984
13Five years for New Chemical Entities (NCEs) (New Chemical Entity is a drug that contains
no active moiety that has been approved by the FDA in any other application submitted under
section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act), three years for other products and
seven years is for Orphan Drugs (drugs for so called rare diseases for which patient populations
are small and one cannot expect that the costs of developing the drug will be recovered within
seven years following the approval).
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generic drugs.14 The process of getting approval for a generic equivalent drug is
much easier, quicker, less uncertain and cheaper.15 A company has to prove only
that its product is bioequivalent with respect to pharmacokinetic and pharmacody-
namic properties, i.e. performs in the same manner. This can be often proved by
measuring how much of the active ingredient reaches the bloodstream in a specific
time period. In general, generic and branded counterparts are equivalent and prod-
uct positioning in the case of treatment of serious diseases is limited. Introduction of
generic drugs to the market increases the competition. From the social perspective it
is beneficial because it speeds up the drug production process and provides low-cost
treatment methods. From the perspective of the innovator, however, it once again
emphasizes the importance of the FDA approval because this limited period shortly
after the approval is the period when the company is rewarded for its innovativeness.
3.2.3 Timing uncertainty
Carrying clinical trials does not guarantee a success. Even if a company relies
on promising early results and has secured financing there is always uncertainty if a
drug will be marketable. Applications for FDA approvals are made for less than 20%
phase III studies (Krieger and Ruback (2001)) and even conditional on filing there
is no certainty about the approval. It introduces randomness into the selection with
regard to which companies get the approval and related benefits of the monopolistic
sales. However, this it not the only source of randomness in the approval process.
Conditional on knowing the new drug is marketable there is still uncertainty when
it is introduced to the market because of the lengthy, multi-stage approval process.
After promising results of the last-stage clinical trials a company submits an ap-
plication for the FDA approval. When the application is submitted FDA has 60 days
14A generic product is “one that is comparable to an innovator drug product in dosage form,
strength, route of administration, quality, performance characteristics and intended use” (FDA
guidelines).
15A generic drug a company has to submit and Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA),
which usually does not require carrying out any preclinical or clinical trials. As generic drugs
can be marketed only after the patent and exclusivity periods expire, FDA may grant tentative
approval if the drug is ready earlier. It delays the final approval until exclusivity issues are resolved.
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to accept it for review and 74 days to communicate to a company any significant de-
ficiencies of the application. In this initial phase it is also decided whether a review
gets priority review status and whether fees related to the process are paid, waived
or exempted.16 Priority is granted if a drug introduces “significant improvements in
the safety or effectiveness of the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of serious con-
ditions when compared to standard applications.”17 It affects the approval process
since FDA dedicates all attention and resources to evaluate such drugs.
After the application is accepted for review, FDA has the goal to review 90%
of incoming original NDA and BLA applications within 10 months.18 The review
clock can be extended by three months if needed. During the review process FDA
may issue letters when it needs assistance and further information to carry out the
assessment. These letters may change the review time goal if there is a considerable
amount of information that has to be provided by a company.
The review process can be sped up if a company obtains a fast track 19 or break-
through therapy20 status. The fast track designation makes the company eligible for
more frequent meetings with FDA or sending completed sections of the NDA/BLA
application before the whole form is completed (rolling review). The breakthrough
therapy status offers additionally more intensive guidance since the early stages of
clinical trials.
The initial application is often rejected. FDA authorities may provide guidelines
about additional tests that has to be done which may require additional, costly
trials. If a company decides to work further on the drug it may resubmit the appli-
cation once again or more if necessary. The review clock goals for resubmissions are
16A priority status is considered for each application, but may be also requested by a company.
17FDA guidelines.
18Source: https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ ucm118925
(2007).
19The fast track approvals are designed to facilitate development of drugs to “treat serious
conditions and fill an unmet medical need” (FDA guidelines). The request for the Fast Track
designation can be done at any stage of the development process and FDA has 60 days to deliver
the decision.
20Breakthrough Therapy designation is designed to expedite the development drugs for a serious
condition for which preliminary clinical evidence “indicates that the drug may demonstrate sub-
stantial improvement over available therapy on a clinically significant endpoint” (FDA guidelines).
To obtain a designation the company has to submit a request before the end-of-phase-II meetings
and FDA has 60 days to deliver a decision.
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shorter and depending on the type of resubmission equal two or six months.
As outlined above, the timing of the review process is uncertain and difficult to
predict. It involves several stages that take various times, can be extended or inter-
rupted. Drug’s indication and status also play a significant role. Additionally, the
process often involves resubmissions. Based on these characteristics in my analysis I
assume the FDA approval cannot be predicted in the medium horizon of one or two
years. Therefore an innovative firm does not know when the drug will be introduced
to the market and cannot act before the final decision is made. The approval comes
as a random windfall of investment opportunities.
3.3 Data sources and main variables
3.3.1 Data
Clinical Trials
I collect the data on clinical trials from the website ClinicalTrials.gov,21 which
gathers information about all trials conducted around the world. I focus on clinical
trials for oncology drugs carried out during the period from 1997 to 2014.22 The
dataset theoretically includes all research studies conducted in the chosen period be-
cause, as described in Section 3.2, trials for treatments of serious or life-threatening
conditions, including the whole area of oncology, are subject to mandatory registra-
tion. I consider only not recruiting, closed, phase III trials because they are the last
step before a company can file for the FDA approval.23
Each observation in the data set refers to a separate study. I keep only studies
sponsored by for-profit companies.24 I transform the database to get observations
21http://clinicaltrials.gov/
22Strictly speaking, drugs and biologics are different products. To simplify description, however,
I use the term drug for both drugs and biologics.
23The exception here are drugs with the accelerated approval status, which do not always require
phase III trials. These are rare situations, but theoretically some drugs qualify for the approval
application after phase II trials. Since they may be difficult to identify in the trials data, I do not
include them in my analysis.
24Other sponsor types include academic institutions, National Institutes of Health (NIH) and
other government institutions.
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at the firm-quarter level. A company is in the sample if it has carried out at least
one phase III clinical trial in the past two years. I drop companies after they are
acquired, privatised or go bankrupt. For each quarter I calculate firm’s research
effort which depends on the average number of phase III clinical trials conducted in
a quarter relative to firm size.25
Compustat, CRSP
Companies’ fundamentals for the relevant period are obtained from Compustat
North America, Compustat Global and CRSP databases. I restrict the sample to
listed companies because of the data availability. I drop joint ventures and sub-
sidiaries for which the fundamentals are available only for a parent company. The
rationale behind is that the strategy of a subsidiary in such a situation cannot be
tracked, while the strategy of a parent depends on more factors. I do not exclude di-
visions of the companies that appear under separate names. The distinction whether
a company truly is a subsidiary or just a division is made case by case for each com-
pany.
The variables of interest include capital expenditure, research and development
expense, cash and short-term investments and debt-equity ratio. Flow variables,
capital expenditure and research and development expense, are summed over four
quarters and scaled with company’s assets. The sum is taken to avoid problems
with seasonality which appears in the quarterly data of flow variables. I scale stock
variables, cash and short-term investments and debt-equity ratio, with company’s
assets and calculate the average over four quarters.
Other variables included in the analysis, firm size, debt and profitability, are used
to match similar companies. Size is calculated as natural logarithm of company’s
assets in the past four quarters. Debt is measured as the four-quarter average of
total liabilities scaled with total assets. Profitability is measured as the four-quarter
average of earnings before tax scaled with total assets. I also create a proxy for com-
pany’s origin. Dummy foreign equals one if a company is listed on the American
25Details in the Appendix.
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stock exchange, and zero otherwise. Detailed definitions of all relevant variables are
included in the Appendix.
I drop firms with negative equity in the past year. Equity is calculated as total
assets minus total liabilities. I also drop firms with negative capital expenditure,
negative research and development expense and negative cash and short-term in-
vestments.
FDA approvals
The list of approved oncology drugs is published on the National Cancer Institute
website.26 The details regarding the approvals can be found in the FDA database
(Drugs@FDA database).27 The database contains the whole history for each drug
including the initial approval, approvals of generic alternatives and all supplements
that introduce minor or major improvements. I focus on the initial approvals (NDA
or BLA) that bring an innovative drug to the market for the first time. These are
the approvals that required most research effort, are most uncertain, and in the case
of success give market exclusivity rights.
Information in the Drugs@FDA database dates back to 1939. I downloaded the
data for the period from 1997 to 2014, but this observation window is determined
by the availability of the clinical trials documentation. The main variables include
application number, approval date (day-moth-year), name of a company holding
the marketing rights, drug name, main active ingredient, marketing status, dosage
and strength, chemical type and review classification. For the sake of the analysis I
need the approval date and the name of the initial sponsor (applicant). Identifying
the applicant is not easy because the database is updated and shows the current
holder of marketing rights. This is often a different entity than the originator or
an application sponsor because of the frequent mergers and acquisition in the phar-
maceutical sector, and because the marketing rights can be sold. Determining the
initial sponsor is necessary because it is a company that carries the trials, obtains
26http://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/drugs#E, accessed in December 2014.
27The database does not contain entries about combinations of drugs or vaccines. Also, some
biologics regulated by the Centre for Biologics Evaluation and Research are not in the database.
152
the potential approval and benefits immediately after the FDA positive decision. To
uncover a company that was granted the approval I look at the original approval
letters that are available for almost all NDA applications.
Finally, I merge information about granted approvals with the dataset of com-
panies conducting clinical trials. I am able to match only 87 out of 143 approvals
granted in years from 1997 to 2014. This poor matching accuracy is a weakness of
the analysis. Firstly, it diminishes the sample of rare events and lowers the power
of the statistical tests. Secondly, some of the companies conducting clinical trials
may not be properly identified as treated. Such mistakes introduce additional noise.
Finally, if the unmatched data are systematically different, then the results would be
valid for the sample of the matched approvals only. I have not found confirmation,
however, that this could be the case.
One of the possible reasons of poor matching accuracy is that not matched ap-
provals were the ones with a special status and did not require phase III trials. It
seems unlikely though that so many approvals would fall into this category. Another
possibility is that some applications were filed by a different company than the tri-
als’ sponsor. Sponsors of trials usually work with collaborators, hence it is possible
that more companies are involved in testing. Unfortunately, the available data do
not allow me to determine what role a collaborator has in the trials. Therefore I
do not include collaborators in the sample. In general, the above issue is partially
alleviated by the matching procedure that allows me to account for observable differ-
ences between companies. I continue with the sample of 87 approvals. This number
further lowers to 73 due to lack of full financial data.
3.3.2 Sample summary
Subsequent approvals
Even though the data cover several years I look at the approvals through a two-
period window, i.e. I compare what happened in the year following and preceding the
approval. The quarter of the approval is included in the pre-event period. In general,
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I do not exclude companies from the sample after they get approval. Pharmaceutical
companies need constant innovation in order to grow and stay on the market. Hence
each approval is a huge success for a company, and firms cannot stay passive after
just one breakthrough. The approval can be perceived as a medium-term goal, and
in the long-term firms need to continue costly R&D efforts even when they already
have a drug on the market. Therefore as long as a company engages in clinical
trials, it is reasonable to assume that the FDA approval has an effect irrespective
whether it is a first or a subsequent one. I exclude, however, approvals that occurred
within four quarters of the previous approval. I call them overlapping approvals.
In such cases the pre-event period of the second approval overlaps with the post-
event period of the first approval. It is impossible to disentangle the effect of the
first approval and accurately measure firm’s strategy in the pre-event period of the
second approval. In a year before and after the approval the company also cannot
serve as a control company. I end up with 60 approvals in the sample.
Summary
The main sample consists of 3,494 firm-quarter observations. It is an unbalanced
panel of firms with a chance for approval in a given quarter. Dates span from 1997
to 2014 and and there are 159 distinct companies. The number of industry sponsors
of clinical trials was higher and equal to 303 in the clinical trials dataset. The ma-
jority (87) of the excluded companies were private firms for which the fundamentals
are not available. Other companies were excluded as subsidiaries or due to missing
data or unrealistic values reported as described in the previous paragraphs.
Table 3.1 presents the basic characteristics of the firm-quarter observations in the
sample.28 The data are presented at the firm-quarter level because in the subsequent
parts of the analysis the observations are matched based on firms characteristics and
date. The statistics can be intuitively viewed as weighted values in which bigger
weights are assigned to companies carrying out trials for longer.
28Analogical table based on the sample in which I do not exclude subsequent approvals is in the
Appendix (Table C.1).
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Firms in the sample differ a lot in terms of size and their spending. To smooth
the cross-sectional variability in firms’ assets, in the matching stage I measure the
size in terms of the logarithm. There is also variability in the number of trials that
companies carry out both in the absolute terms and relative to the firm size. Around
a third of companies are foreign (46 out of 159). The companies are highly levered
and many of them are unprofitable. This is the standard feature of innovative com-
panies, which have to bear large costs of the R&D process and can realize benefits
only upon successful project completion.
Out of 159 companies in the sample only 28 got approval, which constitutes less
than 18%. The frequency of the innovation breakthroughs is very small and amounts
to around 1.8%. It is much smaller than the percentage of successful companies. It
may be justified by a survivorship bias since companies failing the last stage of the
innovation process are less likely to continue operations and often go bankrupt or
are acquired by another entity.
Figure 3.2 presents the number of trials carried out by the companies in the
sample over time. The number of trials grows significantly since 1997 and stabilises
around 400 in a quarter. The plot shows only trials for new treatments in the area of
oncology. The increase in the number of ongoing studies may represent the growth
of the pharmaceutical research, but there are several other factors affecting the ob-
served pattern. Firstly, uncovering sponsors and matching trials with companies for
which financial data are available is easier for more recent trials. Secondly, regula-
tions to register studies of life threatening diseases were introduced in 1997, while
the requirement to register all studies was established in 2007. Even though trials
of oncology treatments theoretically should be registered from 1997 onwards, there
could be an adaptation period. Also, before 2007 there were no official penalties for
non-compliance. Finally, I focus on trials in which the main sponsor is a for-profit
company while the type of entities sponsoring clinical trials may change over time.
The same figure presents also the number of approvals granted to companies in the
sample. The red dots represent the number of approvals granted in a quarter if the
number is non-zero. The values vary from one to four per quarter. Approvals are
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evenly distributed over time with the exception of the initial period when they are
more rare. Overall, the documented pattern confirms that not only drug regulations,
but also the whole research environment changes over time.
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 Identification
The aim of the analysis is to evaluate the impact of an R&D breakthrough
on company’s strategy. It is measured in the sample of companies in the phase III
clinical trials for a new oncology treatment. The R&D breakthrough is defined as the
FDA approval to market a new oncology drug. Conducting last-stage clinical trials
exposes some firms to treatment because some of the firms obtain approval and some
not. I match observations in order to ensure that treated and non-treated companies
are similar. The matching methodology is described in detail in Section 3.4.2. The
treatment is assumed to be as good as random because of the uncertainty related
to the research process and, most importantly, because of the unknown timing of
approval described in Section 3.2.3. The related difference-in-differences regression
is specified as follows:
yiqt = αiq + αP × Postt + αPTPostt × Treatiq + iqt. (3.1)
yiqt denotes the dependent variable of interest for a company i in period t around
year-quarter q, in which a company got/could get approval. A company i is assumed
to be a different entity in every year-quarter q. The dummy Postt identifies pre-
and post-approval periods.29 αiq are firm-year-quarter fixed effects that capture
time-invariant effects. The dummy Treatiq is equal to one if a company i obtained
the FDA approval in year-quarter q. It is not included separately in the regression
29Companies in the control group did not get approval in a given quarter. t therefore denotes
potential approval time for these companies. In practice control companies are matched with
treated companies and I study the strategy of both entities around the time when the treated one
got approval. Matching is explained in detail the following paragraphs.
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because it is absorbed by αiq fixed effects. The regression is weighted after the
matching procedure to ensure covariate balance. The difference in the strategy
response between the treated and not treated entities can be interpreted as the
causal effect of the event (FDA approval) and is measured by αPT . Standard errors
are clustered at firm-year-quarter level.
I also consider an alternative specification where I directly identify matched
observations with fixed effects:
yigt = αg + αP × Postt + αTTreatig + αPTPostt × Treatig + igt. (3.2)
g identifies matched pairs. The dummy Treatig distinguishes between treated and
control observations within matched pairs. Standard errors are clustered at the pair
level.
The main assumption underlying the validity of my regressions states that time
effects in the treatment and control groups are the same. The idea behind is that
treated and control entities would have developed in the same way if not for the
event that randomly hits one of them. While all companies carrying out clinical
trials have chances for approval, the sample is very heterogeneous - firms differ
in size, access to financing and research pipelines. There is a concern that these
differences between companies are related both to the probability of treatment and
to the outcome variables. To ensure the identification assumption holds I match
treated and control companies based on several observables. The matching process
is described below.
3.4.2 Propensity score matching
The idea of propensity score30 comes from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) who
develop standard matching procedures. Propensity score itself is a conditional prob-
ability that an observation is going to be treated. It is conditioned on some vector of
30Review of matching on propensity score and alternative estimators of average treatment effects
can be found in Imbens (2004).
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observable variables X. The main conclusion regarding propensity score matching
is that it is equivalent to matching on the observables X. Hence instead of multi-
dimensional matching one can balance covariates in treatment and control groups
based on the propensity score.
Matching helps reducing bias related to observable characteristics. It does not
reduce the imbalance coming from latent covariates. For example, it does not resolve
the issue that some initiatives may have more potential than others. In my setting,
however, the imbalance in the latent variables is not the main concern because I look
at nearly completed studies. The least promising innovations are naturally filtered
out when a product passes subsequent development stages. A treatment that reaches
phase II or phase III clinical trial consistently confirms its potential for success and
it is reasonable to argue that determining whether and when a particular innovation
will be profitable is not possible. Even if there is some degree of predictability in the
FDA approval based on insider knowledge, the timing is unpredictable. Therefore
companies cannot adjust their strategies based on this knowledge.
The assumption justifying propensity score matching is that determinants of the
participation are known. I include the following observables as potentially affect-
ing the probability of treatment: being American/non-American company, number
of phase III clinical trials relative to firm size, debt, profitability and size.31 Be-
ing a foreign company is likely to affect the treatment probability because FDA
approvals regard the U.S. market only. American companies are more focused on
the U.S. market which may increase the probability of success. It may also imply
that American approvals are of different importance for foreign companies and thus
affect the outcome variables as well. The number of phase III clinical trials serves
as an approximation of the intensity of research efforts that directly lead to final
approval. It can also describe the maturity of company’s research pipeline. Debt
burden reflects firm’s financing situation and is likely to increase if a company has
been waiting long for another research success. Therefore it may indirectly measure
how close to an end of the development process a company is. The size of the taken
31These variables were described in Section 3.3.1. Definitions are included in the Appendix.
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debt would also affect company’s spending following the approval. Past profitability
and size are supposed to capture how experienced and successful a company is. It
is likely that bigger, older companies have already obtained approval in the past or
carried many other trials and are more likely to successfully finalise their research.
To account for time-varying regulations in the pharmaceutical industry and changes
in the research environment I enforce exact matching on the year and quarter. The
pool of possible matches for a treated company consists of companies that in a given
quarter conduct phase III clinical trials or conducted them in the past two years.
There are several ways to estimate the probability of treatment. The signifi-
cant part of the literature relies on the logit model, and Deheija and Wahba (1999)
show that logit estimates are quite accurate. I also employ a logistic regression
and match observation using the algorithm of Ho et al. (2007 and 2007b). For
each treated observation I search with replacement for two nearest neighbours in
terms of the propensity score. The practice shows that forcing either one or two
neighbours is optimal and minimises the mean squared error of the treatment effect
(Austin (2010)). I match only observations within a certain fixed distance called
caliper value (Cochrane and Rubin (1973)). Intuitively, it is easier to find matches
for treated entities with a wider caliper band. On the other hand, big differences
in the propensity score of the matched observations undermine the idea of compa-
rability of the matched observations. Setting the caliper value reflects the trade-off
between the bias of estimates, if the matched observations are not similar enough,
and the variance, if the number of successful matches is low. Austin (2011) provides
the optimal caliper value that takes into account both factors in the following form:
caliper = 0.2 · std.dev.
(
ln
(
PropensityScore
1− PropensityScore
))
(3.3)
I employ this formula in my analysis.
Propensity score matching has been recently criticized by King and Nielsen
(2018) who claim it is model dependent and involves a lot of random pruning,
which unnecessarily reduces the sample size. Propensity score matching, however,
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resembles the randomization within observations with a similar propensity score.
Therefore if covariates determine treatment, then matching improves the balance in
the covariates. This statement reiterates the assumption mentioned in the previ-
ous paragraphs necessary to rationalise propensity score matching. The critique is
more applicable to the one-to-one matching without replacement which is not the
procedure I adopt.
3.4.3 Matching results and validity
This section summarises the outcome of the matching procedure. Table 3.2 shows
the number of observations in the treatment and control groups. Out of 60 treated
firm-quarter observations one has not been matched. Depending on the outcome
variable, some observations may be further dropped if there are missing entries in
the financials. 106 out of 3243 control observations were matched. It implies that
some treated observations were matched with only one control observation.
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the propensity scores based on the treat-
ment status and matching success. The picture confirms that propensity scores in
the treatment and control groups are distributed along the supports that signifi-
cantly overlap. Figure 3.4 depicts histograms of the propensity score distributions.
Raw control group is dominated by companies for which the estimated probability of
treatment is very small. In the matched sample, both for the treatment and control
observations propensity score values are concentrated in the range of 0.04− 0.08.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show summary statistics of the raw and matched samples
by the treatment status. In terms of means, the differences between the treatment
and control groups disappear after matching. Comparing the differences in means,
however, is not sufficient (Basu, Polsky and Manning (2008)). Imai et al. (2008)
show that the more control observations are dropped from the sample, the more
likely that results of a t-test would falsely indicate an improvement in the balance
of covariates. A more accurate measure of balance is provided by quantile-quantile
plots of the treated and control groups. The idea, which comes from Stuart (2010),
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is that if the distributions of covariates are similar for the treated and non-treated
observations, then such a plot should resemble a 45-degree line. Figure 3.5 presents
quantile-quantile plots for all the covariates employed in matching. All the plots
indicate there is significant imbalance in the analysed observables in the raw sam-
ple. It is very pronounced in firm size and number of conducted trials. Matched
observations lie much closer to the 45-degree line.
Summing up, the matching improves the balance in terms of five observable char-
acteristics: origin, research effort, debt burden, profitability and size. The improve-
ment is visible in terms of the means and, more importantly, in the distributions
presented in the quantile-quantile plots. The obtained sample is used to estimate
regressions 3.1 and 3.2. I continue the analysis as if the propensity scores underlying
matching were known, not estimated. Since this is not true, it may introduce bias in
the standard errors as noted by Abadie and Imbens (2016). While there are guide-
lines how to correct errors in certain settings, there is no ready solution for every
scenario. Therefore I do not introduce any correction for propensity score estimation
acknowledging that the reported standard errors may be imperfectly measured.
3.5 Impact of R&D breakthroughs
FDA approval generates an increase in firm’s investment opportunities that is not
predictable. After a long development process innovators can finally monetise the
innovation. Such an event affects firm’s situation in several ways. Firstly, a firm has
to prepare the introduction of a drug to the market. Secondly, the new drug on the
market may trigger several follow-up studies.32 Thirdly, firm’s borrowing capacity
increases since selling new drug promises profits in the near future. Finally, firm’s
pipeline structure changes as one of the late-stage projects is completed. Overall,
the approval event changes the structure of the ongoing projects, the portfolio of
possible investments and the cost of financing.
32New treatments after initial introduction onto the market are often tested for different diseases,
doses forms etc. Studies for such follow-up approvals are simpler since at least the safety of the
drug is proved.
161
A wider choice of projects may affect investment. If a company needs to re-
structure its pipeline and immediately initiate a new research study, there should be
a change in research and development expense.33 Finally, if companies in the last
stage of clinical trials are financially constrained, the approval could result in higher
debt and lower cash holdings. R&D success lowers the cost of external financing
and the need for a safety buffer in the case of liquidity issues.
Capital expenditure
Table 3.5 presents the estimation results for regressions 3.1 and 3.2 with cap-
ital expenditure as the outcome variable. The coefficient on the interaction term
Post × Treat measures the causal impact of the FDA approval on firm’s capital
expenditure in the following four quarters. Companies that successfully finished
studies and expect to introduce a drug to the market increase the capital expendi-
ture relative to total assets by around 2%. The increase is significant at the 5% in
the regression with pair fixed effects and at 10% in the weighted regression. The
magnitude of the approval impact is big since the pre-approval average capital ex-
penditure scaled by assets in the sample amounts to around 6% as presented in
Table 3.1.
Not surprisingly, a positive shock to investment opportunities increases capital
expenditure. At this stage, however, it is not obvious what the increased capital
expenditure is earmarked for. It may be a temporary increase necessary to set up
manufacturing of a new drug. Alternatively, it may an investment in the long-term
assets to improve the research potential of a company. Finally, it may reflect under-
taking projects that were unavailable due to lack of financing.
The results also imply that companies tend to decrease their capital expenditure
33Another way of improving the pipeline structure is through acquisition. Pharmaceutical in-
dustry is characterised by frequent mergers and acquisitions. They often involve, however, private
companies which are not included in my sample. The number of cases when a company from my
sample is involved in M&A activity within a few quarters of the approval is very small. Therefore
M&A activity has not been explored further in the paper. The topic of incentives for acquisitions in
innovative industries has been discussed, for example, in Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) or Phillips,
Hoberg and Fresard (2018).
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over time. Coefficient on the Post is negative and significant. It may be a conse-
quence of the financial burden of the ongoing research trials that limits their other
activities.
Research and development expense
Table 3.6 presents the impact of the FDA approval on the subsequent research
and development expense. None of the coefficients in the regression is significant.
The companies that obtained the FDA approval do not increase their research expen-
diture. Lack of response suggests that research efforts do not depend on the timing
when the research milestones are reached. This supports the hypothesis that the
strategy of an R&D-intensive firm is long-term. This is true in the sample of firms
that survived until the final stages of the innovation process. Alternatively, new re-
search endeavours may be delayed since the assessment of the available new projects
is time-consuming. Companies may also choose to widen the research pipeline by
acquiring other entities at early stages of the innovation process.
The results also indicate that there is no difference in the research expense be-
tween treated and control firms. Significantly higher research and development
expense for treated firms would raise doubts about lack of predictability of the final
success. The coefficient on the dummy Treat is insignificant.
Cash and short-term investments
Table 3.7 summarises the impact of the FDA approval on company’s cash and
short-term investments. The results do not confirm that companies change their cash
holdings in the year following the approval. Since a firm after an R&D breakthrough
gets better access to external financing and a promise of future profits, its demand
for liquidity may go down if a firm was financially constrained. Lack of response of
cash and short-term investments implies that firms in the last stages of the research
and development process are not necessarily financially constrained.
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Debt-equity ratio
Analysing firm’s debt gives further insight about firm’s financial constraints.
Table 3.8 presents the changes in firm’s debt-equity ratio after the FDA approval.
Approval facilitates external financing because it constitutes a positive signal to
potential investors. However, I do not observe any changes in firm’s capital structure
after an R&D breakthrough. The treatment effect is negative, but insignificant. It
does not support the hypothesis that considered firms are financially constrained
and benefit greatly after an R&D breakthrough in terms of potential financing. This
finding, even though surprising, is consistent with my previous results regarding cash
holdings.
While irrelevance of financial constraints is one of the stories, there are other
explanations why the approval does not have significant impact on company’s capital
structure. Firstly, approval as a positive signal may facilitate debt financing and
encourage investors at the same time. If both debt and equity change, the overall
impact on the ratio is not obvious. Secondly, the effect may be heterogeneous among
firms and go in opposite directions depending on other factors. Finally, the impact
may be delayed and better financing opportunities are not realized immediately after
positive shock.
Overall, the results suggest that R&D breakthroughs measured with the FDA
approvals have limited direct impact on company’s actions. Even though these are
rare events with a potentially huge impact on company’s profits within the next
few years, they do not define turning points in companies’ strategies and innovators
seem to follow their long-term plans.
It is possible that successful R&D is not necessarily perceived by companies as
a one-time random shock like, for example, rare shocks in macroeconomic models.
It may resemble an event recurring with uncertain timing. Hence firms implement
long-term strategies knowing the breakthrough has to occur, but preparing for the
long and costly waiting for success. While this perception of marketable ideas is
not true in general, it may be true conditional on firm’s surviving on the market.
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Without successful R&D firms need to terminate operations or engage in M&A.
My findings also indicate that innovative companies are not necessarily finan-
cially constrained. These results are novel in the innovation literature, but may
be specific to my sample. I rely on public firms with research and development
projects close to completion after several stages of assessment. While it is early to
draw definite conclusions, it would imply that the analysed struggles with financing
innovation are relevant only in the initial stages of the process. This may be impor-
tant for policy makers who design incentives for research going in specific, socially
most desirable directions.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper I analyse the medium-horizon impact of the finalised research and
development process based on the example from the pharmaceutical sector. I use a
new measure of innovativeness and innovation success that relies on FDA approvals
of new oncology drugs. The main advantage of the measure is that it directly trans-
lates into real profits. I estimate difference-in-differences regressions on the sample
matched using propensity score.
I document significant changes in firm’s strategy following an R&D breakthrough
reflected in the capital expenditure measured relative to firm size. Companies in-
crease the capital expenditure in the four quarters following the FDA approval.
There are no differences in the research and development expense, cash and short
term investment and debt-equity ratio between companies that have obtained the
approval and other companies carrying out clinical trials.
Lack of changes in the capital structure and cash buffer suggest that firms in the
last stages of the research and development process are not financially constrained.
This may imply that companies that survived until the stage are ready to pursue
long-term strategies and continue with research studies until some of them prove
successful. The increase in capital expenditure is therefore not resulting from better
financing options, but from a wider choice of projects. However, new projects are
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not supposed to replace the finalised innovation since there is lack of response in
terms of research and development expense.
The main weakness of the analysis is the small sample size. Firstly, study con-
siders only listed companies. Secondly, many observations are lost during merging
information from different sources. It is a serious drawback because in rare events
studies any additional entry adds a lot of value.
Pharmaceutical industry is a broad and relevant environment focused on research
and development. Therefore the conclusions drawn in this paper can be extended
to other types of innovation-intensive industries.
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1: Leading death causes in 2013.
Notes: This figure shows leading death causes in 2013 in the U.S.
Figure 3.2: Phase III clinical trials and FDA approvals over time.
Notes: This figure shows the number of clinical trials (line) and FDA approvals (dot) for oncology
drugs conducted/obtained in years 1997–2014 by firms in my sample (for-profit companies with
available financial data). The approvals are presented only for non-zero values.
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Figure 3.3: Propensity score distribution by treatment and matching status.
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the propensity score in the raw and in the matched
sample and by treatment status. The matching methodology follows that of Ho et al. (2007).
Firm-quarter observations are matched based on size, debt, profitability, research effort, origin and
date. Variables’ definitions are in the Appendix. Sample: for-profit companies conducting clinical
trials for oncology drugs in 1997–2014.
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Figure 3.4: Propensity score histograms for raw and matched data.
Notes: This figure shows histograms of the distribution of the propensity score in the raw and
in the matched sample and by treatment status. The matching methodology follows that of Ho
et al. (2007). Firm-quarter observations are matched based on size, debt, profitability, research
effort, origin and date. Variables’ definitions are in the Appendix. Sample: for-profit companies
conducting clinical trials for oncology drugs in 1997–2014.
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Figure 3.5: Quantile-quantile plots for raw and matched data.
Notes: This figure shows quantile-quantile plots for the raw and the matched sample. The matching
methodology follows that of Ho et al. (2007). Firm-quarter observations are matched based on
size, debt, profitability, research effort (trials), origin (foreign) and date. Variables’ definitions are
in the Appendix. Sample: for-profit companies conducting clinical trials for oncology drugs in
1997–2014.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of companies conducting clinical trials.
p50 mean sd
total assets 471.0 82606.2 345902.1
total debt (scaled) 0.38 0.39 0.21
profitability (scaled) -0.020 -0.058 0.13
no of phase III trials 1 3.35 6.50
trials relative to firm size 0.11 1.18 2.40
capital expenditure (scaled) 0.040 0.060 0.070
r&d expense (scaled) 0.21 0.29 0.27
cash/short-term investment (scaled) 0.41 0.47 0.32
debt/equity 0.67 1.16 1.74
firm-quarter obs 3494
firms 159
foreign firms 46
firms with approval 28
approvals 60
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of for-profit companies conducting phase III clinical
trials in years 1997–2014. Companies in different quarters are treated as separate entities. Variables
of interest are defined as: size = average total assets in the past four quarters; total debt (scaled) =
average total liabilities over total assets in the past four quarters; profitability (scaled) = average
EBT over total assets in the past four quarters; trials relative to firm size = logarithm of one
plus number of trials over total assets; capital expenditure (scaled) = summed capital expenditure
over average total assets in the past four quarters; R&D expense = summed R&D expense over
average total assets in the past four quarters; cash/short-term investments (scaled) = average
cash and short-term investment over total assets in the past four quarters; debt/equity = average
total liabilities over equity in the past four quarters. Detailed definitions are in the Appendix.
Overlapping approvals are excluded as explained in Section 3.3.2.
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Table 3.2: Matched observations
Control Treated
All 3243 60
Matched 106 59
Unmatched 3137 1
Discarded 0 0
Notes: This table shows the number of matched and not matched observations by the treatment
status. The matching methodology follows that of Ho et al. (2007). Firm-quarter observations are
matched based on size, debt, profitability, research effort, origin and date. Variables’ definitions
are in the Appendix. Sample: for-profit companies conducting clinical trials for oncology drugs in
1997–2014.
Table 3.3: Covariate balance in raw data
Means Treated Means Control SD Control Mean Diff
distance 0.0509 0.0176 0.0254 0.0333
size 9.9103 6.6482 2.9642 3.2622
debt 0.5141 0.3937 0.2145 0.1204
profitability 0.0245 -0.0591 0.1287 0.0836
foreign 0.0500 0.2584 0.4378 -0.2084
trials 0.0905 1.2525 2.4654 -1.1620
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of companies in the raw sample. Variables’ definitions
are in the Appendix. Sample: for-profit companies conducting clinical trials for oncology drugs in
1997–2014.
Table 3.4: Covariate balance in matched data
Means Treated Means Control SD Control Mean Diff
distance 0.0512 0.0507 0.0245 0.0005
size 9.9251 9.5176 2.1311 0.4074
debt 0.5188 0.5096 0.1665 0.0092
profitability 0.0244 0.0307 0.0530 -0.0063
foreign 0.0508 0.0424 0.2024 0.0085
trials 0.0918 0.1163 0.4696 -0.0245
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of companies in the matched sample. The matching
methodology follows that of Ho et al. (2007). Firm-quarter observations are matched based on
size, debt, profitability, research effort (trials), origin (foreign) and date. Variables’ definitions are
in the Appendix. Sample: for-profit companies conducting clinical trials for oncology drugs in
1997–2014.
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Table 3.5: Capital expenditure after FDA approval.
Weighted Pair FE
Post -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0036)
Treat -0.0084
(0.010)
Post x Treat 0.019∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.010) (0.0075)
Firm x Year-Quarter FE X
Pair FE X
Obs 220 222
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of the FDA approval on the capital expenditure of a
firm. The specifications are presented in Equations 3.1 and 3.2. The dependent variable is defined
as summed capital expenditure in the four quarters over the average total assets in the period. The
matching methodology follows that of Ho et al. (2007). Firm-quarter observations are matched
based on size, debt, profitability, research effort, origin and date. Variables’ definitions are in the
Appendix. In the column Weighted the regression is weighted with the sampling weights obtained
during matching and standard errors are clustered at the firm-year-quarter level. In the column
Pair FE the regression includes fixed effects to identify matched observations and standard errors
are clustered at the pair level. Sample: for-profit companies conducting clinical trials for oncology
drugs in 1997–2014.
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Table 3.6: Research and development expense after FDA approval.
Weighted Pair FE
Post -0.0052 -0.0029
(0.012) (0.010)
Treat -0.0019
(0.014)
Post x Treat 0.00075 -0.0015
(0.013) (0.012)
Firm x Year-Quarter FE X
Pair FE X
Obs 210 212
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of the FDA approval on the R&D expenditure of the
firm. The specifications are presented in Equations 3.1 and 3.2. The dependent variable is defined
as summed R&D expenditure in the four quarters over the average total assets in the period. The
matching methodology follows that of Ho et al. (2007). Firm-quarter observations are matched
based on size, debt, profitability, research effort, origin and date. Variables’ definitions are in the
Appendix. In the column Weighted the regression is weighted with the sampling weights obtained
during matching and standard errors are clustered at the firm-year-quarter level. In the column
Pair FE the regression includes fixed effects to identify matched observations and standard errors
are clustered at the pair level. Sample: for-profit companies conducting clinical trials for oncology
drugs in 1997–2014.
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Table 3.7: Cash and short-term investments after FDA approval.
Weighted Pair FE
Post -0.0047 -0.0020
(0.012) (0.010)
Treat 0.0064
(0.025)
Post x Treat -0.0058 -0.0085
(0.018) (0.012)
Firm x Year-Quarter FE X
Pair FE X
Obs 318 322
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of the FDA approval on the cash and short-term in-
vestments of the firm. The specifications are presented in Equations 3.1 and 3.2. The dependent
variable is defined as average cash and short-term investments over total assets in the four quar-
ters. The matching methodology follows that of Ho et al. (2007). Firm-quarter observations are
matched based on size, debt, profitability, research effort, origin and date. Variables’ definitions
are in the Appendix. In the column Weighted the regression is weighted with the sampling weights
obtained during matching and standard errors are clustered at the firm-year-quarter level. In the
column Pair FE the regression includes fixed effects to identify matched observations and standard
errors are clustered at the pair level. Sample: for-profit companies conducting clinical trials for
oncology drugs in 1997–2014.
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Table 3.8: Debt-equity ratio after FDA approval.
Weighted Pair FE
Post -0.095 -0.086
(0.13) (0.10)
Treat 0.23
(0.35)
Post x Treat -0.11 -0.12
(0.28) (0.16)
Firm x Year-Quarter FE X
Pair FE X
Obs 318 322
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: These regressions show the impact of the FDA approval on the debt-equity ratio of the
firm. The specifications are presented in Equations 3.1 and 3.2. The dependent variable variable
is defined as average debt-equity ratio in the four quarters. The matching methodology follows
that of Ho et al. (2007). Firm-quarter observations are matched based on size, debt, profitability,
research effort, origin and date. Variables’ definitions are in the Appendix. In the column Weighted
the regression is weighted with the sampling weights obtained during matching and standard errors
are clustered at the firm-year-quarter level. In the column Pair FE the regression includes fixed
effects to identify matched observations and standard errors are clustered at the pair level. Sample:
for-profit companies conducting clinical trials for oncology drugs in 1997–2014.
176
3.9 Appendix
Definitions
The dummy i identifies time around the approval. (i = 0 denotes the quarter of
approval). The dummy t = 0 (t = 1) denotes pre- (post-) approval period.
Pre-approval controls:
size = ln
(
3∑
i=0
0.25 · totals assets−i
)
debt =
3∑
i=0
0.25 · total liabilities−i
total assets−i
profitability =
3∑
i=0
0.25 · EBT−i
total assets−i
trials = 100 · ln
(
1 +
number of phase III clinical trials0∑3
i=0 0.25 · total assets−i
)
foreign = 1company listed on the U.S. stock exchange
I winsorize the debt and trials measure in the right-tail at 0.5%. I also winsorize
profitability at 0.5%.
Dependent variables:
capext=0 =
∑3
i=0 capital expenditure−i∑3
i=0 0.25 · total assets−i
capext=1 =
∑4
i=1 capital expenditurei∑4
i=1 0.25 · total assetsi
R&Dt=0 =
∑3
i=0 R&D expenditure−i∑3
i=0 0.25 · total assets−i
R&Dt=1 =
∑4
i=1 R&D expenditurei∑4
i=1 0.25 · total assetsi
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cash/short-term investmentst=0 =
3∑
i=0
0.25 · cash/short-term investments−i
total assets−i
cash/short-term investmentst=1 =
4∑
i=1
0.25 · cash/short-term investmentsi
total assetsi
D/Et=0 =
3∑
i=0
0.25 · total liabilities−i
total assets-total liabilities−i
D/Et=1 =
4∑
i=1
0.25 · total liabilitiesi
total assets-total liabilitiesi
I winsorize capital expenditure and R&D expenditure values in the right-tail at
0.5%, and debt-equity ratio at 1% level. These refinements do not affect the results.
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Table C.1: Summary statistics of companies conducting clinical trials: With over-
lapping approvals.
p50 mean sd
total assets 850.5 77982.3 326290.5
total debt (scaled) 0.41 0.41 0.21
profitability (scaled) -0.0031 -0.048 0.12
no of phase III trials 1 4.66 8.48
trials relative to firm size 0.067 1.06 2.29
capital expenditure (scaled) 0.044 0.062 0.069
r&d expense (scaled) 0.17 0.27 0.25
cash/short-term investment (scaled) 0.34 0.44 0.32
debt/equity 0.74 1.21 1.79
firm-quarter obs 3936
firms 159
foreign firms 46
firms with approval 28
approvals 73
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of for-profit companies conducting phase III clinical
trials in years 1997–2014. Companies in different quarters are treated as separate entities. Variables
of interest are defined as: size = average total assets in the past four quarters; total debt (scaled) =
average total liabilities over total assets in the past four quarters; profitability (scaled) = average
EBT over total assets in the past four quarters; trials relative to firm size = logarithm of one
plus number of trials over total assets; capital expenditure (scaled) = summed capital expenditure
over average total assets in the past four quarters; R&D expense = summed R&D expense over
average total assets in the past four quarters; cash/short-term investments (scaled) = average
cash and short-term investment over total assets in the past four quarters; debt/equity = average
total liabilities over equity in the past four quarters. Detailed definitions are in the Appendix.
Overlapping approvals are not excluded.
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